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By 
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Abstract 
Kenya has increasingly been the focus of China's development assistance over the last 
decade. Thus, the country has received billions of dollars worth of aid from China to 
develop industries, expand infrastructure and encourage trade. Indeed, 'China's 
approach' to development assistance, as it has been termed, has been welcomed by the 
Kenyan government because it is viewed as a means to help the country improve its dire 
social and economic standing. However, the consequences have yet to be studied and the 
negative impact of China's approach has yet to be analyzed. As a result, the objectives 
this thesis include empirically establishing the implications of China's approach to 
official development assistance, merging trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
bilateral assistance, is having on Kenya. This thesis utilized a variety of complimentary 
methodological approaches in order to ascertain the implications of China's approach. 
The evidence to support this qualitative thesis is based on both primary and secondary 
sources. Throughout this thesis, I will argue that current trends all point to China's 
economic and geo-strategic needs rather than Kenya's developmental needs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Background: posing the problem 
Since 2000, Kenya has emerged as a large recipient of China's development assistance 
and consequently bilateral cooperation between the two countries has increased at a rapid 
pace. Accordingly, Kenya has received billions of dollars worth of development loans 
and grants from China to improve social development, expand infrastructure and 
encourage trade. To facilitate this expanding bilateral relationship, Kenya is home to the 
largest Chinese embassy, in terms of size and the number of staff, on the African 
continent (Onjala, 2008b, p. 4). The Kenyan government has actively sought and 
welcomed China's assistance because it is viewed as an antidote to the failed aid 
prescriptions of the West. The unique method employed by China to deliver its aid, 
commonly referred to as 'China's approach' to development assistance, is often presented 
as another means to help Kenya improve its dire social and economic standing. However, 
the consequences have yet to be studied and the negative impact of China's model has yet 
to be analyzed. Kenya, for instance, has a huge and growing trade deficit with China. 
Another dilemma has been that infrastructure aid is, in fact tied to the employment of 
Chinese companies and the use of Chinese-sourced materials. As a result, my thesis will 
study the implications China's approach to development assistance, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), and trade are having on Kenya. 
1.2: China's approach to development 
China promotes an approach to development that has three components (Onjala, 2008b; 
Taylor, 2009; Brautigam, 2009). The first aspect of China's development assistance to 
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Kenya encourages trade and accordingly, China's trade with Kenya has grown 
substantially (and continues to grow) over the last decade (CBIK, 2011). Kenya has 
increased the volume of commodities sent to China, in return for low-cost manufactured 
goods. The second characteristic encourages direct investments of Chinese companies in 
Kenya through state-backed loans. FDI from China has flowed into Kenya from both 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private Chinese enterprises. Examples of China's 
direct investment in Kenya include the creation of textile industries within Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs), Chinese vehicle companies opening assembly plants, and even 
the country's booming Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) sector is 
financed with the help of Chinese multinationals. The final component of China's 
approach directly allocates aid to certain projects, such as the construction of hospitals 
and schools, capacity building in areas such as Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), as 
well as agriculture, while another portion of the aid funds educational exchanges between 
the two countries (Kaplinsky, McCormick, & Morris, 2007, p. 32). These three 
intertwined elements of China's development assistance are promoted for Kenya to 
embrace. 
The theoretical core at the centre of China's foreign aid policy approach is the 
concept of'sovereignty'. This approach is heavily influenced by China's own experience 
as a developmental state. In contrast, the dominant Western model has increasingly 
focused on inserting and attaching numerous conditions on aid recipients so as to 
improve the development 'project'. As a result, the Western model fermented a backlash 
with many positing that these conditions infringe on developing countries' ability to 
choose their own development path. However, China emphasizes, within its foreign 
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policy, the idea of non-interference in the domestic politics of recipient countries, 
including the notion that each country is ultimately responsible for the path of 
development that it chooses (China, 2011). This includes allowing the recipient country 
to prioritize their development projects. With those core theoretical underpinnings, China 
emphasizes a 'win-win' relationship when it comes to the assistance that it gives 
developing countries. The 'win' for developing countries is a willing destination of 
traded goods, improved infrastructure and investment into the social sectors like 
education and health. The 'win' for China includes increased access to natural resources, 
access to more consumers for its goods, and most importantly international diplomatic 
support (Taylor, 2006). Parallel to these foreign policies is the 'Go Global' policy, which 
encourages Chinese companies to expand outside its own borders. All in all, China has 
become a significant player in the development arena. 
China's economic and political rise has shifted global discourse surrounding 
development. The global power dynamic is pivoting eastwards towards China. As a 
result, China has increasingly been projecting its political as well as economic power. 
China is now the world's second largest economy, with a growing middle class, fuelling 
China's insatiable appetite for natural resources. The African continent is one place that 
China has turned to address these needs. For these reasons, China has been building 
roads, ports and supporting agricultural initiatives all over Africa. In turn, African 
governments have been looking to China as an alternative to the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the Chinese state has been more willing to give 
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"soft" loans to African countries1. China has surpassed the World Bank as the largest 
donor to developing countries (PRI, 2011). These loans have been building everything 
from dams (e.g. Ethiopia) to railroads between Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi (Foster, 
Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak, 2008). Kenya is not an exception to the trend of turning 
towards China. 
1.3: Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are three-fold: firstly, to provide a snapshot of China's 
involvement in Kenya vis-a-vis bilateral cooperation; secondly, to critically assess 
bilateral cooperation between these two countries; and thirdly, to critically appraise the 
substantial criticisms levelled at Chinese international cooperation in Africa, and more 
specifically, in Kenya. One argument presented focuses on the lack of transparency in the 
aid agreements that have been signed between African states and China. The conditions 
placed upon the recipient country are not open to public scrutiny. The discourse usually 
portrays Sino-African relations in generally Western-centred terms. In this portrayal the 
West views Africa as a "moral cause" and China views Africa as a "business 
opportunity" (Mohan & Power, 2008, p. 26). Another criticism of Chinese involvement 
on the African continent has been viewed as part of a neo-colonial bond. Moreover, most 
discussions involving China usually portray it in terms of colonial dialogue such as 
'scramble', 'mad dash' and 'resource grab', among others (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & 
Power, 2010). While China's focus on providing infrastructure aid projects can be linked 
to their resource needs Chinese aid is nonetheless viewed to be more responsive and is 
1 The loans provided by China have lower interest rates, longer repayment schedule and are sometimes 
forgivable. 
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undertaken faster, although this is done at the expense of environmental and human rights 
concerns. Moreover, concerns about the flood of cheaper Chinese manufactured goods 
have had a negative effect on the industrial capacity of the African countries that have 
welcomed the Chinese aid. Another criticism is China's policy of non-interference into 
the host country's domestic politics and reification of sovereignty, which helps to stymie 
internal dissent in the recipient country. In the case of Kenya these same critical issues 
are raised by people both inside and outside of government. 
China and Kenya have had documented contact since the Middle Ages (Filesi, 
1972). However, China's influence declined with the arrival of colonialism on the shores 
of Kenya and East Africa. During this period, China itself went through a phase of 
retrenchment with Western forces surrounding China and containing it. This began to 
change, however, with the 1949 establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
Moreover, when communist China settled into power, the focus turned to supporting like 
minded causes around the world (Brautigam, 2009). Accordingly, a focus was placed on 
developing countries that were starting to gain independence during the 1960s. 
Concurrently, in the late 1950s Kenya witnessed an independence movement that had 
taken inspiration from Asian and other African countries. In 1963, Kenya won its 
independence from Great Britain, and shortly thereafter China diplomatically embraced a 
newly independent Kenya. 
1.4: Research focus 
Recently, Kenya has pivoted towards China to secure development assistance. Although, 
Kenya and China have had a cordial diplomatic relationship since 1960s, a major shift in 
how China granted development assistance in the 1990s came into effect — this was the 
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same period that China opened economically to the world. As a result, the way China 
provided aid to other countries placed its economic interests above all. Indeed, by the 
early 1990s, Kenya too was coerced by IFIs into dismantling barriers to trade, resulting in 
trade with countries such as China growing dramatically. By 2006, the pre-existing 
relationship with China was reinforced when the two countries signed a cooperation 
agreement with an emphasis on encouraging trade between the two countries. This is also 
the time when China's current development approach started to fully emerge; firstly, 
China's development strategy in Kenya focuses on encouraging trade. In fact, between 
2000 and 2010 trade has grown by a factor of more than ten times. Indeed by 2010, the 
amount Kenya imports from China has grown past $1.5 billion, while the Kenya's export 
to China slightly increased to $30 million (CBIK, 2011). More specifically, Kenya 
imports manufactured goods from China, while, on the other hand, it exports agricultural 
products such as teas, coffee, and cut flowers to China. The trade between the two 
countries has been growing at rapid rate, which is lauded by both the Kenyan and 
Chinese governments as proof that trade will help Kenya's economic advancement. 
Secondly, China's approach to development heavily promotes FDI as part of the 
'win-win' strategy. Kenya attracts a small but growing investment capital from China. 
Moreover, this is promoted as a good way for Kenyan companies to work together with 
Chinese companies to help promote the industrialization of the country (Onjala, 2008b). 
Additionally, China advances the idea that this element assists with the transfer of 
technology and industrial know-how to benefit Kenya, a consequence of the 2006 
agreement between Kenya and China signed when the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, 
visited Nairobi. Hence, China has encouraged many Chinese companies to setup shop in 
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Kenya ranging from car assembly, services, information and communication technologies 
(ICT) to the textile industry in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Another example has 
been Chinese oil companies which were, in 2006, given six blocks to explore for oil. In 
2007, another Chinese company bought into a titanium mineral mine for close to $10 
million in Rift Valley region (Onjala, 2008b). 
Finally, China's approach to development also includes development assistance. 
The main focus areas for Chinese assistance to Kenya have been geared towards 'turn­
key' infrastructure projects in Kenya, but to also build up capacities within the country 
through the building of schools, hospitals and education exchange programs. In the 2006 
agreement, China pledged to increase this component of its development approach 
(Onjala, 2008b). Within two years of this agreement being signed, China became one of 
Kenya's largest sources development aid. Joseph Onjala (2008b) noted "aid from China 
has become a very strong component of the foreign development assistance received in 
Kenya" (p. 39). In fact, China is now, according to 2012 Kenyan government 
development estimates, the largest bilateral donor to Kenya. 
1.5: Methodology 
This thesis will employ a variety of complimentary methodological approaches in order 
to ascertain the implications of China's approach to development assistance, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and trade with Kenya. The evidence to support the thesis is 
based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary research relies on informal 
interviews in Kenya in June and July 2012. This was followed up by semi-structured 
interviews administered through emails and telephone communications from December 
2011 to January 2012. Other primary documents that were taken into account included 
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government policy documents, archives, debates in the Kenyan parliament and both 
Kenyan and Chinese government press releases. Furthermore, secondary data was 
gathered from documentary reviews of surveys, news reports, as well as scholarly 
research publications. 
One methodology for this research was semi-structured interviews. Preliminary 
outreach was conducted in an informal manner over the summer months of June - July 
2011 in Kenya. During this phase of the research, I identified many issues perceived to be 
of great significance to understanding the relationship. Moreover, this approach was 
beneficial to the discovery of key informants who were then invited to become formal 
research participants for the interviews. As I started out I relied on the Nairobi-based 
Africa Economic Research Consortium (AERC) which extensively studies China's rise in 
Africa through in-depth country case studies. The AERC was helpful in identifying 
various Chinese-funded projects in the country and the policy implications of the 
relationship. Another organization that I collaborated with was the Institute for 
Development Studies at University of Nairobi, with the help of both Dr. Joseph Onjala 
and Dr. Dorothy McCormick, which also assisted in pinpointing key informants, 
particularly within the Kenyan state. These informal conversations were crucial to 
understanding the main issues surrounding the increased reliance on the Chinese model 
of development as it emerged in Kenya. Following the initial contact, key informant 
interviews were conducted via e-mail and/or telephone. The objective of these interviews 
was to include a broad segment of individuals from government, academia, and civil 
society. This research approach allows the research to assess if China's approach is 
gaining acceptance of policy and decision makers. 
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Key informants were chosen because they "have special knowledge on a given 
topic" (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 172) and therefore key informant interviews also "can 
provide insight about a particular topic" (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 172). The main goal of the 
key informant interviews was to get specific inputs from people who have direct 
knowledge about Chinese influence in Kenya. The importance of seeking out individuals 
directly linked to policy makers can better explain trends, opinions and understanding 
about this particular subject. The concept of chain interviews will be crucial to this 
methodology. Semi-structured and conversational interviews were employed for 
gathering data. As a rule, this methodology is employed since "questions emerge from 
the immediate context and when asked in the natural course of things; there is no 
predetermination of question topics or wording" (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 171). Moreover, 
this methodological approach was chosen because it allowed the research participants the 
freedom to explore the given subject. It is important to note that, while this method is 
hard to organise into clear data and hard to interpret, it was crucial to understanding the 
nuanced issues involved with Kenya's increased reliance on China's approach to 
development. 
Once identified, the research participants first received an e-mail message inviting 
them to be part of the research. Then, they were given the opportunity to either answer 
questions through e-mail or through direct telephone conversation. I contacted more than 
twenty potential interviewees, of those six participants responded through email and two 
research participants chose to reply through telephone. The interviewees included 
individuals from government agencies (six participants), academia (one participant) and 
civil society (more specifically a research institute) (one participant). The research 
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participants came from a cross-section of Kenyan government ministries and agencies; 
including the Ministry of Trade, the Treasury, and the Ministry of Planning. Government 
• j  
agencies included members of parastatal agencies such as the Export Promotion 
Council (EPC), the Kenya National Highway Authority, the Export Processing Zones 
Authority, and the Kenya Investment Authority. Other research participants included 
members from the Chinese embassy and the Kenyan High Commission in Ottawa. Due to 
their location in the 'West', the embassies provided a unique vantage point to the raging 
debate surrounding China's increasing role in Africa. In addition to answering basic 
questions about China's aid policies, the Chinese embassy in Ottawa assisted by 
providing internal policy documents, and they also helped in reaching out to China's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. The Kenyan embassy was particularly helpful in 
substantiating the divergence between Western and Chinese aid approaches. However, 
due to the sensitive nature and positions occupied by the interviewees, most of these 
interviews were conducted under the condition that I would neither reveal nor quote the 
people who spoke to me directly, so that they would feel free to speak candidly. 
Other research methods included a primary documentary review and an archival 
search in Kenya. These primary documents included national and global economic 
indicators. For example, government documents included the Statistical Abstract from 
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey of Kenya and the Development 
Expenditure Estimates. The documentary review will be used in such a way to further 
understand how the economy in the country functions. The objective of the documentary 
search is to find out through empirical evidence what China's impact on Kenyan society 
: Parastatals are arms-length government agencies such as state owned-corporations, and highway 
authorities. 
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might be. Moreover, the documentary review will not only focus on the specific sectors 
that are affected, but also provide an overall understanding of the influence of China in 
Kenya. 
One document of particular consequence was Kenya's Vision 20303; this 
document outlines the country's development agenda for the foreseeable future. This 
document is referenced throughout this thesis because it was often referred to by many 
interviewees. The objectives of this all-encompassing policy is summarised as "the 
national long-term development blue-print that aims to transform Kenya into a newly 
industrialising, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens 
by 2030 in a clean and secure environment" (Kenya, 2007, p. 1). The Vision has various 
economic and social pillars that have defined strategies and projects to help the entire 
country unlock its full economic potential and improve its development indicators 
(Otieno & Ndung'u, 2010, p. 43). Accordingly, the Kenyan government often refers all 
subsequent policies and laws back to their compatibility with the design outlined in the 
document. This document has also resulted in the creation of its own Ministry, the 
Ministry of Planning and National Development. This Ministry provided several 
documents for this research including all available yearly progress reports. Finally, the 
Ministry officials also sat down with me to explain how China is playing a role in 
Kenya's development objectives. 
Through the online portal Google Books, I was able to access the official debates 
occurring in the National Assembly of Kenya. The official parliamentary proceedings and 
records, also commonly referred to as Hansard, were accessed in a searchable format 
3 The Vision was created with the assistance of OECD's Development Assistance Committee, along with 
the World Bank, the IMF and various UN agencies. 
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through this portal. The debates occurring in parliament were a microcosm of the larger 
debate surrounding China's development approach in the country. It is important to note, 
the debates in parliament although illuminating, can be ill-informed and by their nature 
adversarial, and thus often may obfuscate the issues involved. Another source that was 
used in this thesis was Wikileaks, which added unique insights that otherwise were not 
publicly available. Wikileaks is a website which made classified documents from the 
U.S. embassy in Nairobi available to the public un-redacted. Some of the documents 
confirmed America's perspective on China's role in Kenya. The cables also provided 
new information relating to Chinese military-related activities in the country, as well as 
allegations of Chinese companies' corrupt practices in winning bids. Although diplomatic 
cables provided some additional information, it was decidedly for American domestic 
consumption which could be as biased. 
Existing data from surveys, universities and even local governments can be found 
throughout the documentary review (Perecman & Curran, 2006). This type of research 
also included looking at archives; although this was not the primary method used in this 
thesis. According to Sage encyclopaedia archival research is "defined as locating, 
evaluating, and systematic interpretation and analysis of sources found in archives" 
(Curting, 2004, p. 20). Some of the data contained in these types of documents include 
historical development assistance; but also bilateral items such as trade volume and 
people directly employed through trade with China. This gave me a more nuanced 
historical context of the impact of China on Kenya. Moreover, archives are a treasure 
trove of information, particularly related to the government policy documents. The 
archives provided a pattern that related to the research question and objectives. I was able 
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to gather insightful documents from the Kenya National Archives, including declassified 
agreements, secret cabinet committee meetings minutes and previous government 
policies. 
Other documents studied included the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators, the United Nations Development Programme's Development Cooperation 
Reports, well as the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. Particular attention was paid to 
documents with information on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). A definitive source of 
FDI data was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The 
information and data gathered from these documents was very helpful during the 
interview phase of the primary research. 
Due to the secretive nature of the relationship between the governments of Kenya 
and China, newspapers were secondary sources frequently utilized in this thesis, in 
conjunction with the other methods such as interviews. For various reasons, China does 
not publish official reports pertaining to its development assistance4. One way that China 
publicizes the aid that it grants is through newspapers, both local and official Chinese 
media. As a result, newspaper reports were frequently cited throughout this thesis. This 
thesis cited local newspapers such as the Daily Nation, the Business Daily, which along 
with allafrica.com (a pan-Africa news aggregate news website) proved invaluable. 
Chinese news dailies included People's Daily, china.org.cn as well as China's official 
news agency Xinhua. However, there are many risks associated with relying on 
newspaper accounts, as Brautigam (2009) notes "[jJournalists have given us quick 
sketches, but these impressions are often very partial, and sometimes, even in the best 
4 For comprehensive reasons as to why the government China is hesitant to publish its official foreign aid 
consult Alden (2009, pp. 22-23), Brautigam (2009, pp. 162-165). 
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newspapers, surprisingly wrong" (p. 20). This was backed up by many informants that I 
interviewed by relating to me that accounts printed in newspapers were often exaggerated 
and over-estimated the figures involved. 
This thesis has evolved since I first proposed it - it began as a comparison 
between the Western and Chinese approaches and how it was playing out in Africa by 
using Kenya as a case study. However, as the research progressed I decided to focus on 
only Kenya-China rather than partaking in the often adversarial dynamic that oftentimes 
pervades China's role in Africa. By focusing on the evidence on the Kenya-China 
relationship, this thesis would avoid the comparative dynamic often present when China's 
development is explored. As I started undertaking the research, the underlying 
assumptions that I initially started with including the idea that China's approach was 
fundamentally different from the dominant Western approach changed immediately after 
arriving in Kenya because the evidence suggested that it was similar in many ways. My 
original plan while in the country was to gather as many documents as possible that 
would outline the aid estimates that China granted. However, these documents were 
virtually impossible to get. I encountered various difficulties in obtaining bilateral 
agreements between the two countries; the only agreements were obtained from the 
national archives from at least thirty years ago, and the most current figures were 
obtained from the UNDP's Development Cooperation Reports, which ceased being 
published in 2006 as annual reports^. The other means that I gained authoritative aid 
figures was through individual interviews with Ministries and agencies officials. The FDI 
data was gained from various parastatals that sent me the information. Finally, the 
5 The UNDP's Development Cooperation Reports changed focus and now publish figures relating to the 
MDGs. 
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informal conversations with different officials in government painted a clear picture of 
China's development focus in which Kenya which has immensely influenced the 
objectives and outcomes of this thesis. 
However, secrecy was pervasive, with most government officials asking that no 
part of the conversations or interviews be used in the final thesis. I encountered the most 
resistance from Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which refused to even let me into 
the Ministry's building until a Permanent Secretary from another Ministry wrote a 
personalized note. The Permanent Secretary was particularly interested in my research 
topic. Once inside the Ministry's building, I returned on four different occasions without 
ever being granted any information - be it policy documents, bilateral agreements, or 
being granted an interview with any staff of the Ministry. I also tried contacting the 
Ministry though email and telephone without any success. This was in contrast to the 
other Ministries that assisted in identifying interview participants. 
In summary, the purpose of this research is to determine what impact China's 
approach to development is having on the Kenya. This research utilized key informant 
interviews, archival research, as well as primary and secondary documentary reviews. 
These research methodologies were chosen because they are designed to allow the full 
picture to emerge of how Kenya is impacted by the rise of China as a development 
partner. The three methods employed by this research paper will be marshalled to 
establish whether Kenya is benefiting or is being harmed by the Chinese model of 
development. 
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1.6: Structure of the thesis 
This thesis study is organized as such: the second Chapter will present the various 
theories on international development and international cooperation since the end of the 
Second World War. The second Chapter is organized into four sections - the first section 
will look at the dominant theoretical approaches in international development from 
development economics in the 1950s to the present post-Washington consensus. By 
tracing and placing the various theoretical debates in wider milieu, this Chapter hopes to 
expose the competing paradigms within development discourse in the global agenda. The 
second section examines the leading theories that have influenced China's international 
development agenda and how they have played in the wider world. The third section 
within this Chapter will then place the competing visions about the role of development 
in the east African context and finally by looking at how the various theories played out 
in the Kenyan praxis. 
The third Chapter begins by looking at the Kenya-China relationship through a 
historical lens. The relationship between the two countries has greatly influenced how the 
two countries interact with each other today starting with the pre-colonial era to post-
independence. The rest of the Chapter assesses China's development approach and then 
presents the data that reviews how each of the approach's components (trade, FDI, and 
aid) are playing out in Kenya. Further, the third Chapter provides examples of the 
direction of trade with China and where it is heading. Next, an analysis of China's FDI is 
studied and the economic sectors which have attracted Chinese investments highlighted. 
The final segment of this Chapter provides the evidence of development assistance from 
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China and which projects are funded though Chinese grants. All in all, this Chapter 
establishes a baseline understanding of the bilateral relationship. 
The fourth Chapter brings together the data collected from my field research 
along with Kenya's development policies and the scholarly debate surrounding China's 
role in the country. This Chapter aims to answer the central question of this thesis by 
looking at the relationship holistically - for instance, this Chapter identifies the 
challenges and opportunities that are presented by Kenya's 'look east' policy and what it 
means for its overall development objectives. Moreover, this Chapter identifies some of 
the negative impacts that Chinese competition is having on Kenya. Even so it also 
presents the positive trends that are linked to China's dramatic rise as Kenya's 
development partner. Ultimately, a framework of analysis is utilized in order to place the 
complimentary/competitive and direct/indirect aspects of the relationship into 
perspective. 
Finally, the fifth Chapter summarizes this thesis by presenting the main findings 
and offers brief a glimpse the direction the Kenya-China relationship is taking. Moreover, 
this thesis aims to identify the main areas of weakness in the relationship. However, this 
conclusion aims to stay away from offering an enchiridion of blanket recommendations 
but will instead target its recommendation in specific areas that the author believes would 
have a profound impact on Kenya's development objectives. 
1.7: Argument 
The central question that will guide this paper is: in what ways does China's approach of 
development assistance, foreign direct investment (FDI), and trade impact Kenya? A 
corollary question includes: what impact will Kenya's embrace of China's approach have 
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to its development policy? Throughout this thesis, I will argue that current trends all point 
to China's economic and geo-strategic needs having precedence in the bilateral 
relationship over Kenya's developmental needs. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1: International cooperation and development 
Since the end of the Second World War, international cooperation and international 
development have become intertwined6. One influential motivation behind international 
cooperation, guiding the relationship between developed and developing nations, has 
been international development. The Second World War was a watershed with regards to 
international cooperation; the international community recognized that increased global 
alignment was one way to avoid a similar catastrophic event in the future. Thus, the new 
project of international development, as devised by United States President Harry 
Truman, was designed to enhance the economic and social well-being of the entire 
worldwide population7. Today, international development is one of the defining features 
of global politics (Leys, 1996; Black, 2007). To that end, various overarching goals have 
been presented as to why development is beneficial for all countries. First, cooperation 
between rich and poor countries should improve humanity's condition. Second, 
'cooperative arrangements' would help achieve efficiency within the global economic 
system. These two social and economic ideals have been immensely influential in the 
overall development agenda (Garrett, 1992). Third, development assistance was tied to 
efforts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to gain influence over newly 
independent countries (Hunt, 1989). In order to achieve these goals; various bilateral and 
multilateral institutions were created to further the development project. 
6 For the purposes of this paper, development assistance after WW II will be explored. For the history of 
international development prior to WW II consult Cowen & Shenton (1995). 
7 For a comprehensive history of the development project see Leys, (1996); Martinussen, (1997); Mohan & 
Power, (2008) 
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Forums for dialogue along with institutions to facilitate dialogue were created and 
many argued that the world would become safer and could avoid future antagonisms 
through these mechanisms. The United Nations (UN) system along with its multitude of 
sister organizations came into existence and became entrenched in the overall 
international cooperation agenda. The multilateral mechanisms instituted under the UN 
were intended to help enhance global collaboration in such matters as trade, security and 
social protection (Martinussen, 1997). For instance, one of the guiding principles within 
the United Nations was the goal of employing the multilateral system to help develop the 
world. In the preamble of the UN charter was "to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom" and "to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples" (Fuhrer, 1996, p. 4). 
As a result, the UN system became one of the leading multilateral agencies to deliver 
international development. The many development agencies created through the UN 
system were tasked with defining, distributing and managing development assistance. 
The UN was one of the most prominent institutions for international cooperation, 
along with the Bretton Woods institutions that were created to help regulate the world 
economy which became the most visible purveyors of development assistance globally 
(Leys, 1996; Black, 2007). The World Bank gave loans that would help improve the poor 
economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was tasked with regulating capital 
flows and help short-term balance of payment issues that arose (Moss, 2007). 
Consequently, the World Bank and the IMF became the largest financier and donors to 
the developing countries (Black, 2007). 
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Another venue of delivering development assistance, in addition to the 
multilateral development agencies, is through bilateral agreements (direct country-to-
country agreements). Each developed country launched its own development agency that 
could also distribute the assistance. Examples of this are USAID in the United States, 
CIDA in Canada, and DFID in the United Kingdom (Moss, 2007). Consequently, the 
various agencies began to compete against each other, creating a multitude of methods of 
distributing, defining, and assessing development aid. As a result, one institution created 
as a way to help set the standards and track bilateral assistance was the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD, a grouping of the largest, capitalist, industrialised 
economies, became an important part of defining development assistance (Fuhrer, 1996). 
The OECD created an understanding of how and where the richest countries spent their 
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official development assistance (ODA) (Moss, 2007). Through the DAC, countries 
would declare all forms of aid including technical, grants, and loans they had provided to 
developing countries. 
Historically, development assistance - technical and financial aid granted to poor 
countries - were corollary to Western Europe's political decline, the United States and 
the Soviet Union ascendance to global supremacy, and most importantly, the 
transitioning of many colonies into independent states. It should be noted, however, that 
development itself can be traced further back to the Enlightenment period (Cowen & 
Shenton, 1995; Veltmeyer, 2001). During this period, many colonized countries 
8 ODA is, according to the OECD: "official transactions which are made with the main objective of 
promoting the economic and social development of developing countries ODA is non-military aid. 
Financial aid is given on 'concessional' terms" (OECD, 2012) 
21 
throughout much of Africa and Asia agitated for independence fuelled, in part, by strong 
nationalist movements that took inspiration from India's independence. Western 
countries, acknowledging that independence was inevitable, started the process of 
transferring sovereignty to the local populations9. One of the earliest examples of 
development assistance was the European Recovery Program (more widely known as the 
Marshall Plan) in which the United States granted massive monetary aid to war ravaged 
Western Europe (Sogge, 2002; Black, 2007). The success of the Marshall Plan in helping 
with the quick recovery of Western Europe was viewed as a defining moment in 
development discourse. With the successful Marshall Plan as an example, a similar 
strategy of delivering aid was employed to poor post-colonial countries (Fuhrer, 1996). 
Development of these former colonies was perceived to be the best way to integrate them 
into the global economy. However, another overriding factor was, as Thomas W. Dichter 
(2003) noted, "[i]n the heady days after the war, progress was seen as a right that no 
country should be denied" (p. 54). Additionally, development assistance was viewed as 
the right remedy to speed the process of social and economic development of poor 
countries. Accordingly, various theories and praxis were promoted as to how to achieve 
development. 
2.1.1: Development theories 
Early on, development itself was viewed as strictly economic in nature; thus, earlier 
development theories focused on how countries grew economically. For example, the 
'big push' (Rosenstein-Rodan), the different stages of growth (Rostow), the dualist 
9 For more information on how African countries, in particular, were granted/gained sovereignty refer to: 
Yansane (1980); Harbeson and Rothchild (2009). 
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structure of developing countries (Lewis), and the centre-periphery structure of the world 
economy (Prebisch) were concerned with economic systems (Bowen, 1998; Pronk, 
2004). In order for developing countries to improve their economic capabilities, 
development assistance would be applied in such a way so as to transition developing 
countries from being primary commodity exporters and into industrialized nations. 
Development assistance would provide poor countries what they lacked, namely a capital 
infusion as a catalyst to start the development process. As Maggie Black (2007) noted, 
"aid on a massive scale, furnished by the industrialized world led by the US and the ex-
colonial powers, would fuel a 'big-push', enabling development in poor countries to take­
off' (p. 31). Thus, Economic Growth Theory (also commonly referred to as development 
economics) emerged in early development discourse. Economic growth theorists believed 
in three overarching themes; the first being the division of labour, the second being the 
expansion of trade, and third the accumulation of capital (Stilwell, 2006). Developing 
countries would economically grow by adopting policies to improve economic efficiency 
and integrate their economies globally. Robert Solow's 'Theory of Economic Growth', 
often cited as the theoretical groundwork of development economics, articulated how 
growth can lead to economic development. Solow (1956) argued the source of economic 
growth is predicated upon the ability to inject capital into the economic system in 
developed countries; and for the developing countries Solow advocated for capital to be 
directed towards 'modern industries' and the wage labour sector. In a cyclical process, 
capital accumulation is used to invest in new technology, resulting in greater 
specialization (Solow, 1956). Capital accumulation, a theory with a long history but 
greatly expanded upon by Sir Arthur Lewis, necessitates that capital be hoarded by a 
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small class of people. These few 'elites' would have the capability to acquire and reinvest 
this capital for the benefit of the entire population. At the heart of the argument is that the 
capitalist class has a better capacity to invest the capital rather than the majority of the 
population that would spend it unproductively (Lewis, 1954), eventually, the 
reinvestment of the capital leads to development (Weaver & Jameson, 1978). 
Ultimately, it was hoped that development assistance would help modernize 
'backward' countries. Modernization theory, closely associated with economic growth 
theory, arose out of a discourse that believed that development in itself should modernize 
societies (Toye, 1987; Martinussen, 1997). This theory, originating from the United 
States, was perceived to be the primary objective of development during its prime in the 
1940s and 1950s. The main theorist who is often cited as an important figure in 
modernization theory is W.W. Rostow. Rostow relied on W. Arthur Lewis' Theory of 
Economic Growth as the basis of modernization theory; according to Lewis, the genesis 
of development was labour supply, with capital accumulation being another important 
factor. Later, Rostow, in his The Stages of Economic Growth, explained the importance 
of creating a political and economic system which fostered favourable conditions to 
facilitate economic growth (Martinussen, 1997). 
According to Rostow's stages, all societies start at the same stage. These societies 
move up through these stages before reaching the apogee like Western capitalist 
countries, especially the United States. The first stage is a traditional society, a 
subsistence society, in which science and technology play little part. This is a society that 
only makes enough to feed itself (Rostow, 1991). The second stage, pre-conditions for 
take-off, is another stage that Rostow uses to determine if a society is economically 
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advancing. This occurs when the society starts saving and acquiring capital which leads 
to "the blessings and choices" opened up by compound interest. The third stage, the take­
off, is when a society starts using economic models as the basis for development. The 
society starts developing specific sectors and has, for the most part, abandoned traditions 
for the economic process. The fourth stage, the drive to maturity, is when a society starts 
moving away from producing just what is required, by generating a surplus. The society 
starts diversifying the goods made these investments start to be felt by the poorest of that 
particular society. The final stage is the age of high-mass consumption. This is when 
people earn enough money to spend on other goods not just basic living items (Rostow, 
1991). According to Rostow this is what is experienced in the developed world. Of these 
five stages, the in-between stages (2-4) were the most important because this meant that 
societies in general were developing, not just the economy (Menzel, 2006). 
At its height, modernization theory was used to explain social, economic and 
political aspects of development (Jiafeng, 2009). John Martinussen (1997) describes the 
theory as a "process whereby the traditional and backward third world countries 
developed towards greater similarity with the western, or rather, the north-western world" 
(p. 38). The idea was that developing countries needed to imitate the industrialized north, 
meaning that development had a similar path projection. This implied that countries in 
the industrialized north had reached the apex of human and economic development and 
developing countries had to reach the same level (Teivainen, 2009). A capitalist system, 
with similar production systems, was another. Consequently, various criticisms of the 
dominant liberal theories of international development emerged. 
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2.1.2: Critical theories 
Throughout this period, development discourse was closely associated with a capitalistic 
system. Aguibou Y. Yansane (1980) argued that the promotion of development is 
fundamentally a capitalist cause - for example, the expansionist nature of the capitalist 
system means it is always searching for new markets and resources to help it grow. 
Indeed, this has been a constant of the Marxist critique of the development project which 
has fixated on reproducing the capitalist economic structure. Furthermore, the capitalist 
system was at the heart of setting up the centre-periphery dynamic that has greatly 
impacted development of the Global South. Many Marxist scholars pointed out how the 
international economic system is today is very much like the colonial system that took 
raw materials and resources for very low prices and helped fuel the manufacturing sectors 
in the North (Toye, 1987). With many arguing the form of capitalism advocated for 
liberal development theorists has been detrimental to developing countries. For example, 
developing countries rarely benefit from the value added to the materials that they send to 
the North. 
One critique from the Marxist perspective was expressed through Structuralist 
theory. Raul Prebisch (1959) argued that the economic imbalances created by the 
international trade system were skewed to favour the developed countries. For example, 
structuralists pointed to the over reliance on primary exports as the main source of 
income for developing countries, in the long run as Diana Hunt (1989) noted, "the 
situation for primary exports would worsen rather than improve" (p. 44). Indeed, 
dependent countries have very little control or influence on their economies because they 
are locked into the international capitalist division of labour. The countries have no input 
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into what to make and how to make it (Kaufinan, Chemotsky, & Geller, 1975). Latin 
America is often cited as an example of this dependency. Latin America was placed into 
three distinct phases of dependency; the first phase was the period immediately after they 
achieved independence. The second was during the industrial revolution by which the 
Northern economies relied on the raw materials provided by Latin America. The last 
phase was after the great depression when the Latin American economies tried to 
industrialize, however, fell into a greater dependency (Kaufinan, Chemotsky, & Geller, 
1975). Dependency theorists argued that development policies promoted by the IFIs were 
disadvantageous to developing countries. The theory, first proposed by Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in the book Dependency and Development in Latin 
America (1979) also came out of the Marxist paradigm (Hunt, 1989). According to 
Martinussen (1997), Cardoso and Faletto postulated that dependency was so pervasive 
that it infiltrated the relationship within the society. For instance, the unbalanced structure 
within developing countries ultimately served the elites by replicating that system. In the 
theory, closely aligned with centre-periphery theory, states that developing countries are 
part of an unfair capitalist system which favours the industrialized, developed centres 
instead of the agrarian based periphery (Heller, Rueschemeyer, & Snyder, 2009). 
An influential dependency theorist, Ruy Marini (1991), argued that although 
countries in Latin America had achieved independence in the 1800s, they were still 
dependent on the capitalist system of trade. These newly independent countries were 
inserted in the capital system and the international division of labour. The terms of trade 
have created a "super-exploit"; the world economy was turned into a cycle of exploitation 
of the underdeveloped countries. This, thus, creates a stable system by which the raw 
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materials are supplied by the developing countries to the industrialized economies. 
Marini posited that an unequal exchange between the centre and the periphery always 
creates a dependency because the values added to items have a higher return on income. 
However, when primary goods increase in price this does not necessarily mean that 
depended countries will develop faster (Martin, 2009). 
A similar critique was the centre-periphery concept, which viewed the world as 
divided into two parts. One part, the centre, controlled world capital, more stable and 
with a higher income; the other part was the periphery which provided the raw materials 
and also depended on the centre. As Wim Ettema (1983) explains the theory as such there 
"is always a distinction between strong and weak regions, with the first conditioning the 
latter. The former are called the Centre, core region or metropolis, the latter constitute the 
periphery subordinate to it" (Ettema, 1983, p. 107). Centre-periphery theory contends that 
the current economic global setup has certain disadvantages for developing countries-
particularly, trade is viewed as the biggest indicator of how developed countries 
interacted with their developing counterparts. The centre-periphery model traces the 
political economy of developing countries to colonialism and imperialism. The 
relationships that resulted from the colonial period are used to explain the centre-
periphery paradigm. The argument presented by the centre-periphery theorists postulates 
that colonialism greatly impacted how the world economy was organized. The hegemonic 
capitalist system of international trade grew out of this colonial relationship. The centre-
periphery theorists like Prebisch (1959) believed that the best way to move from the 
periphery to the centre was to industrialize. This was best done by strategic planning and 
creating protective barriers. Prebisch defined import substitution industrialization (ISI) as 
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"an increase in the proportion of goods that is supplied from domestic sources and not 
necessarily as a reduction in the ratio of imports to the total income" (Prebisch, 1959, p. 
253). The creation of an industrial sector was crucial for the development of the 
periphery countries. They advocated industrial substitution policy to create industries. 
By the end of the 1970s the development project was seen as a failure by both 
liberal and Marxist scholars (Yansane, 1980; Bauer, 1984). Indeed, criticism of the 
dominant development paradigms began to arise particularly with regards to the 
relationship between rich and poor countries. Various scholars argued that the nature of 
assistance has fostered an aid dependency in developing countries. For example, many 
countries rely on the aid to fund basic government services. Development assistance itself 
then became a source of contention, should aid be increased or taken away? The 
proponents of aid argued that it should be increased for most poor countries with 
increased conditionalities attached. However, the opponents argued that aid itself was the 
root cause of under-development by limiting the recipient country's ability to choose a 
path out of poverty. A consensus seemed to have coalesced around the idea that the 
development project was failing. Many billions of dollars had been spent on developing 
countries, yet the economic indicators in developing countries had not improved 
(Yansane, 1980; Bauer, 1984; Leys, 1996). 
2.1.3: The neoliberal shift 
A backlash from the perceived failures of state-led development began to take hold in the 
1980s after the arrival of the neoliberal revolution. Earlier, development was a state-led 
endeavour and thus, when countries were given development assistance, primacy was 
given to the state. As noted by P.T. Bauer (1984) "[s]ince the Second World War, it has 
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been a major axiom of the mainstream development literature that comprehensive central 
planning is indispensable for progress of poor countries" (p. 19). The donor countries and 
agencies endorsed the state-led model, because at the time the state was viewed as the 
best conduit to achieve the goals of development. In other words, the state would design 
the objectives and goals of development. Then assistance from developed countries 
would be diverted into projects acknowledged as crucial for development. One factor was 
the global downturn during the 1970s that was exacerbated with the oil crisis, with many 
developing countries' economies stagnated. Another factor included neoliberal ideals of 
reducing the role of the state in economic affairs thereby encouraging less reliance on 
assistance and more trade. A shift happened during this period when some aid recipient 
countries moved away from import-substitution industrialisation to the export-led model 
that occurred with the increased liberalization. The aims of such development assistance 
have been controversial and its benefits began to be disputed. This backlash was 
articulated by Bauer (an advisor to the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher), 
arguing that previous approaches of using the state to foster the economy through policies 
such as protectionism, state planning, and import-substitution industrialization (ISI) were 
misguided and development assistance prolonged poor countries negative economic 
status. 
The effects of foreign aid have in fact been quite different. 
It is foreign aid, for instance, that has brought into 
existence the Third World (also called the South), and 
which thus underlies the so-called dialogue or 
confrontation. Foreign aid is the source of the North-South 
conflict, not its solution. The paramount significance of aid 
lies in this very important, perhaps momentous, political 
result. A further pervasive consequence of aid has been to 
promote or exacerbate the politicization of life in aid-
receiving countries. These major results have been 
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damaging both to the West and to the peoples of the less 
developed world. (Bauer, 1984, p. 38) 
To redress the development project's failure, further conditions were placed on recipient 
countries. Although conditionalities have always been part of the aid system, the new 
development agenda resulted in more stringent and direct conditions. The collapse of 
primary commodities in the 1970s coupled with a debt crisis led to many developing 
countries agreeing to the new terms and conditions from the International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs) and donor countries before being able to access development assistance 
(Goldin, Rogers, & Stern, 2002). The imposed conditionalities ranged from economic to 
political and later social in nature. Western donors argued, through economic incentives, 
aid is more effective by using 'positive' conditionalities to promote human rights, 
instituting democracy, instil the primacy of the rule of law, and good governance (Lirong, 
2011). Accordingly, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were introduced in the 1980s 
making assistance conditional on implementing policies such as deregulation, 
liberalization, privatization and reducing government spending (Rodrik, 2007). One 
economic conditionality was to encourage the liberalization of the market, forcing many 
countries to abandon the state-led development model. Additionally, this was meant to 
open up the developing countries' vast labour and natural resources for exploitation from 
the more efficient private sector. Another important concept of the new development 
approach was deregulation, which called for the removal of as many regulatory barriers 
hindering private enterprises (both domestic and international). Indeed, states in the 
developing countries were seen as the biggest obstacle to economic growth and 
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development. It was believed that less government interference would encourage both 
economic growth and modernisation in the developing countries (Harvey, 2005). 
Political conditionalities became another integral part of the new development 
policies. These included reforming the political structures necessitating more democratic 
methods to governing. For example, governments were required to hold multi-party 
elections, encourage the decentralization of political power, and open the decision­
making process (Rodrik, 2007). By adopting these policies, it was argued, developing 
governments would be more accountable to the international donors and their own 
citizens. But ultimately, by opening up the countries, it would endear developing 
countries to outside investors. The foreign investment and capital flows attracted would 
help ease some of the development problems faced by developing countries thus helping 
to spur economic growth (Mencinger, 2003). 
Accordingly, one theory notes that development could be achieved through 
foreign direct investment10. Although widely acknowledged as a trade mechanism, some 
have argued that FDI is an important contributor to development. Essentially, FDI is a 
tool for development. For example, it can help to acquire new technologies and improve 
human resources (Dunning, 2002). Moreover, FDI is an integral part of 
internationalization (Kayam & Hisarciklilar, 2009). Indeed, FDI is often viewed as a 
more stable form of capital investment, and it would help with the balance of payment of 
countries as well as assisting with economic growth. Thus, FDI would be more conducive 
for development (Moss, Ramachandran, & Shah, 2005). Some theories have been 
formulated to evaluate how FDI can be used as a means for development. With an 
10 FDI is defined to include equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
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increase in the rise of foreign direct investment globally, one concept that has come to the 
fore has been the 'Investment Development Path' 
The Investment Development Path (IDP), like Rustow's 'stages' theory, is placed 
into five distinct categories to study both inward and outward FDI. According to John H. 
Dunning (2002), the first stage of this attracts very little FDI due to the lack of 
infrastructure and government policy that would be conducive to attracting inward 
investments while outward investment would be almost non-existent. The local 
governments should invest in basic infrastructure and implement social and economic 
structural changes that would be advantageous to companies. The second stage is 
characterized by a growing inward FDI but still very low for outward FDI; a reason being 
the country created a small industrial base. Nevertheless, most of the investment is still 
directed towards natural resources. This stage is where government policy can create a 
'virtuous' cycle to benefit the country (Dunning, 2002, p. 140). The third stage is where 
the outward flows start outpacing the inward investments as the local population has 
accrued higher incomes from the previous stage. The fourth stage is when the domestic 
companies can compete globally. The inward investments play a small role in the 
development of the country. The outward flows start going to countries that placed lower 
in the stages. The fifth and final stage is when equilibrium is reached between inward and 
outward investments. Multinational enterprises become the norm and capital is very fluid 
between countries (Dunning, 2002; Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008). 
However, other theorists such as Sanjaya Lall (2000) argued that the economic 
benefits of FDI are frequently exaggerated and the biggest impact that arises out of FDI is 
usually the improvement of human capital. Indeed, FDI's impact on development has 
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been very hard to empirically demonstrate (Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008). The biggest 
beneficiaries of FDI are often the big corporations that have the capacity to move their 
operations to other less costly locales. The often contradictory nature of FDI is summed 
by Lall as follows: 
The complexity of the FDI package also means that there 
may be trade-offs between different benefits and objectives. 
For instance, countries may have to choose between 
investments that offer short as opposed to long term 
benefits; the former may lead to static gains but not 
necessarily to dynamic ones. A large inflow of FDI can add 
to foreign exchange and investment resources in a host 
economy, but it may lead to a crowding out of local firms 
or create exchange rate problems. The desire to generate 
employment may lead governments to favour labour-
intensive, low technology investments... (Lall, 2000, p. 8) 
Moreover, FDI as a development tool itself is often negligible, most theorists point out 
that as the economy grows it is usually followed by increased direct investments. Thus, 
some have concluded "OFDI seems to follow economic development automatically" 
(Liu, Buck, & Shu, 2005, p. 113). As a result, an argument presented is that increased 
spending for such programs as education and human-resource development are the most 
favourable opportunity for attracting FDI. As the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) noted "many countries are in outright competition with 
each other to attract FDI" (Agosin & Prieto, 1993, p. 63). This competition was 
particularly pervasive within developing countries. Developing countries aggressively 
turned towards FDI as a way to access capital that had dried up during the 1980s. 
Enticements included such tools as tax incentives, subsidies and removing restrictions on 
the movement of capital (Carkovic & Levine, 2005). 
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The increased interconnected world led to a shift in development discourse. This 
major shift in the international sphere began to take hold with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Concurrently, by the mid-1990s donor countries and IFIs started implementing 
amended development policies by adding a 'social' aspect to earlier neoliberal 
prescriptions (Veltmeyer, 2001). Indeed, a vigorous debate ensued questioning the role 
of SAP conditionalities in causing the economic and social decline in many developing 
economies during the previous decade. Some hypothesized that recipient countries' half­
hearted attempt at implementing the SAPs resulted in their failure. However, others 
blamed, among other things, the restrictive conditions which plagued the normal 
functioning of the state in the developing countries (Leys, 1996; Harvey, 2005). It has 
now been widely acknowledged that the neoliberal policy prescriptions have not 
delivered the desired outcome for developing countries, especially in the African context. 
Subsequently, an alternative approach to the dominant Western approach, both 
'Washington Consensus' and post-Washington Consensus, has emerged. The beginning 
of the twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of international relations 
realignment. Countries in the Global South are shifting some of their focus elsewhere. 
Some have termed this shift a 'South-South' relationship; others have termed this 'South-
East' relationship, or even 'Africa-East' (Shaw, 2010, p. 13). Emerging economies such 
as India, United Arab Emirates, and South Korea are changing the rules of development 
assistance (Woods, 2008). This led Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (2010) to conclude the 
"West no longer enjoys a monopoly of influence over Africa's future development" (p. 
1). One such country, China, emerged as an alternative source of development assistance 
to the dominant Western approach. 
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2.3: China and the West: competing visions on international cooperation 
Over the last two decades, China's power and influence politically and economically has 
grown immensely (Kang, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Prior to the communist takeover in 
1949, China underwent a period of political retrenchment partly as a result of under­
development, poverty, and economic decline. However, China began its slow rise after 
the Second World War (Wenping, 2010). The bi-polar nature of global politics influenced 
China's relationship with the rest of the world - for instance, China's foreign aid 
objectives aligned politically and strategically with that of the Soviet Union (Taylor, 
2006). Consequently, China's government provided assistance to other likeminded, 
communist causes. One early form of aid dispersed by China was often linked to anti-
colonial independence movements (Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 2008). Indeed, the 
distribution of aid explicitly promoted by the country as anti-Western, anti-colonial, and a 
new form of South-South cooperation. As a result, when countries in Africa and Asia 
started gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, China sought them out as natural 
allies. Interestingly, China distributed development assistance to countries with higher 
economic and social indictors than its own. (Copper, 1975; Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 
2008). Another purpose of its aid was to export communism globally. 
At the height of the Cold War, China broke with the Soviet Union (Wenping, 
2010). Subsequently, China portrayed itself as a leader of the developing countries; these 
developing countries would constitute a separate entity from a bi-polar world. The 
communist world led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist world led by the United 
States. Thus, a new entity comprised of a majority of developing countries worldwide 
called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came into existence. The entity was inspired 
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by a treaty signed in 1954 between India and China called the 'Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence'. The other inspiration was the Bandung conference between Asian 
and African countries in 1955 (Fifield, 1958). The Chinese government termed this 
approach as the 'Three World' theory (Taylor, 2006) - China's Three World theory was 
constructed upon the foundations of its anti-hegemonic agenda directed at both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, China argued for greater options in the 
international system. However, many pointed out the option offered by China was only 
intended to boost China's influence. The Three World theory was designed to 'allow 
Chinese leadership of the Third World' (Taylor, 2006, p. 44). Indeed, this theory placed 
China firmly at the centre of international affairs often with a support constituency 
consisting of other developing countries. One direct benefit from this approach included 
mainland China's ascension to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, 
replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Onjala, 2008a). 
However, during the 1980s, China withdrew from the international political arena 
due to shifts in the internal political sphere within the country. An internal power 
struggle, which arose from both the failure of the Cultural Revolution and the death Mao 
Zedong, led to an increased focus on domestic issues. By the end of the same decade, 
China was faced with a major upheaval throughout the country, leading to calls for 
political and economic reforms which coalesced around the iconic protests in Beijing's 
Tiananmen Square. The government sent in the military to remove the protests, leading to 
many deaths. The images of the protests (and the government reaction to them) were 
broadcast throughout the world. By the 1990s the country attempted an image makeover 
after the Tiananmen massacre. One consequence was a policy shift in how foreign aid 
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was distributed in an attempt to reduce the international outcry stemming from the 
Tiananmen massacre (Brautigam, 2009). At the same time, China was also opening itself 
up to the world economically (Onjala, 2008a; Wenping, 2010). This new strategy has 
been associated with 'soft power' theory (Taylor, 2006; Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 
2008). This approach claimed that China's rise as a global power would be benign and 
favourable for developing countries. A concept within this theory is accents a 'peaceful 
rise' which would prove beneficial to the countries that trade and cooperate with China. 
Moreover, this approach portrayed China's rise as inevitable and thus other developing 
countries would benefit by supporting it through bilateral agreements and the various 
multilateral institutions. Importantly, this approach acknowledged that China is 
politically and economically growing hence this approach would help it diversify its 
economic links as well as its political links (Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 2008). 
Notably, the shift in how China granted development assistance occurred at the 
beginning of the 1990s. As a result, the way China provided aid to other countries placed 
economic interests above all. Moreover, this shift was accompanied by China opening 
itself up economically to the world. Most importantly, China's foreign policy interests 
were at the heart of how development assistance would be granted. These foreign policy 
goals included supporting the 'One China' policy, support at international forums such as 
the United Nations, and securing natural resources to help sustain its rapid economic 
growth. The new approach to China's development assistance would have three focus 
areas which would incorporate reductions of debt, promotion of investments and 
assistance in human-resource development (Onjala, 2008a). Furthermore, China 
intricately linked the three disparate approaches to maximize the benefits of its 
development assistance. As such, China's approach of linking FDI, trade and 
development assistance is important to its foreign policy. An argument by John Franklin 
Copper (1975) presages that this approach can be traced to the historical nature of the 
China's international relations: "China's traditional style of foreign relations gave 
emphasis to the tribute mission, whereby foreign countries brought gifts to the Chinese 
emperor and received more valuable gifts or trade concessions in return" (p. 4). This 
strategy is evident in the manner by which China emphasises a mutually beneficial 
assistance as an integral part of it overall development assistance agenda. 
Subsequently, important policy changes occurred, the first was government 
ministry functions were bifurcated: a commercial arm and a governmental sector. The 
second was to create policy banks which would help expand the influence of Chinese 
foreign policy. Consequently, the government termed this new policy as the 'Going 
Global' policy. The policy banks resulted in the creation of the China Export-Import 
Bank (Exim Bank), China Development Bank (CDB), and China Agricultural 
Development Bank (CADB) in support of the new policy shift (Brautigam, 2009). These 
banks were explicitly a tool of government policy. These policy banks were separate 
from the other commercial banks that were also encouraged to invest around the world. 
Indeed, the new policy banks became important instruments the government's foreign 
aid. The policy banks coalesced around a strategy of combining development aid, 
bilateral cooperation, and trade into one overarching strategy. 
To coordinate this new policy, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) became 
the lead department responsible for devising policy and implementing development 
assistance. As a result, the small foreign aid department was taken over by MOFCOM 
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and its mandate was linked into the three goals (trade, FDI, and assistance) set out by 
China's aid agenda. These changes included turning away from direct aid projects such as 
building stadiums and government buildings. The policy change was part of China's 
move to focus on investments that would help Chinese companies expand globally. In 
addition, the Chinese government would also provide other types of support, such as risk 
assessment, export tax exemptions and insurance (Brautigam, 2009). 
Above all, the 'going global' policy was intended to assist Chinese companies 
expand beyond the country's own borders as the companies were encouraged to seek out 
projects that would be 'mutually beneficial' to the beneficiary countries as well their own 
bottom line. As a consequence, companies primarily in low-intensity manufacturing, 
resource exploration, and agriculture were initially the targets of this policy. As Deborah 
Brautigam (2009) noted, "[t]he new aid program was deliberately shaped to assist 
Chinese firms to enter unfamiliar region[s] with daunting challenges" (p. 81). As a result, 
aid was tied to Chinese companies that would set up projects in the recipient country but 
the products would be, for the most part, destined for China. For instance, light industries 
no longer competitive in China were persuaded to relocate to cheaper locales in Africa. 
This strategy would help Chinese companies involved in light industries like textiles, 
often the first casualty of economic progress and development within a country, keep 
their competitive edge. As the policy evolved, the government, through the policy banks, 
started to move up the value chain by giving preferential loans to Chinese construction 
companies so they could compete against more established companies from the West for 
projects on the continent. Now, the government is encouraging heavy industries such as 
car assembly plants to open new branches on the continent (Brautigam, 2009). In 
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contrast, the one industry that was exempted from this policy was the pharmaceutical 
industry which was still encouraged to support the Chinese medical teams and help 
supply Chinese built hospitals without having to buy medical supplies from Chinese 
companies. Thus, a consensus term has emerged to promote this new model to African 
countries, in particular: China's approach. 
China's foreign policy approach to development assistance emphasizes FDI as 
essential to development of both itself and the recipient country. China argues that the 
FDI approach advocated is a direct transfer of capital to developing countries. Japan was 
an early advocate of this approach to development assistance. Although FDI is 
traditionally not considered to be development aid, China actively promotes the 
investment into certain sectors within the recipient country. An important theory 
employed to explain these benefits is the 'Flying-Geese' (FG) theory. According to this 
theory "latecomers successfully adopt a strategy of entering sectors in which they have a 
rising comparative advantage and import technology from a mature economy whose 
advantage in that industry is declining" (Geda & Meskel, 2010, p. 101). One vehicle to 
deliver FDI is China's State-Owned Enterprises (SEOs) which are encouraged to actively 
seek investment opportunities that would have a direct correlation with the development 
of the recipient country (Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 2008). China claims that by 
promoting FDI as a form of development assistance, it is helping developing countries 
gain access to capital otherwise lacking in many developing countries as MNC and 
independent investors find developing countries too risky to invest in. 
Importantly, China has emphasized this strategy as part of a 'win-win' 
relationship when it comes to the development assistance that it gives to countries 
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particularly developing countries. The 'win' for developing countries includes increased 
trade, improved infrastructure and investment into the social sectors like education and 
health. The 'win' for China would include increased access to their natural wealth, access 
to more consumers for its goods, and most importantly diplomatic support. China invests 
heavily in projects such as hydroelectric power stations and railroads. These projects are 
financed by two state-owned banks, the China Development Bank and the China Export-
Import (Exim) Bank. These two banks have overtaken the World Bank as the biggest 
financier of development projects in developing countries. For instance, in 2010, the 
World Bank issued $100 billion while the two Chinese banks issued $110 billion to 
developing countries (Butagira, 2011; Semakula, 2011). 
The method by which China delivers assistance is itself unique. In most instances 
direct aid, grants, and loans delivered are not accompanied with monetary transfer from 
China to the recipient country but are transferred directly to the contractor that delivers 
the aid. This process has been termed the 'Angola Mode' by the World Bank. The 
Angola Mode works thusly: the loan or grant is never given to the recipient country, 
rather the Chinese companies build the infrastructure and it is paid by the Chinese 
government directly. The recipient country pays for this through licenses that are 
awarded to Chinese companies. The Chinese company in turn pays off the loan directly 
to the Chinese bank. In fact, this is the most-used method to back loans and grants given 
to African countries. Moreover, the Angola mode is designed to reduce the risk for China 
while at the same time it ensures that access to natural resources, which are then exported 
to China. Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves (2008) argue that Angola mode is a 
Chinese risk management strategy that would help solve local problems such as 
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corruption and favouritism. The recipient government chooses the project that needs to be 
built. Many critics in and out of the continent argue that this process is not in the best 
interest of African countries, because it binds their resources to long-term deals with 
Chinese state-backed companies, not to mention the many other problems that are 
associated with Chinese companies, such as poor labour and environmental records as 
well as a lack of transparency (Alden, Large, & de Oliveira, 2008). 
As a result, China's involvement in Africa has aroused suspicion and has been 
heavily criticized. These criticisms have been directed at many aspects of the Chinese 
policy in Africa, including that it does not care about the environmental, human rights 
and ethical concerns resulting from its engagement. Chinese companies have been 
accused of ignoring local laws that protect the environment or even basic labour 
standards that protect workers. Other critics such as Shaun Breslin and Ian Taylor (2008) 
argue that this is part of a double standard that the West has when it comes to China. For 
instance, the West has ignored human and environmental concerns when it came to China 
so it could access its vast market. However, when China started competing directly with 
the West in developing countries that is when human and environmental ideals came into 
play. 
Another criticism is China's non-interference policy, which emphasises its 
disengagement in the domestic country's internal mechanism. One of the consistent 
criticisms of China's approach to aid is that it supports despotic regimes on the continent 
because they prolong undemocratic leaders in countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), through the loans and grants China 
showers upon them (Davies, Edinger, Tay, & Naidu, 2008). Furthermore, many of these 
regimes trade away many natural resources, which a majority of their people do not 
benefit from. Some critics have called this relationship a new form of imperialism that is 
labelled 'Sino-Imperialism', Mark T. Jones (2011) noted, "whilst seemingly subtle and in 
nature, is seeing African nations or those who lead, sell off fishing rights, precious 
mineral resources, agricultural land, forests and in effect the birthright of future 
generations" (2011, online). This is in stark contrast with the emphasis of Western donors 
place on norms of human rights and liberal democracy. Equally important, China asserts 
the importance of economic rights and rights of subsistence, but advocates for the 
political non-interference policy. 
Another critical theory often applied to China's development assistance is 'rogue 
aid'; a term coined by Moises Nairn in Foreign Policy magazine. Rogue aid was defined 
by Nairn (2007) as "development assistance that is nondemocratic in origin and 
nontransparent in practice; its effect is typically to stifle real progress while hurting 
average citizens" (online). This theorem posits that assistance from rogue nations, 
authoritarian and undemocratic regimes are undermining aid that is meant to improve the 
lives of vast majority of the world's poor. The objective of this rogue aid is often to help 
the donors access the recipient country's natural resources and gain international backing, 
in contrast to the allegedly laudable aid agenda of structural and economic reform set out 
by multilateral institutions such as the IFIs, and the DAC (Woods, 2008). As a result, 
Western donors are undercut by aid that often comes with very few strings attached and, 
importantly, rogue donors are the principal beneficiary of the aid that they provide. 
Furthermore, proponents of this theory hypothesize that aid from rogue donors is 
detrimental to developing countries' likelihood of tackling the root causes of their under-
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development. Hence, the European Union has been heavily courting China, a large non-
Western donor, to adhere to guidelines instituted by the DAC. However, this theory has 
been heavily criticized for the lack of empirical studies to prove its thesis. One study 
concluded "[b]ased on China's aid allocation decisions, it seems that fears that Chinese 
aid undermines the efforts of other donors to promote democracy and good governance 
are exaggerated" (Dreher & Fuchs, 2011, p. 27). Moreover, the new aid donors are 
viewed as threats rather than as a viable approach to the local conditions. For example, 
critics of this theory point to the overly bureaucratic, top-down approach to Western 
development assistance (Chahoud, 2007). 
Another criticism is with regards to the economic benefits for Africa. China 
presents the argument that through trade with China, Africa will grow economically and 
develop - however, many argue that Africa is trapped in a similar relationship with 
Western countries. Moreover, the benefits of the relationship with China have not yet 
come to fruition. Davis et al (2008) concluded "[w]hat is clear is that aid, mainly in the 
form of concessional loans, but also commercial financing, serves as a platform for 
mainly Chinese state-aligned enterprises to establish a foothold in the African market" (p. 
54). This strategy is evident in the manner by which China emphasises trade as an 
integral part of its overall development assistance agenda. Indeed, China ties its 
infrastructure aid to its own companies. Moreover, the development assistance that China 
provides has conditions attached. Nevertheless, China prides its approach as one that does 
not have conditions attached. In fact, jobs that are created with the Chinese funded 
projects are with mostly Chinese workers that are brought in. Accordingly, the local 
populace, for the most part, are not employed during the construction of the projects. 
45 
Finally, another argument surrounding discourse of the increased Sino-African 
relationship usually compares with the language that describes the West. According Giles 
Mohan and Marcus Power (2008), the West views Africa as a 'moral cause' and China 
views Africa as a 'business opportunity'. However, most of the discussions involving 
China has usually portrayed it in terms of colonial dialogue such as 'scramble', 'mad 
dash' and 'resource grab' among others. Moreover, this relationship is now deeper and 
more entrenched with private Chinese enterprises also directly involved with the African 
states. Some have argued that Chinese foreign policy, which advocates for non­
interference, is not very different than the 'liberal ideal'; the importance of the capitalist 
market but with the state as an important controller (Mohan & Power, 2008). 
The West and China have a diverging vision of the role of development assistance 
and how it should be granted has played out throughout the continent of Africa. More 
specifically, the two visions have been starkly contested in a region of Africa that has 
been traditionally considered an area under Western influence. East Africa has witnessed 
considerable international attention over the last 50 years; the region has received a large 
amount of development assistance throughout its post-independence period. 
2.4: International cooperation and development in East Africa 
East Africa was part of the European 'scramble' for Africa that took place in the 
nineteenth century. Uganda became a protectorate of the United Kingdom, Kenya was a 
British colony, while Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi became colonies of Germany. 
Following the First World War, the German colonies were handed over to the victorious 
allied countries (Sircar, 1990) with Tanzania transferred to the British while Rwanda and 
Burundi were assigned to Belgium. All of five countries experienced different methods of 
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governance during their period of European colonisation. The British encouraged the 
settlement of some of their colonies with Kenya hosting sizeable number of British 
colonists. The region was part of an imperial race for the control of trade in the region. 
The British, in particular, developed a sophisticated transportation network throughout 
the region, connecting the hinterland to the coast. The British created these infrastructure 
projects that criss-crossed the region, a colonial development strategy to exploit the 
regions resources. The most famous was the Uganda railway that connected the Kenyan 
coastal city of Mombasa to the heart of Africa. However, this pattern of British colonial 
development fit what Elliott P. Skinner (1980) identified as non-development noting that 
East African "economies were geared to the production of ... export crops and to 
extractive industries. There was little or no industrial development" (p. 73). Uganda was 
the treasure the British had coveted, overlooking Kenya, and on their way to the natural 
resources that were in Uganda. Uganda was described by Winston Churchill as the 
"pearl" of Africa, which was the opposite of resource-poor Kenya. In contrast, Kenya did 
not have easily accessible mineral wealth with the only resource it possessed agricultural 
lands (Collier & Lai, 1986). When the East African countries finally achieved 
independence, they had very little (if any) industrial capacity. 
The East African region was, like most of Africa, a testing ground for the 
differing theories of development, particularly after sovereignty was gained from 
European countries starting in the early 1960s. A theory which influenced the newly 
independent countries was African Socialism11. The overarching theory was summarized 
11 African Socialism was propagated by the early post-colonial leaders of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania, Tom Mboya of Kenya, and Leopold Senghor of Senegal, the theory was also 
influenced by the pan African ideas of W. E. B. Du Bois and George Padmore. 
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as "the ideology thus embodies a cluster of ideas through which African leaders are 
searching for some common identity" (Friedland & Rosberg, 1967, p. 4). The three EAC 
states asserted that African Socialism would transition the new countries into the era after 
colonialism and that it would be employed as the development model throughout the 
region. It should be noted that African Socialism was influenced by economic 
development, which was the dominant development ideology of the time (Friedland & 
Rosberg, 1967, p. 5), including the state's role of in helping to accumulate capital for 
further development. Another tenet of the theory was Pan-Africanism, a concept with a 
long history, which encouraged the unity of the continent as it was emerging from 
colonialism. However, what African Socialism meant to each country became contested -
for example, the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, claimed that African 
Socialism entailed development at the village or community level. Nyerere labeled this 
version of African Socialism as Ujamma or Familyhood; which he differentiated from 
the two other dominant ideologies as such "it is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to 
build a happy society on the Exploitation of Man by Man; and it is equally opposed to 
doctrinaire Socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of Inevitable 
Conflict between Man and Man" (Nyerere, 1962, p. 7). The Tanzania adaptation of the 
theory became a leading source of antagonism with the West, which viewed Tanzania as 
turning towards the Soviet sphere of influence. Uganda, before its civil war, was 
sympathetic towards Nyerere's version of African Socialism. 
At the time, the three East African countries were economically and politically 
integrated into EAC, and the differing ideologies were heavily touted by the three 
leaders. A divergence within African socialism became evident in East Africa, and 
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debates raged as to which would deliver better development outcomes, a socialist 
Tanzania model (Ujamma) or an inherently liberal Kenyan model {Harambee - meaning 
let us all pull together). Within the EAC, Kenya promoted a one-party political system 
with a capitalistic economic model, while Tanzania promoted a one-party socialist state. 
These models of development had their positives that each touted, Kenya achieved 
remarkable growth in the early years, and Tanzania achieved a fairly equitable society. 
Kenya's model of capitalism was referred to as Patron-Client Capitalism'2 (Barkan, 
1994, p. 15). Thus, a uniquely Kenyan model heavily influenced its economic and social 
governance, resulting in a development approach called Harambee which "entailed the 
formation of community based organizations for the purposes of implementing small-
scale self-help development projects" (Barkan, 1994, p. 19). Essentially, rural 
communities would come together to build the required social infrastructure such as 
schools, clinics and water wells. Harambee ensured that, although mostly based in rural 
areas, which fit into the capitalist model of development adopted after independence; 
most projects received virtually no state funds, although state approval was required for 
an organization to be labeled as such. Anne Nangulu-Akuyu (2007) succinctly concluded 
that the end result of the policy was that "despite the euphoria of independence, 
decolonization in Kenya ... appears to have permitted a significant deepening of the new 
nation's participation in the production networks of the world's capitalist economy" 
(Nangulu-Ayuku, 2007, p. 134). Inequality increased in the country, although Kenya 
enjoyed remarkable economic growth in the decade after independence. 
13 This is, sometimes also referred to as clientelism, defined as "a form of politics in which ties between 
leaders and followers are personal" (Rothstein, 1979, p. 25). 
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However, in the 1970s, the region as a whole struggled to economically develop; 
its economies, after showing promise in the 1960s, stagnated by the end of 1970s and in 
some cases even shrank, despite having pursued development models required by 
Western donor countries. These development models required the newly independent 
countries to take on heavy debt burdens. When some East African countries started 
experiencing civil war and economic downturn, they had difficulty repaying these loans. 
For some countries in East Africa, an over-reliance on development assistance 
was required to supplement their budgets. The nature of development assistance itself has 
gone through transformations throughout its history in the region. Development 
assistance became an entrenched philosophy that governs the relationship between 
developed and developing countries, with many questioning the role of development 
itself. For instance Yansane (1980) noted "often this independence of flag did not involve 
any major structural changes, and thus it led to few changes in people's lives" (p. 3). 
Indeed, the pattern that followed most of the development assistance in the world also 
held true for East Africa. This form of control was best described by the first president of 
Ghana as "[t]he essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in 
theory, independent and has all the trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its 
economic system and thus its internal policy is directed from the outside" (Nkrumah, 
1965, p. IX). For example, they termed this aid relationship as 'neo-colonial' in nature 
(Yansane, 1980). Indeed, many scholars posit that development assistance is not a 
'charitable' donation. Critics often point to the trading relationship as one of the biggest 
indictors of how much a developed country provided to the recipient country. In a study 
by Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ariane Tichit (2004) noted, bilateral assistance is 
intricately linked to the interests of the donor country: "[trilateral trade has a strong and 
significantly positive impact on aid allocation" (p. 263). Thus, trade is often part of any 
development agreements between rich and poor countries. Many argued that Western 
countries promoted economic policies that were similar to the colonial practice used 
before East African countries gained independence. East Africa became a supplier of raw 
goods, and materials and industry was discouraged. 
This discrepancy became even more glaring because the majority of the 
population did not see any major changes in the governance structure with the exception 
of a few elites who gained more power that had been granted to them with the 
achievement of independence. The international institutions under the UN system 
generally were allied with Western goals of development. One notable exception to this 
was Tanzania, which was linked to the socialist method of development. Tanzania was 
firmly non-aligned; accepting assistance from both the West and the Communist bloc. 
Moreover, it was also closely linked with China with the construction of the Tanzania-
Zambia Railway (TAZARA)13 in the 1970s by an estimated 50,000 Chinese workers 
(Monson, 2008, p. 6) a signature project. On the other hand, Kenya also experienced the 
development project from a unique vantage point as it embraced a decidedly pro-Western 
and at its core capitalist paradigm. 
2.5: International cooperation and development assistance in Kenya 
Kenya's experience with development assistance is similar to many other East African 
countries. However, Kenya was unique in the sense that it was relatively stable compared 
to its neighbouring countries. One benefit of such stability was that Kenya rapidly 
13 For background on the TAZARA and its impact on Tanzania consult Monson (2008). 
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industrialised in the decade after independence. Even so, Kenya received development 
assistance because its economy was weak, and a large segment of its population lived in 
poverty. Moreover, Kenya relied on aid to help fund the government (Mosley, 1991). The 
development assistance that Kenya received was directed towards improving 
infrastructure such as building roads and railroads. Another portion of the assistance was 
converted into loans to help finance capital-intensive industries. For instance, the 
country's development policy called for aid to be invested in such industries as cement 
factories, sugar refineries, and telecommunication infrastructure (Holtham & Hazlewood, 
1976). Notably, the development assistance that Kenya received during this period 
originated from Western countries. 
Kenya relied on multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, and its 
agencies to gain access to development aid. In fact, the United Nations African 
headquarters was located in Nairobi and many international agencies and organizations 
soon located there as well. Additionally, Kenya was part of the Non-Aligned Movement 
meant to resist the global superpowers' influences. This did not mean that Kenya was 
politically neutral as it was under heavy influence of Western countries. Kenya was very 
much linked to its neighbours originally as part of the East Africa Community (EAC) and 
its trade heavily relied on the neighbouring countries. The country's political stability 
relative to its neighbours helped the country attract investors from around the world. 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia experienced civil strife that resulted in many refugees 
settling in Kenya. Moreover, the perception that it had successfully transitioned from 
colonialism to a developing country attracted international attention. The country's 
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membership in the multitude of international organisations helped the country find 
investors and donors alike. 
The United Kingdom, the former colonizer of Kenya, has been the largest 
provider of aid (Holtham & Hazlewood, 1976). Similarly, Kenya has been a large 
recipient from other Western countries, as well Western-based multilateral agencies such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Njeru, 2003). In the 
1960s, Kenya was viewed as one of the success stories of using aid for development. 
During this period, Kenya experienced high economic growth rates and it increased some 
social indicators as growth in the decade after independence averaged six percent of GDP 
(Collier & Lai, 1986, p. 73). The biggest economic sector, agriculture, was the driving 
force behind this impressive growth. However, Kenya's impressive growth came to a halt 
by the middle of the 1970s as Kenya experienced economic stagnation while at the same 
time most of the loans that it had taken on in the aftermath of independence came due. 
Moreover, a large portion of the aid that Kenya received from many donor countries was 
classified as technical assistance, and loans, rather than direct aid (Mosley, 1991). 
Technical aid was mostly delivered through 'experts' that donor countries would send to 
Kenya. Yet, the country was still required to repay these loans. By the 1980s, the 
perceived failure of the state-led development model combined with a political shift in 
Western countries resulted in a change in the way that development assistance was 
granted. 
Kenya was not spared when the age of increased conditionalities arrived in the 
1980s. Consequently, Kenya became involved in constant negotiations and conflicts with 
donor agencies and countries that led to aid being frozen multiple times. Structural 
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adjustment programs were implemented that would help to liberalize the economy, 
privatize government services and decentralize power (Mosley, 1991). Furthermore, this 
was part of the democratization process that was intended to help make the government 
be more accountable to its citizens. Additionally, the Kenyan government was required to 
sign agreements that ranged from civil service reform to specific economic programs 
(Cohen, 1995). All of these reforms were implemented as part of Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) that were to be completed in return for development assistance from the 
World Bank. Consequently, the increased conditions that Kenya had to comply with 
resulted in an adversarial relationship with donor countries and International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs). 
Kenya has gone back and forth with aid being given before being promptly frozen 
around every three years from the 1980s until the middle of the 1990s. The first time that 
Kenya had its development assistance frozen was in 1982 when the required policy 
reforms were not implemented. It took two years, 1984, before funding would resume, 
after the country experienced a severe drought and the aid that was provided was for food 
aid (Njeru, 2003). Paul Mosley (1991) described, the relationship between Kenya and the 
World Bank as exasperating, as "few country lending experiences have given the Bank so 
mush cause for frustration" (p. 247). According to James Njeru (2003), Kenya's 
economic decline can be charted to the periods that aid was suspended. The last attempt 
was "with the help of the World Bank, a team of experts from the private sector and 
international organizations (popularly known as the Economic Recovery Team or the 
'Dream Team') was recruited into the civil service to initiate the economic recovery and 
ensure economic reforms and good governance at the treasury" (Njeru, 2003, p. 12). The 
54 
other donor agencies take a cue from the Washington institutions as to how to distribute 
funds to Kenya. If one of them withholds funds or loans, then inevitably Kenya 
experienced huge budgetary shortfalls as a large portion of Kenya's government is 
funded by aid from donor countries. However, after years of decline in development 
assistance for Kenya, it started to increase to record levels in 1990. This period saw 
increased conditionalities placed on Kenya that included democratization and this process 
saw Kenya hold it first multiparty elections in 1992. The levels of aid that Kenya 
received would never reached that of 1982 after the first freeze on aid until the middle of 
the 2000s. 
Kenya's development has been hampered by economic and social stagnation since 
the country gained independence. As a result, the country endured various development 
approaches prescribed by Western countries and multilateral agencies. Therefore, some 
politicians have placed the blame of Kenya's lack of development on the conditions that 
were placed on the country by these outside actors. Consequently, critics have urged 
Kenya to look elsewhere for development assistance that would remove the 
conditionalities that were perceived to be at the heart of Western-led approach to 
development assistance. Accordingly, the approach offered by China has been promoted 
as a solution. China promotes an approach to development that has three components. 
The first aspect of China's development assistance to Kenya encourages trade. China's 
trade with Kenya has grown substantially (and continues to grow) over the last decade. 
The second characteristic is to encourage direct investments of Chinese companies in 
Kenya through state-backed loans. The final component is development aid in which 
China directly gives aid to certain projects such as building hospitals, infrastructure 
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projects, and funding educational exchanges. These three intertwined elements of China's 
development assistance have been promoted by China as an alternative for Kenya to 
embrace. Having reviewed the theoretical context behind Kenya's development, the next 
Chapter systematically assesses China's approach to development assistance and how it 
is playing out in the Kenyan environment. 
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Chapter 3: China's approach: a case study of Kenya 
3.1: Background: the bilateral relationship in context 
3.1.1: Pre-independence 
The relationship between Kenya and China can be documented as far back as 545 BCE 
(Snow, 1988, p. 3). Chinese traders and diplomatic missions left evidence along the East 
African coast between Zanzibar and Somalia14. Indeed, Chinese artefacts such as coins, 
porcelains and pottery, as well as Chinese imperial accounts have affirmed this prior 
contact (Filesi, 1972; Snow, 1988). For a variety of reasons, in the fifteenth century 
China pulled back from its expeditions to the African continent, starting with a 
proclamation by Emperor Hsuan-te which decreed "the building of ships to go to the 
barbarian countries shall everywhere be stopped" (Hutchison, 1975, p. 11). By the 
nineteenth century China retrenched, and Western forces had begun to assert their 
presence on the continent. Philip Snow (1988) observed one direct consequence included 
that "contact had passed into the hands of the Europeans with their small ships and their 
unimpressive goods. Much of the old trade filtered now through [the Europeans]" (p. 36). 
Gradually, the exploration and trading missions by the European powers into Africa 
evolved into colonialism. Accordingly, the relationship between Africa and China 
virtually ceased to exist. 
14 For further studies of China's historic interaction with Africa consult Filesi (1972); Hutchison (1975); 
Snow (1988). 
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Therefore, a 500-year gap between 'official'15 contact of the Africa-China 
relationship came to a pass, with the next official account being the Bandung Conference 
1955 (Hutchison, 1975, p. 11). Change came, however, with the communist takeover of 
China in 1949. As communist China settled into power, the focus turned to supporting 
like-minded causes around the world (Brautigam, 2009). Above all, China viewed 
independence struggles across Africa as interconnected and linked to the socialist 
movements that had taken hold in Eastern Europe and East Asia. More importantly, they 
believed that the Chinese version of communism could serve as a model for 
development; particularly, through revolution and self-help (Cooley, 1965, p. 4). An 
example would be Mao's theory of a 'people's war' which could be replicated in one part 
of Africa before spreading throughout the continent (Copper, 1975, p. 86). In an effort to 
foster discourse on African independence, China helped to create the 'Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Council' in 1957 as a forum to propagate Chinese influence and promote 
Chinese leadership in Africa (Neuhauser, 1968). Concurrently, during the 1950s, one 
colony agitating for independence was Kenya. 
Kenya was formally colonized by Great Britain in 1895, although Vasco da Gama 
had established economic links on behalf of Portugal as early as 1498 (Eliot, 1905, p. 14). 
The Portuguese established trading posts to the south, in what is now Tanzania and 
Mozambique. In fact, the Portuguese effectively colonized Kenya's coast by the mid-
1500s (Eliot, 1905). Starting in the 1840s, British explorers in search for the source of the 
Nile helped to establish British claim over East Africa (Gray, 1965, p. 213). Importantly, 
European powers set out to assert their claim over Africa at the 1884-85 Berlin 
15 Official accounts indicate that Chinese government stopped their missions to Africa. As Snow (1988) 
noted the Portuguese became the middle men between Africa and China. 
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Conference and by 1886, East Africa was divided up between Britain and Germany as 
part of the 'Anglo-German Partition Agreement' (Flint, 1965, p. 389). In the agreement, 
the Imperial British East Africa Company was granted exclusive economic rights in 
Kenya and Uganda. Accordingly, the company expanded into the interior of Africa by 
building roads and communication infrastructure into Uganda. However, in 1894 the 
company had its charter revoked by the British parliament and in 1895, Uganda became a 
British Protectorate and what is now known as Kenya became a settlement colony of the 
British (Eliot, 1905; Flint, 1965, p. 389) resulting in colonists arriving as an elite 
managerial caste from both the United Kingdom and the Indian Raj. Kenya's quest for 
independence, built on much opposition to British imperial rule, came to a head in the 
1950s, with the outbreak of the 'Mau Mau' uprisings in 1951, which had an influential 
Marxist element to its leadership attracting Chinese attention (Masta, 2009). In fact, as 
Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's revolutionary leader, languished in prison for almost a decade, 
China consistently called for his release (Ning-I, 1961). 
3.1.2: Post-independence period 
After a long struggle against the British for independence, Kenya won self-government 
on December 12, 1963. Soon after independence, Kenya established a diplomatic 
relationship with China. Markedly, Kenya recognized the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) instead of the Republic of China (Taiwan). This allowed for the reciprocal 
recognition of an independent Kenya and therefore, on December 14, 1963 the PRC was 
the fourth country to recognize Kenyan independence (Onjala, 2008b, p. 4). A short five 
months later, Kenya secured its first development assistance from China. According to 
Kenyan cabinet committee minutes, the earliest form of assistance took the form of 
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technical assistance16 directed towards the Ministry of Agricultural and Animal 
Husbandry. Another component of that agreement was that China would provide Kenya 
with a loan of $70 million and most importantly, China agreed to finance future 
1 7 
development projects . By December 10, 1964, the two countries had reaffirmed earlier 
agreements to help build sugar and textile factories with an agreement calling for 
exchanges of expertise between the two countries such as China's dispatch of three 
experts to Kenya to teach bamboo weaving while Kenya would send trainees to China to 
learn ivory carving . In exchange, for such technical aid, Kenya would repay the loans 
through the goods that it sold directly to China (Masta, 2009, p. 386). Table 3.1 illustrates 
the loans and grants initially received from China after Kenya gained independence. 
Notably, China adhered to similar Western development assistance theories dominant 
during this period. Development economics, namely, advocated for massive capital 
infusion into developing countries to propel their development. As Peter Andrews Poole 
(1966) noted: 
The Chinese economic aid program, though 
patterned on the Western model, has evolved certain 
distinctive characteristics; some of these have 
enhanced its value to aid recipients, while others 
have led to serious friction between Peking and the 
recipient states. Among the essentially positive 
features of Chinese foreign aid activities have been: 
(1) the provision of credits without interest or at 
very low rates of interest; (2) an emphasis on small, 
16 OECD defines technical assistance as: "(a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving 
education or training at home or abroad, and (b) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as 
well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated 
equipment)"(OECD, 2012). 
17 See annex 2: The cabinet meeting minutes; the Kenya National Archives: File TR/U/PV4/Tourism, 
Nairobi. 
18 See annex 3: The protocol: Kenya National Archives (KNA), File AE/446, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Nairobi. 
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uncomplicated, light industrial projects that can be 
put into operation quickly and which yield some 
tangible benefits promptly to the recipient state; and 
(3) the practice of insisting that Chinese technicians 
live at the level of their host country counter-parts 
(a practice that parallels that of the American Peace 
Corps). (Poole, 1966, p. 623) 
Table 3.1: Initial aid from China to Kenya 
Date Type of assistance Amount Source 
May 1964 Gift: 200-bed hospital, a 
technical school for 1000 
students, credit financing of food 
processing and a radio station. 
$2.8 million Hevi (1966); 
Copper (1975, 108) 
May 1964 Loan: 5-year repayment 
schedule; to be used to pay for 
Chinese technicians. 
$25 million Colley (1965); 
KNA 
June 1964 Loan: to build sugar factories 





However, a backlash against Chinese influence and China's support for revolutionary 
movements across Africa through its potential Kenyan base started to ferment within 
Kenya, and the agreement was never finalized (Masta, 2009). Indeed, Chinese premier 
Chou En-lai, after having visited ten African countries, including Kenya, noted the 
"excellent revolutionary situation in Africa" (Masta, 2009, p. 386). Such concerns were 
not without merit, on May 15, 1965, Kenyan police seized 75 tons of Chinese weaponry 
whose destination and recipients were unknown (Cooley, 1965, p. 57; Copper, 1975, p. 
109). Moreover, around the same time, it emerged that China had supported and supplied 
both armies during the Kenya-Somalia war (Copper, 1975). Additionally, the Kenyan 
government did not want to be seen as getting aid from the communist bloc. At the height 
of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union were in competition to gain influence over 
African countries - and Kenya was receiving a majority of its development assistance 
19 This loan was never finalized because it was canceled by Kenya. 
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from US allied countries. For instance, in 1964, the same year that China agreed to assist 
Kenya; the latter also received $300 million in development funds from the UK alone 
(Copper, 1975, p. 109). More generally, the decline of the Kenya-China relationship was 
linked to the overall decline of the revolutionary left in Kenya, which had fought for 
independence (Masta, 2009, p. 110). At its lowest, China (along with the Soviet Union) 
was accused by Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union (KANU), of funding 
opposition groups to the tune of $1.5 million - $4 million20. As a result, three members of 
the Chinese consulate were declared persona non grata, including the Chinese charge 
d'affaires (Li Chieh), a clerk and a third secretary along with a journalist affiliated with 
the New China News Agency (Xinhua) who was directly linked to the storming of the 
KANU's headquarters (Larkin, 1971, p. 136). The diplomatic antagonism reached its 
peak when Minister for Economic Planning, Tom Mboya, equated Chinese activities in 
the country with that of the United States: as being imperialistic in nature (Hutchison, 
1975, p. 151). Mboya's comments resulted in China's harsh criticism of the minister as 
being a stooge of the US and in 1967, China's expelling of Kenya's ambassador in 
Beijing (Chege, 2008). Bruce D. Larkin (1971) noted that Chinese support for anti-
Kenyatta forces: 
in supporting a minority faction or selected 
members of a governing party, China was indiscreet 
to say the least. Perhaps she erred, or perhaps she 
took a calculated risk. China was not alone in 
having diplomats and newsmen expelled from 
Kenya. China's action can be judged careless or 
unwise or miscalculated, but they were not 
incompatible with policy preparation. Chinese in 
20 This was converted into today's dollar figures using w-ww.measuringworth.com's GDP deflator index: a 
number that represents the "average price" of all the goods and services produced in the economy. The 
original amount was £100,000-£400,000. 
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Nairobi could have hardly refused an approach from 
Oginga Odinga; it is even hard to imagine they 
could have forgone approaching him on their own 
initiative. Such a move would have been among the 
most obvious available preparatory steps. A policy 
of preparation can never be entirely free of risks. 
(Larkin, 1971, pp. 204-205). 
As a result, the relationship between the two states went through a quiet period and due to 
the lack of effective diplomatic representation in each other's capitals, Chinese 
development activities in the country came to halt (Chege, 2008). As Jane Masta (2009) 
noted "China and Kenya had severed diplomatic relations in all but name" (p. 387). Some 
attributed this decline as part of Western 'machinations' to guide Kenya away from 
China (Masta, 2009, p. 385). However, by the 1970s, China itself had retrenched 
politically and in spite of such disquiet, the relationship between the two countries 
remained cordial with Kenya maintaining their recognition and relationship with 
mainland China instead of Taiwan (Onjala, 2008b, p. 4). 
In the 1970s, Kenya underwent a period of domestic political turmoil that resulted 
in drastic structural changes to the country. First, a political split between the leading 
members of government resulted in a period of political uncertainty. An economic 
decline soon followed, helped along by the 1973 oil crisis. For instance, in 1972 Kenya 
had an astounding annual GDP growth rate of 17% but by 1975, the growth had slowed 
to less than 1% (World Bank, 2012b, online). This resulted in Kenya's external debt 
(comprising of debt to multi-lateral, bilateral, commercial, and export credits) rising 
dramatically from $581 million in 1972 to $1.3 billion in 1975, in current US dollar 
figures (World Bank, 2012a, online). Moreover, the decline saw Kenya rely more heavily 
on development assistance to help meet its needs. For instance, development assistance 
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more than doubled during this period, from $66.85 million to $124.82 million (World 
Bank, 2012b) and by the end of the decade, Kenya was in dire economic straits with both 
external loans and ODA contributing a large portion of government revenues. 
Subsequently, external debt almost approached unmanageable levels during this decade, 
with reliance on hard currency-generating agricultural goods, particularly coffee, to 
acquire national income. Coincidentally, at the beginning of the decade coffee prices 
increased drastically helping to offset some of the balance of trade problems. However, 
this too was offset by increases in the price of oil raising energy costs by as much as 35% 
(Hansard, 1980, pp. 5-7). Consequently, Kenya spent close to 40% of its export earnings 
to import oil (Martin, 2011, p. 69). Inflation became another problem that affected the 
country, averaging 10-20% in the 1970s (Legovini, 2002, p. 4). Although, in the 1970s 
Kenya was receiving more in loans and ODA, the relationship with Western countries 
were starting to turn sour, which alongside a dramatic economic decline forced it to look 
elsewhere for increasing levels of assistance. Debt repayment levels became hard to 
achieve, and Western countries and institutions started requiring more stringent 
conditions before granting rollover and new loans. Thus, as the decade came to a close, 
Kenya started to re-examine its frayed relationship with China - coincidently, under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China was in the process of transforming its economy and 
instituting an outward policy (Onjala, 2008b, p. 5). 
3.1.3: Rapprochement 
Within this context, the two countries entered into negotiations in 1978 with their 
bilateral relationship quickly warming. Shortly thereafter, President Daniel Arap Moi 
visited China to sign the first bilateral treaty between the two countries since the 1960s 
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(Masta, 2009, p. 387). The agreement that was struck covered both economic and cultural 
activities in both countries. A focus of the new bilateral treaty was culture, with the 
agreement detailing areas such as the hosting of visiting scholars and writers as well as 
the exhibitions of culture and art. Education, included as part of the cultural component, 
was crafted to facilitate grants and scholarships for students to study in both countries. 
Moreover, higher institutions of learning were encouraged to help coordinate the two 
countries' educational capacities and to engender collaborative efforts. 
The second aspect of the treaty agreed to increased economic co-operation, 
particularly in rural areas. China agreed to help fund various infrastructure projects 
within the Kenyan agri-economy, including technical and other assistance to subsistence 
farmers. Another area of focus was industries based on urban industrial estates. The most 
notable project out of this renewed rapport was the construction of the Moi Sports 
Complex in Nairobi which was set to host the 1983 All-Africa Games. China agreed to 
•j f 
cover 85% of the estimated costs to finance and construct the complex. 
Following such tentative steps in the 1980s, China instituted outward - looking 
policies such as the 'going global' policy in the 1990s, with one of the beneficiaries of 
such efforts being Kenya. In the 1990s, China, under a similar arrangement such as the 
Moi sports complex construction, helped to erect the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital 
in Eldoret. This expansive Chinese policy directly impacted Kenya with a prominent shift 
in China's aid policies. Like for the rest of Africa, the main focus areas for Chinese 
development assistance to Kenya became focused on general infrastructure, with a 
21 See annex 3: The cooperation agreements: KNA, File AE/446, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Nairobi. 
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commensurate build-up of economic linkages, allowing for easier access to the Kenyan 
market through a reduction of tariffs for both countries' products and services. The 
linking of FDI to the aid regime was another important shift. Finally, development 
assistance started to become a significant element to China's peaceful rise policy. This 
culminated with China and Kenya signing a total of twelve bilateral accords between 
2004 and 2006, which expanded into a range of fields including the economy, 
technology, energy, tourism, health, aviation, media, archaeology and education (Xinhua, 
2006, online; Onjala, 2008b, annex A). Consequently, various overarching themes have 
arisen from Kenya's relationship with China - particularly, what has been labelled as 
'China's approach' encapsulating trade, FDI, and development assistance. China's 
approach in Kenya will be detailed in the following three sections. Therefore, China is 
often presented as a new development partner. The debates have come to encapsulate 
how China's approach fills Kenya's developmental void. On the other hand, China is a 
self-interested competitor to Kenya or even that China has imperialistic and colonial 
impulses. Given these points, China's approach will be analyzed in the next Chapter. 
3.2: Trade 
3.2.1: Background 
Kenya's development policy called for increased reliance on trade to improve its 
development indicators. This included moving away from an overreliance on the 
agricultural sector and to diversify its industrial and manufacturing base. In the advent of 
liberalized trade in the 1980s, Kenya opened its economy by reducing tariffs, eliminating 
regulations and the removal of price controls (Kenya, 2010a). This move can be traced 
back to the liberalization of its economy in the late 1980s as part of the Structural 
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Adjustment Programs (SAPs) mandated by the IFIs. For instance, one condition placed 
on Kenya, in the 1990s, in order to access aid, was to open its market and step away from 
state-led industrialization. Accordingly, market liberalization led to lowering of tariffs 
and reduction of non-tariff barriers such as protective measures to promote industries 
within Kenya. Further, the implementation of a trade regime guided by market-driven 
principles under the World Trade Organization (WTO) came into effect in 1995. 
Subsequently, imports grew noticeably, an annual average of 6.1% to 22.5% between the 
periods 1998-2002 and 2003-2007 respectively. Meanwhile, over the same periods, 
exports grew from an average of 6.6% to 10%. One consequence of this was that Kenya's 
trade deficit doubled from $55 million to $105 million over the same period (Kenya, 
2010a, p. 11). At the same time, Kenya's economy was underperforming compared to its 
neighbours - a research analysis complied for the United States Congress concluded: 
"Kenya has one of Africa's worst performing economies, notwithstanding a pick-up of 
economic growth in the past three years" (US, 2007, p. 9). Even today, Kenya relies on a 
small number of primary products as its main exports and agricultural products account 
for more than 50% of its total exports (Kenya, 2010a). 
Such influences can be seen through Kenya's post-colonial trade with China. In 
the decade prior to Kenya's independence, between 1950 and 1960, trade between the 
two states was almost non-existent. In the year that Kenya gained independence, Kenya's 
total trade with China was valued $1.2 million22 (Chege, 2008, p. 18). Kenya traded raw 
commodities such as sisal fibre, and raw cotton and in exchange China sent Kenya base 
metals, fabrics, and sundry manufactured goods (Chege, 2008, p. 18). Thus, across 
22 This figure is based on the prevailing exchange rate. 
67 
Kenya's early years as an independent nation, it enjoyed a positive balance of trade with 
China, often to the tune of three times (Chege, 2008). However, over the 1980s, trade 
levels between the two countries developed a new equilibrium. While Kenya continued to 
export around $10 million worth of goods to China, it now imported roughly $20 million 
from an ever growing China, resulting in a negative trade balance of $10 million. This 
discrepancy escalated, with 1993 as the turning point by which time the balance of trade 
changed dramatically in favour of China. For example, in 1993, Kenya imported slightly 
over $20 million while by the next year it had jumped to over $80 million (Chege, 2008, 
p. 22). This negative balance in trade has grown unabated ever since. This is, in contrast 
to other African countries which trade 'hard commodities' or oil to enjoy a positive trade 
balance with China. 
Recently, China has emphasized trade as integral segment of its peaceful 
development' policy, which prioritizes its own development but importantly: "it should 
seek mutual benefit and common development with other countries in keeping with the 
trend of economic globalization, and it should work together with other countries to build 
a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity. This is a path of scientific, 
independent, open, peaceful, cooperative and common development" (China, 2011, 
online). For this reason, China has managed to use an export-led model to rapidly 
industrialize and is now labelled the 'world's factory'. Further, China's approach to 
development assistance places emphasis on the developmental impacts of trade. As 
Brautigam (2009) noted China utilized 'compensatory trade' to exploit its own resources 
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and help it transition from mainly a subsistence economy to an industrial one23. China 
views trade as part of its 'win-win' strategy from which a developing country can benefit 
from deeper relations with its burgeoning economy. Thus, trade between Kenya and 
China is an essential element of the relationship between the two states. Figure 3.1 
illustrates this growing trade link between the two countries. 
Figure 3.1: Balance of trade 
Kenya's imports/exports with China, 1998-2010 
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One example, copper prices have risen from under $2000 per ton to almost $7700 
between the 2000 and 2010 according to the US geological survey. This dramatic 
increase in metalliferous ores is partly attributed to demand from China, which 
contributed 30% of global demand growth between 1999 and 2004 (Goldstein, Pinaud, & 
23 Compensatory trade is defined as: the sale of goods and services with payment in the form of goods 
rather than cash. For example, the sale of manufacturing equipment by a U.S. firm to several Asian 
businesses that promise payment in the form of goods to be produced by the equipment. 
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Reisen, 2008, p. 33). Accordingly, Kenya has seen its copper exports to China grow 
marginally from 2006 to 2010. More importantly, the earnings from its copper exports to 
China have increased dramatically from slightly over $500,000 in 2006 to almost $4 
million in 2010. This can be best illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Kenya's increased returns on copper 
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However, one industry that has faced increased competition from China is the dry cell 
batteries industry. Estimates peg imported batteries from China now account for some 
60% of the country's market share because they were cheaper than locally produced 
batteries, although a significant portion of them are fake or illegal (Kagwe, 2012, online). 
For example, one state owned company, Jinzhong Battery Company, in 2005 quickly 
achieved a remarkable market share of 40% in Kenya through its Rhinoceros branded 
products (Asia Times Online, 2005, online). In response, a local battery manufacturer, 
Eveready East Africa, threatened to relocate from Kenya to Egypt unless a ban was put in 
place to protect local manufacturers from the less expensive Chinese products (Mwanza, 
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2011, online). Since 2007 the Kenyan Battery Manufacturers Association has been 
actively lobbying for a ban on Chinese batteries claiming that Chinese batteries were 
flooding the Kenyan market. As a result, the Kenyan government adopted a proactive 
measure and banned Asian batteries (almost exclusively Chinese made, but a small 
percentage could be traced to Malaysia) from entering the county (Eveready East Africa, 
2011). 
Kenya's other dominant trade partners include the United Arab Emirates, which 
supplies 90% of the oil consumed in the country and other African countries: Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Sudan. Moreover, the European Union, United States, and Pakistan round 
out the other principal trade partners. The other East African Community states are 
principal destination of goods from Kenya with the leading exports from Kenya to EAC 
countries being manufactured goods, fuel and lubricants and machinery and other 
equipments. (Kenya, 2010a, p. 18). There is a caveat attached to this: Kenya re-exports24 
many goods to the other landlocked countries, which count towards Kenya's export 
ratios. The impact of this re-export to Kenya's economy cannot be directly quantified; 
however, anecdotally, Kenya claims significant tariff loss due to traders claiming goods 
entering Kenya are destined for another EAC member. When the goods reach the second 
country, for example Tanzania, they are then repackaged and brought back into Kenya. 
An example of this phenomenon was Kingsofit toilet papers imported from China, which 
was supposed to be charged an import duty of 25%, an excise duty of 10% and a value-
added tax of 18% to enter Kenya but avoided all the other taxes by paying only the 
24 The OECD defines Re-exports as "foreign goods exported in the same state as previously imported, from 
the free circulation area, premises for inward processing or industrial free zones, directly to the rest of the 
world and from premises for customs warehousing or commercial free zones, to the rest of the world" 
(OECD, 2001). 
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customs tax at the port of entry (Mombasa). More specifically, Kingsoft transited the 
goods to Tanzania, repackaged the toilet paper and then brought it back into Kenya 
(Muwanga, 2011, online). 
Another important trading partner is India, which often competes directly with 
China in the country. However, China has received all the attention, resulting in India 
being labelled as 'sleep walking' throughout Africa (Naidu, 2010, p. 39). Markedly, India 
has recently refocused on Africa as India hosted an India-Africa summit in 2008 and 
pledged to aid Africa in exchange for India's access into African economies (Naidu, 
2010, p. 42). A consequence of the summit was that India has courted African countries 
in a similar fashion as China - through concessionary loans, human-resource 
development, and capacity-building - with an added emphasis on the information and 
communication sector. Modern Kenya and India have had economic linkages that were 
helped by the British transfer of Indians into Kenya during the colonial period. Ever 
since, Kenya has had a significant Indian minority, in addition to the business traders who 
arrived after independence (Indian Embassy, 2009, online). These small-business owners 
became important players in the import-export segment of Kenya, helping India achieve a 
foothold into the country. Moreover, local Indian construction companies play an 
significant role in the infrastructure projects in Kenya. In 1981, the two countries signed a 
trade agreement which declared goods from each country would be accorded the Most 
Favoured Nation status. Consequently, India has been consistently one of Kenya's top 
trading partners even after independence. Trade between the two reached $1.2 billion in 
2008; again, Kenya imports manufactured goods, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, while 
exporting cashews, horticulture and leather products (Indian Embassy, 2009, online). 
However, even with this expanded trade, the imports from China are more diversified 
than both UAE and India (Juma, 2012). 
Between 2000 and 2009, imports from China grew by more than a factor of ten. 
Indeed by 2010, the amount Kenya imports from China has grown past $1.5 billion, 
while Kenya's export to China had not kept pace with China's imports - increasing to 
$30 million25. Kenya continued to export mostly agricultural commodities and food stuffs 
to China. Table 3.3 illustrates the top ten products sent to China in 2010, which included 
tea, leather and copper, with scrap metals and waste products also making it into the top 
ten exports list. Table 3.4 lists the top ten imports from China. 
Table 3.2: Top ten exports from Kenya to China (2010) 
Items Value (USD) 
Tea and mate. 5,028,599 
Jute and other textile bast fibres. 3,836,792 
Leather 3,583,255 
Copper 3,522,820 
Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap. 3,080,327 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits. 3,047,566 
Fish 1,694,169 
Fruit and nuts 1,278,839 
Iron ore and concentrates 1,229,177 
Waste, parings and scrap, of plastics. 959,355 
Source: Centre for Business Information Kenya; author's calculations 
Table 3.3: Top 10 imports from China (2010) 
Items Value (USD) 
Telecommunications equipment. 205,824,363 
Electrical machinery and apparatus. 95,834,773 
Automatic data processing machines. 72,158,150 
Machine-tools. 69,408,556 
Knitted or crocheted fabrics. 39,129,370 
Rubber tyres. 33,483,959 
Mechanical handling equipment 32,286,838 
Motorcycles 31,633,609 
25 These figures were acquired from Centre for Business information Kenya (CBIK). 
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Tubes and pipes 30,657,338 
Aircraft and associated equipment 27,921,680 
Source: Centre for Business Information Kenya; author's calculations 
The one-sided trend in trade and the overall negative trade balance led to calls from both 
Kenya and China to see such discrepancies redressed and rebalanced. Towards that end, 
in 2007 China and Kenya signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to improve 
the economic linkages between the two (Kenya and China, 2007). The same year, the 
Kenya-China Economic and Trade Cooperation information portal was created for 
Kenyan and Chinese business to enter into partnerships. In a newspaper interview, a 
former Chinese ambassador to Kenya was quoted as saying "[t]he goods we exchange are 
certainly very different in nature and cannot attract similar returns, but we need to move 
beyond commodities and also look at services such tourism. Kenya greatly benefits from 
such service sectors and factoring this can help redefine the scale of imbalance" 
(Odhiambo, 2011, online). As a result, China agreed to assist Kenya in various sectors in 
the economy such as the informal sector, agriculture, tourism, and solar energy industry. 
China also agreed to improve the infrastructure within Kenya to create efficiencies 
through the rehabilitation of existing roads, the building of new roads and railroads, as 
well as finance a new sea port and expansion of the largest airport. China also pointed 
towards the transfer of some manufacturing to Kenya, thereby helping to slow and 
reverse the trade balance between the countries (People's Daily, 2011, online). The 
following four sections will study areas where China has been most active in Kenya. 
These areas, Jua Kali, infrastructure, energy and tourism, have been touted as important 
areas that will help Kenya reduce its trade deficit with China. 
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3.2.2: Jua Kali 
Kenya has been plagued by underdevelopment. In 2011 it was ranked 143rd (out of 185) 
in the world by the United Nations Development Programs' Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2012, p. 126). The country relies on informal jobs to absorb a majority of its 
unemployed. These types of jobs are often in the small and micro-enterprises and have 
been labelled 'jua kali\ which literally means 'hot sun' because the jobs often entail 
setting up informal jobs by the side of the road to sell a small amount of goods and 
agricultural products. These jobs have accounted for 98% of all businesses in Kenya 
(Gadzala, 2009, p. 204). More specifically, the informal sector provided employment to 
7.5 million Kenyans in 2007, and created 427,000 new jobs in addition to 420,000 during 
the previous year (Kenya, 2010a, p. 13). This constituted 89.9 per cent of all the new jobs 
created outside the small-scale agricultural sector and pastoralist activities (Kenya, 
2010a). 
One problem often cited as an impediment to small and micro enterprises is the 
lack of access to capital. As a result, China agreed, at the 2009 FOCAC summit, to help 
provide loans - to be distributed by its policy banks - to small and medium enterprises 
(SME) throughout Africa. China pledged to make available $10 billion concessional 
loans to encourage trade, and another $5 billion directed specifically towards small and 
medium enterprises (Taylor, 2011, p. 84). Kenya was the first country in Africa to access 
this fund (Equity Bank, 2010, online). China has placed an emphasis on supporting small 
businesses in Kenya. In 2009, China Development Bank (CDB), in conjunction with a 
local bank (Equity Bank of Kenya) entered into an agreement by which CDB would 
provide $50 million in loans to small and medium enterprises (Xinhua, 2010, online). The 
75 
deal was hailed as a great way for SMEs to access loans at the cheapest rate available in 
the country - a 3-7 year repayment period, and an interest rate of 7-9% (Equity Bank, 
2010). Further, the agreement between the banks stipulated supporting youth and farmers 
by discounting the interest rate from anywhere from 1-3% off the base rate. 
Subsequently, the initial loan of $2.25 million from the CDB was used to expand two tea 
factories, the Mataara Tea Factory Expansion Project and the Kapkoros Tea Factory 
Project, which according to CDB's annual report "created 170 jobs for local people and 
stimulated an export volume of US$11.5 million" (CDB, 2011, p. 18). In essence, these 
are some of the direct jobs that China points to as integral to the 'win-win' policy which 
supports the 'self help' of its approach's recipients. 
3.2.3: Infrastructure 
In order to improve its economic output, Kenya has signalled that it needs to invest large 
amounts of revenues into infrastructure. Through its Vision 2030, Kenya has identified 
and prioritized various projects that are needed to improve its transportation, energy and 
telecommunication infrastructure. The poor state of infrastructure has been blamed for 
hampering the business climate in the country (Kenya, 2010a). The World Bank 
summarised the critical role infrastructure plays in lifting a country's development 
indicators as such: 
Infrastructure is a key ingredient for achieving all 
the [Millennium Development Goals]. Safe drinking 
and convenient water supplies save time and arrest 
the spread of a range of serious diseases-including 
diarrhea, a leading cause of infant mortality and 
malnutrition. Electricity powers health and 
education services and boosts the productivity of 
small businesses. Road networks provide links to 
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global and local markets. ICTs democratize access 
to information and reduce transport costs by 
allowing people to conduct transactions remotely. 
(World Bank, 2010a, p. 2) 
After the multi-lateral institutions - especially the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank - China has been a leading bilateral financier of essential 
infrastructure projects in Kenya. China, since the FOCAC summit in 2000, has become a 
substantial player in infrastructure projects in Kenya; whether upgrading the national 
airport, constructing roads, or the building of a new sea port (World Bank, 2008). China 
and Chinese contractors have been active in projects such as the rehabilitation and 
expansion of the Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi. The airport was originally designed 
to handle 2.3 million passengers annually; however, its capacity has been consistently 
rising from 4.3 million in 2005 to 6.3 million in 2007 (Kenya, 2010b, p. 165). This is in 
an addition to the increased is air cargo arriving from China. In fact, Kenyan Airways 
recently added cargo routes to Guangzhou, one the largest manufacturing centres in 
China, to accommodate the increased trade (Okulo, 2012, online). Another is tourism, 
which will be analyzed in more depth in the subsequent section, which has been steadily 
rising with the figure for 2011 standing at 37,000 tourists (Kenya, 201 Id). Hence, in 
2008, the government started the process of renovating and expanding the airport to 
handle the increased passenger and cargo traffic. The companies that won the first two 
phases were Chinese firms - Wu Yi ($30 million) and China National Aero-Technology 
International Engineering Company ($58 million) (Samora, 2011, online). The project 
was financed domestically with the remaining 10% coming from the World Bank and 
Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) (NRI, 2011, online). Eventually, revenues 
from the airport itself will be utilized to repay 90% the rehabilitation/expansion costs 
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with the residual loan being converted into a World Bank grant. Lastly, a Chinese firm 
won the reconstruction of Kisumu airport located near Lake Victoria, turning it into an 
international airport thereby reducing the need to transport goods from the Western 
border regions to Nairobi before being transferred to international markets. This region is 
where a majority of Kenya's cut flowers are grown, often destined for Europe. Moreover, 
the airport will be linked by a road being constructed by a Chinese contractor, Sinohydro 
Corporation, costing over $68 million and also financed by the World Bank (Sangira, 
2011, online). 
Road construction is another area where China has been most visibly active in 
Kenya. Chinese construction firms have taken advantage of the 'go global' policy 
promoted by the Chinese government. An important distinction of Chinese construction 
firms noted by the World Bank (2008) is that: "Chinese contractors involved do not risk 
equity capital nor gain control over any foreign affiliate, they do not qualify as FDI" (p. 
5). Indeed, other benefits include the reduced costs offered by Chinese contractors, 
which, depending on the project, can range between 20% to 50% (Kaplinsky, 
McCormick, & Morris, 2006, p. 19). Indeed, the Chinese firms are often credited with 
completing 'First World' infrastructure with 'Third World' labour costs (Alden & 
Davies, 2006, p. 88). There are many reasons why Chinese firms are able to compete for 
these projects, including access to cheap credit backed by the Chinese government, in 
addition to subsidies. The Chinese government has granted permission to bid on these 
projects to their construction companies, allowing them flexibility to bid on larger and 
riskier projects. Other reasons noted by Kaplincky et al (2006b) included that Chinese 
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firms often use standardized designs, the sourcing of all materials from China, and fewer 
concerns with regards environmental standards, in order to lower a project's costs (p. 19). 
Of note, loans obtained through the World Bank, and the African Development 
Bank require the contracts be open to the public for review but that also the projects be 
unrestricted to both local and international companies bidding on them. Chinese firms 
have been the direct beneficiary of winning around 10% - 20% of contracts financed by 
the IFIs in Africa (World Bank, 2008, p. 26). Since 2004, Kenya has been extensively 
rebuilding its road network, with a renewed emphasis on its busiest trade routes from the 
coast towards the interior as well as Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Kenya started 
rebuilding over 4000km of roads within the country, amounting to over 63 projects; the 
estimated cost of the projects was $800 million (Kenya, 2011b, p. 27). Kenya started on 
these projects partly due to the large quantities of trade that rely on the nation's road 
network. More specifically, the road network handles 80% of all the country's passenger 
and cargo traffic (Kenya, 2008, p. ix). Kenya turned to the donor countries and 
international institutions to help fund the road construction. 
Between the years 2004-2009, Chinese firms have been capturing an increasing 
share of the road construction projects in Kenya. Through an analysis of ongoing road 
construction and rehabilitation projects provided by the Ministry of Roads, it was 
determined that Chinese firms bid on the larger projects with a longer time duration than 
the Kenyan counterparts. In fact, between 2004 and 2009 of the 38 road construction 
projects that took place in the country; five Chinese firms were awarded contracts that 
averaged 91km and cost, on average, $38 million. By comparison, the other 33 projects 
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awarded to local companies averaged 35km and cost $15 million. Table 3.5 lists the 
construction contracts awarded to Chinese firms in Kenya. 
Table 3.4: Road construction by Chinese firms 2004 - 2 009 






Dundori - Olkalou China Wu Yi 42,172,473 100.3 24 
Wote - Makindu China Road 22,246,683 66 24 
Isiolo - Merille China Wu Yi 58,988,617 136 30 
Emali - Loitoktok Synohydro 51,254,672 100 30 
Kipsagak - Serem China Wu Yi 16,515,426 53.5 26 
Source: Kenya (2008) annex 2; author's calculations 
Meanwhile, the rehabilitation of roads has similar trends, with Chinese firms bidding on 
larger projects. For example, the four projects for which Chinese contractors rehabilitated 
an average of 51km and cost $37 million. Kenyan firms were responsible for 27 road 
works averaging 50km and cost $18 million (Kenya, 2008, annex 2 & 3). Table 3.6 
catalogs Kenyan roads being rehabilitated by Chinese firms. 
Table 3.5: Rehabilitation of roads by Chinese firms 2004 - 2009 






Nairobi Roads China Shengli 32,547,430 53.85 18 
Mai ya Chumvi - Miritini China Road 27,883,829 35 18 
Lanet - Njoro Turn off China Road 35,956,667 32 24 
Njoro Turn off - Timboroa China Road 53,038,158 84 30 
Source: Kenya (2008) annex 3; author's calculations 
More recently (2010-2012), China is financing the construction and rehabilitation of 
seven national highways in Kenya26. More specifically, Chinese contractors are involved 
in construction projects valued at $311 million. The Chinese firms are also helping to 
rehabilitate national highways in Kenya to the tune of $346 million. Indeed, of the 
26 This information was gathered from interviews and is yet to be published by the Kenya National 
Highways Authority. 
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highway projects underway between 2010 and 2012, China is the top bilateral financier, 
currently standing at $48 million. In comparison, the World Bank is the largest investor at 
$105 million, followed by the African Development Bank at $58 million, while the 
European Union and the OPEC countries lent $58 million each27. A vigorous debate has 
raged within Kenya as to how to protect local construction firms from the increased 
competition of Chinese firms. This debate will be assessed the next Chapter. 
China has been cited by the Kenyan government as the natural partner to develop 
the port in Lamu, on the Indian Ocean. The port is estimated to cost in the range of $4 
billion, which cash-strapped Kenya does not have. In 2009, Kenya turned to China, after 
a deal with Qatar fell though, which called for Qatar to finance the new port in exchange 
for 40,000 hectors of agricultural land. In fact, when Kenya turned to China the Prime 
Minister, Raila Odinga, declared, in an interview with the Financial Times, "[t]he 
Chinese offer the full package" meaning that China would also provide financing, the 
technical assistance, and the construction companies to see through the project (Jopson, 
2009, online). The construction of the new port in Lamu is one part of a $24 billion 
infrastructure project that will include oil pipelines, railroads, and highways connecting 
to Ethiopia and South Sudan. 
3.2.4: Energy 
Another sector of focus for China, designed to help Kenya improve its economy, is to 
make the energy sector more reliable. Electricity generation in Kenya is hampered by low 
investment. There are frequent outages, at the rate 11,000 per month, meaning that the 
electricity supply is not consistent that damage industrial equipment, causing businesses 
27 These figures are courtesy Kenya National Highways Authority. 
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to invest in their own power generators (Disenyan, 2009, online). The Chinese 
government views the energy sector as a place where investments can be directed, 
because it is a segment in which Chinese expertise can help Kenya improve its overall 
energy production. One such company is Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, which entered 
into a $140 million partnership with Kenya's Electrogen Technologies to construct a 
solar panel factory in Nairobi to sell within the region (Disenyan, 2009). The Chinese 
company would invest 70% into the new venture, while 30% would come from the local 
company which would also provide the land for the factory. The factory would employ 
200 people in Nairobi, use locally sourced material, and reduce the cost of solar panels 
from $310 to $77 (Disenyan, 2009). 
In addition to solar energy, Kenya has also turned to geo-thermal energy to help 
meet its energy demands. Thus, the country created the Geothermal Development 
Company, a state enterprise, to help spur investment into that sector. One of the first 
deals to be signed was with TBEA International, a Chinese firm, to build a 120MW 
thermal plant in Longonot along the Rift Valley - the company is also building a 600MW 
coal-fired power station in Mombasa (Samora, 2011, online). The company is building 
the needed transmission lines and substations from its plants. A more substantial deal was 
signed between GDC, Great Wall Drilling, and financed, in part, by Exim Bank. A MOU 
between GDC and Great Wall Drilling granted the company the right to drill 80 wells at 
an estimated cost of $400 million and 50 of which would be financed by Exim through a 
$98 million loan. However, this loan did not include the equipment (such as drilling 
wells) that would be brought in by the company - the Kenyan government would have to 
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sign another agreement with China through 'preferential export buyer's credit' (Kisero, 
2011, online). 
3.2.5: Tourism 
Tourism is one area that has been heavily promoted by the two countries to boost 
Kenya's foreign exchange capital. It remains one of the largest income generators for 
Kenya where in 2011 it generated over $1.5 billion of direct revenue for the state (Kenya, 
2011c). More specifically, tourism is 11.4% of the Kenya's GDP total, and directly 
contributes 245,000 jobs (643,000 indirectly). Finally, tourism accounts for 14% of 
Kenya's total exports (WT&TC, 2011, p. 3). In August 2005, a bilateral agreement on 
economic and technical cooperation included provisions to enhance tourism between 
Kenya and China. In the previous year, China also accorded Kenya its Approved 
Destination Status (ADS) designation in December 2004 (China, 2005). China views this 
as an investment for Chinese tour operators, restaurants, and hotels to cater to Chinese 
consumers (Kenya, 2007). The countries also signed an air services agreement that would 
help facilitate travel for the tourists. As a consequence, the number of tourists from China 
increased dramatically from 11,000 in 200528 to 37,000 by 2010, which placed China 12th 
overall (Kenya, 201 Id), however, this fell short of Kenya's goal to double that number by 
2012 (Kenya, 201 le). 
3.3: Foreign Direct Investment 
The second tool within China's approach to Kenya and other developing countries is FDI 
which as part of the 'win-win' and 'going global' strategies is directly linked to China's 
28 These numbers from 2005 are based on the first full year since China granted Kenya Approved 
Destination Status (Xinhua, 2006) 
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ODA as well. The argument presented is that African countries in general, and Kenya 
specifically, lack the capital to invest in local industries that would help to propel their 
development. China's outward foreign investments have risen dramatically since 2000, 
from virtually nothing in 1979, when the country opened up economically, to $90.6 
billion in 2007 (OECD, 2008, p. 66). Moreover, 95% of China's OFDI is directed 
towards developing countries; interestingly, the country's OFDI is dominated by state 
owned enterprises to the tune of 84% of the entire outflow with the ten largest sources of 
Chinese investments being SOEs (OECD, 2008, p. 66). SOEs have access to cheaper 
financing and a longer timeframe in contrast to Western originated FDI in Africa which 
are dominated by private enterprises (Besada, Wang, & Whalley, 2008). As we will see 
in the next Chapter, the involvement of SOE has brought to the fore a variety of questions 
about the true intentions of China's promotion of FDI. Another reason why China has 
entered the African market is because "other countries have decided to withdraw or 
abstain from investing due to concerns regarding human rights abuses, corruption and 
repressive regimes" (OECD, 2008, p. 109). Half of the SOEs are in the natural resource 
sector and across Africa the largest concentrations of OFDI are in resource-rich countries 
such as Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia (Draper, Disenyana, & 
Biacuana, 2010, p. 111). However, China has been encouraging the move into other 
sectors such as the service industry, agricultural sector, as well as the manufacturing 
sectors to diversify its FDI. This has been credited with helping Africa become the 
second largest destination of Chinese OFDI (Broadman, 2007, p. 10) . More 
importantly, China has linked its FDI activities to its ODA by assisting Chinese 
29 The largest receivers of Chinese FDI are China's neighbours. 
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companies that invest in the construction sector (OECD, 2008, p. 67). As a result, this 
strategy has helped to establish internationally many large Chinese construction 
companies because the Chinese government's requirement for Chinese firms to serve as 
construction contractors and/or equipment and material suppliers for its ODA. As 
Kaplinsky et al (2007) noted, four major trends of Chinese FDI include 1) increasing 
investments in the energy and resource sectors 2) participation in infrastructural projects 
3) contribution in global production networks, and 4) small-scale entrepreneurial 
investment (p. 27). These four strategies can all be witnessed in Kenya. 
In such an environment, Kenya has turned to China to help increase its FDI stock. 
In the 1980s Kenya attracted the highest level of FDI in the region. However, in the 
1990s the investment rates from outside were generally declining until Kenya established 
the Investment Promotion Act to allay fears over investment protection in the country 
(USAID, 2007). Kenya's attraction of FDI has been on the low end due to what has been 
perceived as a poor investment climate. In order to facilitate easier transfers of 
investments into the country, Kenya liberalized its investment procedures in 2004 
(Kenya, 2010a). Further, the Kenyan government placed an emphasis on attracting more 
investments into the country as part of its Vision 2030 in an effort to realize some of its 
development objectives. For example, for Kenya to achieve 'middle income' status by 
2030, it needs to achieve 10% annual growth (Kenya, 2007). Yet, in 2010 it has been 
achieving a figure of only 6.1%, which has been attributed to the low levels in the 
exploitation of current capacity rather than through the acquisitions of new investments 
or efficiency gains (USAID, 2007). Essentially, Kenya has promoted the fact that it 
serves neighbouring countries as one of the strongest arguments encouraging companies 
to invest in the country. Thus, Kenya is now a gateway to other East African countries, 
particularly though its membership in major trading blocs such as the five-country East 
African Community, the nineteen-country Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa, in addition to the US-initiated African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
AGO A was established by the US government as a way to incentivize African countries 
that embraced free-market reforms and therefore open their economies (KHRC, 2004). In 
spite of all such efforts, FDI in Kenya remains a minuscule component of its GDP 
(Mwega, 2009, p. 10). On average, Kenya receives a similar amount of funds from 
remittances each month ($50 million) than it receives from an entire year's worth of FDI 
inflows ($51.8 million) (Mwega, 2009, p. 12) 
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Kenya receives a small but growing pool of investment funds from China. This 
was one direct consequence of the 2006 agreement between Kenya and China signed 
when the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, visited Nairobi (Onjala, 2008b), which was 
86 
promoted as a preferred means by which Kenyan companies can work together with their 
Chinese counterparts to help promote the industrialization of the country (Onjala, 2008b). 
Additionally, China advances the notion that this is the best method to transfer 
technology and industrial know-how to benefit Kenya. Hence, China has encouraged 
many Chinese companies to set up shop in Kenya, particularly in the Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs). Another example of such capital flows has been Chinese oil companies, 
which in 2006, were given six blocks (44 500 sq miles) in Kenya's offshore territorial 
waters to explore for oil in (Masta, 2009, p. 400). However, by 2010, CNOOC returned 
one block (L2) back to the Kenyan government and was in the process of selling a second 
(Block 9) due to court challenges by residents contesting the method that CNOOC 
acquired the exploration rights (Roelf, 2010, online). It should be noted that in March 
2012, an Irish oil company, Tullow Oil, reported to have discovered huge oil deposits in 
Kenya's Turkana region. The amount of oil discovered is estimated to be larger than that 
in neighbouring Uganda, and could rival South Sudan in reserves (The Guardian, 2012, 
online). In 2007, another Chinese company bought into a mineral mine in the Rift Valley 
region for close to $10 million (Onjala, 2008b). Table 3.6 is a compilation of the largest 
Chinese companies in the various segments of the economy that have established 
facilities and services in Kenya. The table illustrates a sampling of Chinese firms with 
stakes in Kenya. 
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Table 3.6: A sample of Chinese FDI 
COMPANY ACTIVITY CAPITAL CAPITAL EMPLOY EMNT EMPLOYEMNT 







Edermann Manufacturin 425 100 10 81 






340 9 105 1360 
Stratimes Telecommuni 23.4 0 7 1275 
Media (K) cation 
Ltd (2010) 




Newland Manufacturin 46 0 2 800 
Industries g 
Ltd (2001) 




An- Ning Textiles 16 0 4 168 
Holding Ltd. (2001) 





Source: Raw data acquired from Kenya Investment Authority 
Additionally, private Chinese enterprises have matched the country's economic growth 
inside and outside its own borders. Jian-Ye Wang (2007) argues that "China's private 
sector is in the forefront of the country's external trade and investment expansion" (p. 
17). These enterprises have ranged from manufacturing to the service industry. Prior to 
1985, SOEs had the exclusive right to export and import goods. When that requirement 
was relaxed and China liberalized its economy, Kenya started to witness a small number 
of China-based companies enter the Kenyan market. For example, two companies 
(Kenboad Development Co. Ltd, and Kifaru Manufacturers Ltd) registered with the 
Kenya Investment Authority in 1990. These two companied employed 278 Kenyans. 
Ever since, the number of Chinese enterprises has gradually increased, averaging 92 local 
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employees and seven foreign staff and in 2010, ten Chinese companies were 
established.30 The companies which have established themselves in Kenya are in varied 
industries such as manufacturing, service, and the textile industries. 
One industry that is heavily touted by both the Kenyan and Chinese government 
is the establishment of car assembly plants. Beiqi Foton Motors was the first vehicle 
assembly company to open a $15 million car assembly plant in Kenya in April 2011; the 
company manufactures mainly heavy vehicles such as buses, light commercial vehicles 
and earth movers (Juma, 2011, online). Foton plans to build 10,000 heavy vehicles per 
year. A second vehicle assembly company, Chery Automobile Co Ltd, plans to open its 
first facility in 2013 after it secures $50 million in investments from both governments. 
The company intends to build 20,000 vehicles per year specifically for the African 
market (Gachenge, 2011, online). The arrival of the two Chinese car manufacturers into 
the country has resulted in other car manufacturers in Kenya expanding their current 
capacities. For example, in November 2011, Japan's Toyota announced that it planned to 
build two additional assembly plants in Kenya over the next five years to help protect its 
existing 65% share of the car market in the country (Kagwe, 2011, online). During that 
same month, India's Tata Motors declared its intention to build its first assembly plant, at 
a cost of $25 million allowing for the production of 5000 vehicles per year in Kenya for 
the East African market (Financial Times Africa, 2011, online). 
Another sector that has witnessed increased investments is information and 
communication technology (ICT). Kenya's recent growth is partly attributed to the ICT 
sector, growing at an annual rate of 23% since 2000, outperforming all other sectors in 
30 These figures were provided by the Kenya Investment Authority. The data included all Chinese firms 
that were established in Kenya from 1990 until June 2011. 
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the economy. The stunning growth rate of ICT led the World Bank to conclude 
"[w]ithout ICT, growth would have been a lackluster 2.8 percent—similar to the 
population growth rate—and income per capita would have stagnated" (World Bank, 
2010b, p. 4).31 Kenya is where 'Mobile Money' was invented, through the partly state-
owned Safaricom. Internet usage has increased dramatically from 200,000 users in 2000 
to 8 million by 2010 (World Bank, 2010b, p. 16). In 2006, Kenya removed import tariffs 
on computers and computer components, which helped the industry grow rapidly (Masta, 
2009, p. 393). One beneficiary of the rule changes was Chinese telecommunication 
companies such as Huawei and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company 
Ltd. (ZTE) - the two most active telecommunication equipment providers in the country. 
For example, Huawei won a contract to help set up Telkom Kenya's network for $22.6 
million. This is in addition to Huawei's other contract with Safaricom's to set up a 4G 
network in the country for $1.4 billion (Kinyanjui, 2011, online). Although, Huawei 
started as industrial equipment suppliers they are now increasingly focused on the 
consumer market with cheap mobile phones. Indeed, under a tied aid project with the 
Kenyan government, only Chinese companies could bid for a project for a police 
communications system. The project is being facilitated through a $100 million 
concessionary loan negotiated when Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki visited Beijing in 
May 2010 (Wahome, 2012, online). The linkage of FDI and development assistance from 
China can be witnessed such deals. 
31 Mobile money is a phone based money transfer service. 
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3.4: Official Development Assistance 
The final component of China's approach is development assistance. China has 
transformed into a major international donor of development assistance and has pledged 
to assist other developing countries "to the best of its abilities" (China, 2011).32 China 
asserts the fact that the aid it provides reaches many of the globe's poorest countries. 
China claims that it has provided aid to as many as 160 countries and 30 international 
agencies, and today it annually supports 100 countries: "China's foreign [aid] have 
achieved a certain scale, covered most developing countries, diversified forms and 
contents, and involved every area of the economic and social development of the aided 
countries" . Africa has been a special region of focus for China and it provides aid to 
fifty-one countries on the continent (China, 2011, online). To support such efforts, in 
2000 China created the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as an opportunity 
for China and 'friendly' African countries to gather and coordinate their policies. 
Subsequently, the financial resources allocated to the aid segment have been dramatically 
increasing, averaging 29.4% between 2004 and 2009 (China, 2011, online). Notably, 
Chinese foreign aid policy has some caveats that distinguish it from other forms of aid. 
These include focusing on two primary delivery vehicles: first, providing financial 
resources (i.e. grants, interest-free loans, and concessionary loans)34, and second, direct 
aid (i.e. infrastructure aid, technical assistance, and human-resource development). 
China considers itself to be a developing country. This designation entails receiving a longer grace period 
pertaining to international agreements such as the World Trade Organization and Kyoto Protocol. 
J Email communication, December 15, 2011.This information was received from the Chinese Embassy in 
Ottawa, Canada which was forwarded from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
4 Exim defines concessionary loans as: the medium and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by 
China Exim bank under the designation of the Chinese government with the nature of official assistance 
(Exim, 2010, p. 23). 
91 
The financial component of the policy is overseen by the 'policy' banks such as 
the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM), the Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC), and China Development Bank (CDB). Although these policy banks are similar 
to OECD export credit banks, what is unique is the enormous amount of money they 
lend; for example, Exim Bank is now larger than all other OECD export credit banks 
combined (Moss, 2011, p. 238). Exim Bank is by far the largest of these banks and is 
responsible for the delivery of all concessionary loans granted by the Chinese state 
(EXIM, 2010). Indeed, the company's annual report noted the bank's objectives: "While 
standing firmly behind Chinese companies to support their overseas investment, the Bank 
spared no efforts in advocating the concept of China's peaceful development, building 
mutual trust relations, clearing up confusion and misunderstandings, and guiding the 
international public opinion towards the correct direction" (EXIM, 2010, p. 48). 
Importantly, the company has staked its success on the ability to measure developing 
countries' access to China's promised financial assistance. 
Interest-free loans are the second segment of the monetary aid promoted by 
China; these interest-free loans, with a twenty-year repayment period, are often directed 
towards the construction of public goods such as hospitals and schools. Grants are used to 
train, house, and construct basic infrastructure in developing countries such as Kenya 
(China, 2011). Kenya has been a recipient of the various methods of assistance provided 
by China including both financial and direct aid. 
The direct aid component delivers assistance of'completed' projects with the help 
of China's companies, which include designing, surveying, and finally constructing 
infrastructure projects in the target country. China has noted it "has made full use of the 
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mature technologies and relative low cost of manpower to help other developing 
countries construct a host of infrastructure projects in transportation, communication, 
power supply, etc" (China, 2011, p. 16) According to China's foreign aid policy 
document (2011), these types of completed projects constitute 40% of China's foreign 
aid. Additionally, these completed projects numbered around 2000 by the end of 2009 
(excluding projects completed through loans). The human-resource development segment 
has traditionally been one of the most consistent forms of aid that China provides. This 
type of aid usually includes the training of people from developing countries, whereby 
the Chinese government pays for participants from target countries to attend training 
sessions in China. As a result, since the 1950s, 4000 training sessions per year take place 
and the outcome is over 120,000 individuals were trained in areas such as agriculture, 
health, and public administration by 2009 (China, 2011). Another area of focus explicitly 
promoted by the Chinese government has been in the medical arena. The Chinese 
government has agreed to help African governments reach their United Nations' 
mandated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by focusing on their health needs. 
The country has committed to providing medical teams, equipment, and training to 
African countries particularly through the FOCAC summit. As a consequence, the 
pharmaceuticals provided by China to developing countries have no strings attached. For 
example, China built an anti-malaria vaccine factory and provided the necessary 
equipment and training to Tanzanians (Brautigam, 2009). Another area of focus has been 
agriculture, with more of the direct aid in the dispatch of technical experts into the 
developing country to assist in the building of increased local agricultural capacity. The 
training of local expertise in focus areas of such as farm irrigation and the ability to use 
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agricultural equipment to help mechanize farming has been common (China, 2011). 
Education and educational exchanges are another part of the direct aid, as China provides 
aid for students to attend Chinese schools and the building of schools in the recipient 
country. Finally, industrial aid is designed to help developing countries create and 
improve the industrial sector where a lack of industry is viewed as the reason why many 
developing countries as see a negative transfer of income to industrialized countries. 
In Kenya, Chinese direct aid grants have been geared towards infrastructure 
projects, often utilized by a large segment of people in the country, such as the 
construction of schools and hospitals. In the 2006 agreement, China promised to increase 
this component of its development approach (Onjala, 2008b). Within two years of this 
agreement being signed, China became one of Kenya's largest sources development aid. 
More significantly, China's aid to Kenya "has become a very strong component of the 
foreign development assistance received in Kenya" (Onjala, 2008b, p. 39). Figure 3.3 
compares the largest bilateral donors to Kenya, and the most recent figures (2011/2012) 
confirm that China is the largest source of loans and is the eighth largest source of grants. 
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Figure 3.4: 2011/2012 Bilateral grants and loans estimates 
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Source: Data Government of Kenya 2011/2012 Estimates of Development Expenditure (201 Id, p. xi) 
China's aid has witnessed a dramatic rise, particularly since 2001. Although figures from 
2006-2010 have been hard to verify due to the lack of reporting35, Figure 3.4 shows 
China's growing development assistance. 
35 The UNDP's Development Cooperation Reports ceased being published in 2006. 
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Figure 3.5: China's development assistance 2000-2005 












2000 2001 2002 
Year 
2003 2004 2005 
Source: UNDP De\'elopment Cooperation Report Kenya various (UNDP, 2005, p. 38; UNDP, 2006, p. 40) 
In the 2011/2012 period, Chinese development assistance to Kenya has come to depend 
more heavily on loans rather than grants, as compared to Figure 3.4. Now, China has 
committed more than $240 million in loans, particularly in large infrastructure projects. 
In fiscal year 2011/2012, the one grant that China pledged was directed to a portion of a 
highway that was being constructed by Chinese firm. Table 3.8 summarises the assistance 
China has contributed towards Kenya's budget estimates in the fiscal year 2011/2012. 
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Table 3.7: China's development assistance to Kenya in 2011/2012 fiscal year 
Assistance category Project Amount 
Grant Gambogi - Serem road $4,836,993 
Loan Kenya Power and Distribution System and 
Modernization Project 
$49,579,183 
Kenya e-Government $1,408,720 
Nairobi Eastern and Northern bypass Project $26,602,435 
Nairobi-Thika Highway Improvement Project 
(LOT 3) 
$48,367,689 
Drilling of Olkaria IV Geothermal Wells $38,694,151 
Universities and Technical Training Institutes 
CITVET) 
$29,867,002 




Total Commitments $246,269,985 
Source: Data Government of Kenya 2011/2012 Estimates of Development Expenditure (Kenya, 201 Id, p. 
xxiii) 
Agriculture is Kenya's largest source of employment and income; the majority of 
Kenyans depend on agriculture for their livelihood. It is responsible for 26% of Kenya's 
GDP, second only the service sector (Kenya, 2010b). More than 70% of the labour force 
is employed in the agricultural sector; it produces 23% of value added, and 8% of 
merchandise exports. It also provides raw materials for Kenya's agro-industries, which 
account for 70% of its industrial production (Legovini, 2002, p. 6). Half of the sector's 
output remains subsistence production. However, due to Kenya's heavy reliance on the 
agricultural sector, and especially on rain-fed agriculture, it is left vulnerable to cycles of 
boom and bust (US, 2007, p. 9). China has promoted its development in the agriculture 
sector to help Kenya to improve its resiliency as a sector. 
Kenya and China signed a MOU in 2011 to increase cooperation in the 
agricultural sector through an initiative to increase Kenyan capacity while they also 
agreed to "collaboration as agricultural mechanization, waste water management, agro-
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processing and machinery and collaboration with [Kenya Agricultural Research Institute] 
in water harvesting and remote sensing" (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2011, online). 
Consequently, Kenya has received increased technical assistance and training in the 
agriculture sector from China. For instance, one form of assistance publicized was an 
exchange between Lanzhou University and various agricultural departments and agencies 
within Kenya. This exchange was meant to assist Kenya improve its capacity in dealing 
with water conservation and research into water conservation (Ministry of Commerce of 
China, 2011). The tours by members of the university included the training of Kenyans in 
coping with drought conditions that afflicted the country in 2011. Moreover, the Chinese 
university delegation delivered free equipment and other technologies to be utilized in 
Kenya (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2011). 
Finally, China has increasingly focused on small projects that could be quickly 
constructed and used. In 2007, China provided scholarships to forty Kenyans to attend 
universities in China, and pledged to double that number (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2007, online). In that same year, China provided a $3 million grant to the Kenyan army to 
buy spare parts for its Chinese-built air planes (US Embassy in Nairobi, 2008, online). In 
2010, China also built a new 112-bed hospital on the outskirts of Nairobi at a cost of $6 
million and provided $3 million in equipment (The Standard, 2011, online). Additionally, 
in 2010, China built two schools (Mihang'o Primary School in Nairobi and Eronge 
Primary School in North Mugirango), costing more than $120,000 (Guangyuan, 2010, 
online). The Chinese embassy provided office equipment to the Kenyan National 
Assembly, donated by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in November 2011 (Chinese Embassy in Kenya, 
2011a, online). The Chinese also donated more $20 million in emergency food aid to 
Kenya during its drought in 2011 including 2500 tons of rice destined to the Turkana 
region of Kenya (Embassy of China in Kenya, 201 lb, online). 
3.5: Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided data from the three distinct methods and illuminated 
applications of China's approach to development assistance in Kenya. Since Kenya's 
independence, China has been an active development donor. In the 1960s, China 
promoted a development model based on communist ideology and Kenya received 
development assistance that would help the global socialist movement. In the 1970s, with 
Kenya cementing ties with the West and China distracted with internal concerns, the 
relationship cooled. However, in the 1980s the relationship warmed when Daniel arap 
Moi became president, followed by his visit to Beijing, resulting in China constructing 
the Moi sports complex. 
More recently, China's ascendency as a global economic power has seen it 
increase its presence in Kenya though trade, FDI and direct aid. China is now Kenya's 
largest bilateral donor. Trade between the two countries has grown exponentially over the 
last decade and Chinese companies have an ever-expanding presence in the country. The 
FDI component has grown and an increasing number of Chinese multinational companies 
are starting to locate 'branch' plants in Kenya. Indeed, Chinese construction firms are 
dominating when it comes to large (with a longer period) construction projects in the 
country. The development assistance provided by China is mainly delivered through 
concessionary loans - and the grant aspect of China's approach is minuscule compared to 
the loans. As will be discussed in the next Chapter, the empirical evidence suggests that 
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China's approach seems to be benefiting China's needs and interests rather than Kenya's 
developmental requirements. However, as we will see in the next Chapter, Kenya has 
unquestioningly embraced China and its approach to development. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis and discussion 
4.1: Making Sense of the Kenya-China Relationship 
Having reviewed the empirical evidence in the third Chapter, this Chapter evaluates the 
impact and the debates surrounding China's approach to development assistance, trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and aid to Kenya. This Chapter aims to bring together 
field interviews, the aforementioned review of development policies, and the scholarly 
debates explored in the literature review in order to articulate the development 
implications for Kenya. The previous Chapter contextualized the relationship by 
assessing how each component of the approach is currently playing out in Kenya. 
Historically, the two countries have had a warm relationship which resulted in 
development assistance being granted to Kenya in exchange for diplomatic support. More 
recently, China's three-pronged approach to development assistance has been credited by 
the Kenyan government as a factor in helping to transform its development path; 
President Kibaki even declared that China is a "genuine development partner" 
(Presidential Press Service, 2009). Based on the data provided in the previous Chapter, it 
is apparent that China's development approach is having mixed results in Kenya. The 
first approach assessed found trade between the two countries is growing at an 
increasingly rapid pace and indeed China is now Kenya's largest source of imports. The 
implications, however, in order to redress the growing trade imbalance, have included 
both Kenya and China publicly stating that diversifying Kenya's exports should be the 
principal way to negate this imbalance. Nonetheless, alternatives include seeing China 
focus infrastructure projects to help Kenya maximize its economic efficiency as well as 
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the encouragement of additional Chinese investment into Kenya. Such efforts have 
resulted in various Chinese individuals and companies investing in the country. Finally, 
China's aid has been primarily geared towards capacity building and infrastructure 
projects that are billed as mutually beneficial. This Chapter critically assesses the 
development implications by utilizing a framework of analysis of the various aspects of 
the relationship and what this all means for Kenya's stated developmental objectives. 
Ultimately, the argument of this thesis is: current trends all point to China's economic 
and geo-strategic needs rather than Kenya's developmental needs. 
4.2: A framework of analysis 
To that end, a framework that assesses the impact of China's approach to development 
needs to be applied so as to examine its full effects on Kenya. This thesis has adapted a 
framework developed by Raphael Kaplinsky, Dorothy McCormick, and Mike Morris 
(2007) which analyzed the impact that China's approach is having on Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). This framework attempts to systematically evaluate China's impact even when 
lacking definitive data. The accessible data provides significant information regarding 
monetary amounts granted, the direction of trade and the destination of investment 
capital. However, often lacking is how to interpret that data. The purpose of the 
framework is to dig deeper into the existing data to find out in what ways African 
countries are benefiting as well as how they are losing? Moreover, in which sectors are 
African countries most or least competitive? (Kaplinsky, McCormick, & Morris, 2008, p. 
2) By employing a systemic method to identify these positive and negative impacts 
allows for a more nuanced and robust analysis which, in turn, provides insightful 
recommendations. While acknowledging the existence of other factors such as the 
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environment, institutional participation and financial flows, the authors utilized the 
framework to evaluate China's impact on trade, FDI, and aid across SSA (Kaplinsky, 
McCormick, & Morris, 2007, p. 13). The authors theorized, in each of the three areas of 
study, that China is either complementary or competitive (sometimes both) when it comes 
to the relationship with SSA. However, it should be noted that not all categories can be 
plugged into the framework. For instance, they pointed out that China can be a source of 
low-cost goods, but it could also be the result in the closing of uncompetitive industries in 
SSA, which provide employment in the small but vital industrial sector. Nevertheless, 
they found that China is competitive in many other aspects that would be detrimental to 
SSA. China, in each of these methods, can also be either direct or indirect. In this case, 
China could directly import a product from an SSA country, but it could also be 
responsible for the increase in consumer prices of products (Kaplinsky, McCormick, & 
Morris, 2007, p. 13). This Chapter applies this framework to Kenya, and in some 
instances will modify it to fit the local situation in the country using relevant examples 
that were discussed in this and the previous Chapter. 
The first component of the framework is trade. China is now Kenya's largest 
bilateral trading partner. As was illustrated above the trade deficit between the two 
countries, especially since in 1993 when Kenya implemented SAP mandated free-market 
reforms, has increased dramatically in favour of China. The goods exported by Kenya 
still constitute a similar basket of goods as a decade ago (primary commodities), but the 
goods coming into Kenya have diversified (manufactured goods). Kenya has seen a direct 
impact on one product that is traded with China as it increased dramatically in price; a 
phenomenon which can be directly contributed to China's rising demand. The product in 
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question is copper as was illustrated in figure 4.1, which highlighted the increase in 
copper prices as evidenced in figure 4.2, whereby the revenues generated by the exports 
of Kenyan copper as a result of the increase in global prices. 
A second component is Chinese direct investments in the country which have 
been one of the most visible aspects of China's approach. We have observed Chinese 
companies open automobile assembly plants and the Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) sector is integrated with Chinese technology. Chinese companies 
have established themselves in Kenya's EPZs. Chinese entrepreneurs are being assisted 
by the Chinese government to relocate some operations to Kenya, however, it should be 
noted that China and Kenya are competitors for investments globally. The East African 
Community (EAC) member states, of which Kenya is the largest economy, are also direct 
competitors for Chinese investments in the region. 
The third and final component of the framework is development aid. Chinese 
grants have been mainly directed towards capacity building such as the training of public 
servants, and extending scholarships to Kenyan students. The Kenyan government has 
been able to access concessional loans and export credits from China. The concessional 
loans are largest component of the aid component of the approach. The neglected 
network of roads are finally being rebuilt and expanded due largely to Chinese loans and 
grants. 
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Table 4.1: A framework to analyze China's development a 
Trade Direct impact Indirect impact 
Complementary * Copper prices 
* Iron ore 
* Consumer goods 
* Tourism 
* Increased competition 
for Kenyan goods 
Competitive * Kenyan batteries 
* Chinese labour cost 
* Textiles 
* Loss of market share 




Complementary * automobile 
assembly 
* Information and 
Communication 
sector 
* Access to a larger 
amount of investment and 
financing options 
Competitive * The hoarding 
acquired of 
technologies 
* Increased capital 
reinvestment cost 
* Increased competition 
from other jurisdictions 





Complementary * grants for schools 




Competitive * Aid to neighbouring 
countries 
iproach's impact on Kenya 
Source: adaptedfrom Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris (2007, p. 35) 
4.3: A survey of Kenyan attitudes on China 
As a starting point, a survey of the attitudes and perceptions of Kenyans will be utilized 
to establish the Kenya-China relationship in a wider milieu. By acknowledging how 
Kenyans, in general, view China, this thesis can then provide a cogent analysis of the 
development implications. In a study completed by the Pew Research Center, through its 
annual Global Attitudes Survey of twenty-three nations, China and Chinese companies 
were found to be viewed positively in Kenya, with many Kenyans believing that such 
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relations to be a positive influence in the country/6 When Kenyans were asked "Will 
China replace the U.S. as the world's leading superpower?" opinion in the country was 
split; 44% of respondents answered that indeed China has already replaced or will soon 
replace the US as the world's superpower, while in contrast, 43% of respondents 
answered that China will never replace the US as the world's preeminent power (Pew 
Research Center, 2011, p. 1). In the same survey, more Kenyans perceived China's 
growing military rise as a good thing (62%), as opposed to it being a bad thing (29%) 
(Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 7). Moreover, Kenyans generally viewed China's 
economic rise as favourable, an overwhelming majority (85%) believed that China 
economic rise was a good thing as compared to a bad thing (12%) (Pew Research Center, 
2011, p. 7). Finally, Kenyans have had a consistently positive view of China over the last 
three years, a finding that shows Kenyans differ from many other countries sampled 
which generally view China in a negative light. For example in 2009, when asked "Do 
you have a [favourable] or [unfavourable] view of China?" 73% of respondents had a 
favourable opinion, which ranked Kenya as third highest among the nations surveyed. In 
2010, even more Kenyans (86%) viewed China in a positive light; though this shrunk in 
2011, when a total of 71% replied that China is a positive manner. Having acknowledged 
the generally positive view held by Kenyans towards China, this thesis explores one area 
,h In the survey, 1004 adult Kenyans were surveyed face to face between March 24 and April 5, 2011 with 
a margin of error of +/-4.0%, of the 23 countries surveyed, Kenya was the only African country (Pew 
Research Center, 2011). 
37 Interestingly, Kenya's numbers are split compared to Western European countries that overwhelmingly 
believe that China will replace or has already replaced the US as the world's superpower, for example, 
France (72%), Britain (65%), and Germany (61%). Kenya's figures are split in a similar fashion as 
American respondents (46%) who answered that China will replace or has already replaced the US as the 
world's superpower versus (45%) who believed that it will never over take the US (Pew Research Center, 
2011, p. 7). 
38 However, more Kenyan (62%) believed that the US to be the current leading economic power in the 
world, China came in a distant second at 20% followed by Japan at 7% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 16). 
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that illustrates China's growing political influence over the Kenyan government, China's 
unwavering support during the International Criminal Court (ICC) process. China's 
support has exposed its entrenched influence in country, although the ICC trials have 
divided Kenyans themselves. 
4.3.1: The ICC, Kenya, and China 
China has emerged a strong defender of Kenya's sovereignty through its stated policy of 
non-interference, best exemplified within the International Criminal Court (ICC) trials. 
The ICC investigated members of the Kenyan government in the aftermath of the 
2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya. In December 2007, the country became 
engulfed in post-election violence, which erupted following a contested election between 
the opposition leader Raila Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and 
the sitting President Mwai Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU). While ODM won the 
most seats (92) in parliament, with other opposition parties winning 27 seats in the 
national assembly in addition to the PNU's 34 seats (Prunier, 2008, online), the conflict 
revolved around the presidential contest. Although Kibaki was declared the winner of the 
presidency by a slim margin (2.5%) many independent observers, and later the 
independent electoral commissioner, claimed Odinga to have won the presidency 
(Prunier, 2008, online). The opposition, with evidence from European Union election 
observer's, alleged that the Kibaki government committed election fraud on a grand scale 
in many districts throughout the country (Branch, 2011, pp. 269-271). In spite of these 
challenges, Kibaki did not relinquish the presidency, inviting a crisis in the country as 
both men vied for power. In the ensuing chaos, ethnic violence saw at least 1,133 people 
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killed and many hundreds of thousands internally displaced (Aljazeera, 2008, online; 
AFP, 2012, online). 
Under dire circumstances, the major political parties agreed to form a government 
of national unity in an effort to end the turmoil and restore peace. The agreement 
stipulated that Kibaki remain as president but with Odinga as Prime Minster and other 
opposition leaders elevated to Vice Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers. In the 
aftermath of the violence, many sought to try to find the root cause of the violence. As a 
start, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (commonly referred to as the 
Waki Commission after its chairman) was established to "to investigate the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their 
handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters" (Waki, 
2008, p. 1). Indeed, the report concluded that anyone found to have instigated or 
participated in the violence should not be given amnesty and also should be prosecuted 
under national and international law (Waki, 2008, p. 468). However, due to the nature of 
the national unity agreement, prosecution of some of the prominent members became 
virtually impossible. A law that would establish a tribunal to put on trial those 
responsible failed to pass parliament on three separate occasions (Brown & Sriram, 2012, 
p. 245). 
Therefore, the ICC stepped in as a response to the perceived failure of local 
authorities to try to bring to justice some of the perpetuators of the violence. Kenya 
adamantly protested the decision by arguing that it could (and would) bring to justice 
anyone responsible for the violence on its own. For this reason, Kenya lobbied the United 
Nations to try to prevent the ICC from putting on trial six prominent supporters from both 
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major parties. One of the strongest supporters of Kenya's call to stay the ICC charges 
against the six was China39. In fact, China on various occasions stated its support for the 
Kenyan government by arguing that this was a matter of national sovereignty. Rather 
than trying the six outside the country, which many (including members of parliament) 
assumed would create a backlash in Kenya and possibly result in more violence, China 
assisted Kenya in trying to defer the case for one year so as it could establish its own laws 
to put the accused on trial (Gevers & Du Plessis, 2011, p. 3). China's vice premier, Wang 
Qishan, when visiting Kenya in 2008, affirmed China's position on the ICC with regards 
to Kenya as "China supported home grown solutions that would help Kenya overcome 
any challenges it faced including the ICC process" (Presidential Press Service, 2008, 
online). At the UN, China also held further informal meetings with other countries to try 
to stop the ICC charges against the Kenyan nationals (Ochami, 2011, online). China went 
even further when, holding the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security 
Council, it placed the concerns of Kenya on the agenda to try to convince other Security 
Council members adamantly opposed to the deferral. In spite of these efforts, in March 
2012, the ICC confirmed the charges and proceeded to take them to trial (AFP, 2012). 
China's policy of non-interference and deference towards national sovereignty 
has brought to the fore, as many argue, the entrenchment of national political and 
economic elites in developmental countries like Kenya. Denis M. Tull (2006) argues that 
these policies benefit "unsavoury regimes [and are], likely to undermine existing efforts 
at political liberalisation at large. Revenues from trade (and taxes), development 
assistance and other means of support widen the margins of manoeuvre of Africa's 
39 China is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which resulted in the 
creation of the ICC and it is often critical of the ICC and its decisions (Jianping & Zhixiang, 2005). 
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autocrats, and help them to rein in domestic demands for democracy and the respect for 
human rights" (Tull, 2006, p. 474). In Kenya, the Chinese government adamantly 
defended the Kenyan political elite, who have returned the embrace - best illustrated 
when the Kenyan president claimed he is an advocate of the now official 'Look-East' 
policy starting in 2011 (Xinhua, 2012). 
The basis behind the protection of the Kenyans from the ICC has been the 
diverging interpretation of human rights (Brown & Sriram, 2008, p. 252). The Chinese 
government has always asserted human rights should be considered within the purview of 
national sovereignty. For example, Taylor (2009) noted, "[t]he persistent call by Western 
leaders to universalize "international human rights" - which implicitly boil down to 
Western capitalist values - can be countered by Beijing and its African allies as reflecting 
neo-colonial impulses. Conversely, however, China's leaders may be seeking to 
rationalize their policies on human rights in ways that universalize China's post-Mao 
developmental trajectories" (Taylor, 2009, p. 171). In Kenya, this policy was most 
evident in China's unwavering support to defer the ICC case. 
Ultimately, China's support for a 'home grown' solution in the Kenyan context 
can be traced to its own geo-political interests. As the ICC process has advanced, China's 
support for the Kenyan government is often compared to China's support of other 
illiberal regimes throughout the world. Brown and Sriram (2008) went further by 
concluding "China is a natural 'alternative partner of pariah states'" (p. 263). This 
strategy, some have claimed, works for China through its support of pariah states 
ensuring China's own human rights record is not subject to international criticism in 
forums like the UN Human Rights Council (Copson, 2007, p. 63). Along with other 
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factors such as the Chinese government lack of action against pariah regimes which 
abuse human rights is motivated by its desire to protect its access to their resources and 
markets. It should be noted that China's influence over these types of government can 
sometimes be exaggerated and in many instances they do not have decisive influence 
over the offending countries. However, in Kenya, China's unwavering support for 
members within the government has demonstrated that China is protecting its strong ally 
both politically and economically, especially in the East African context. China's support 
has raised questions as to what the Kenyan political elites have given to China in return 
for its support, however, without access to the inner workings of the Kenyan government 
or bilateral documents this research could not definitively conclude that China had 
received a direct quid pro quo. Importantly, what the ICC process has confirmed, at least 
anecdotally, is my argument that China seems to support Kenya because it furthers its 
economic and geostrategic needs rather than letting the perpetrators of the election 
violence be put to an impartial trail. 
4.4: Trade: challenges and opportunities 
To review, in Chapter 3 the data relating to the trade component of China's approach 
showed that bilateral trade has grown dramatically, particularly over the last decade. 
Indeed, when the trade relationship is investigated more thoroughly, the research 
uncovered that trade is overwhelmingly in favour of China. When we look at the goods 
exported to China, we notice that Kenya relies on primary commodities such as tea, 
fruits, and fish. However, China exports value-added manufactured goods such as 
telecommunication equipment, machinery, and textiles to the Kenyan market. As was 
observed in Figure 3.1 in the previous Chapter, this bodes poorly for Kenya's net-barter 
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terms of trade which favoured China, to the tune of $1.5 billion in 2010 (CBIK, 2011)/° 
This raises crucial questions: what is the wider significance of China's trading 
relationship with Kenya and how will this impact Kenya's developmental plans? 
To begin, Kenya has promoted the idea of diversifying its economy away from 
being commodity centric to one that is industrial in nature. The orientation towards 
industrial trade would result in a largely export-led economy particularly of manufactured 
products. The export-led model was utilized by East Asian economies, including China, 
to help them rapidly industrialize in the 1980s (Xu, 2010, p. 20). However, Kenya's 
industrialization efforts have come under significant pressure due to Chinese competition, 
as evidenced by the goods imported into the Kenyan market. Such cheap Chinese goods 
are double-edged in their effects. Chinese goods have negatively impacted Kenya's small 
but vital industrial sector by depriving them of a home market. This has been noticed by 
the Kenyan Government, best illustrated by a question put forward by a member of the 
opposition when asking what the government would be doing to stop this negative trend 
"most of the factories in this country have closed down because of cheap imports from 
China...as long as we encourage cheap imports from China, most of our factories will 
close down and we will not be able to generate employment for our people" (Hansard, 
2011, p. 5). The government responded by reminding the opposition member that 
Kenya's free market policy encourages Kenyan companies "to compete with foreign 
companies and improve their efficiencies" (Hansard, 2011, p. 5). The current dominant 
international economic order, which China has wholeheartedly embraced, is often at the 
centre of the discourse. 
40 Net-barter terms of trade are measured by the ratio between the unit value (price) index of exports and 
that of the imports (Goldstein, Pinaud, & Reisen, 2008, p. 35). 
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As Adama Gaye (2008) noted, "[wjhatever one thinks of Chinese methods, it 
must be granted that the Chinese have a perfect understanding of a liberal economy, 
including the huge opportunities it offers as well as well as the many flaws" (p. 134). 
This line of analysis was also articulated by Ian Taylor (2009) when he posited, "Chinese 
economic policies, if at times arguably neomercantilist, are fundamentally capitalist. The 
post-Mao Chinese leadership is thus doing precisely what the West wants it to do and yet 
it is, on occasion castigated for doing so in areas formally held to be in the West's sphere 
of influence" (p. 178). Further, Michael Chege (2008) also argues that fears about China 
are overstated and that this mainly due the fact China is challenging the current world 
order by being more nimble in the African market (p. 37). Others, such as David Harvey, 
have gone further by asserting that China is part of a global political and economic order 
that has transported a capitalist regime through a process of 'accumulation by 
dispossession' (Carmody, 2011, p. 69). Marcus Power and Giles Mohan have labeled this 
'Chinese Neoliberalism' which has its own characteristics, but which is centred on the 
international market - attracting FDI, technology transfer, and an abundant supply of 
cheap labour (Power & Mohan, 2011, p. 51). Importantly, the market fundamentalism 
that swept the world became a conduit for China to move into African countries. 
Beginning in the 1980s, Kenya implemented neoliberal reforms as part of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) mandated by the IFIs, these reforms also 
necessitated the removal of trade barriers to international trade. These perceived barriers 
to international trade included the restriction of financials flows, the removal of tariffs to 
protect local industries, and the strict enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Consequently, SAPs were implemented in areas traditionally left under the direction of 
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the recipient countries, including policies that related to industry, market liberalization 
and privatization (Chang, 2008, p. 32). Additionally, countries were encouraged to 
devalue their currencies, remove price controls on consumer goods as well as policies 
that 'let the market work' (Meilink, 1996, p. 3). In Kenya, SAPs became entrenched in 
government policies after the country experienced a balance of payments crisis as the 
1970s came to a close. In the early 1990s, the government had capitulated to donor 
countries and IFIs after its SAP credits were suspended and started instituting neoliberal 
policies that pried open the country's market. A confluence of events led to the dramatic 
shift in policies which included: "the liberalization of imports and exports, the removal of 
exchange controls and freed exchange mechanisms; [and] removed barriers to foreign 
investment" (Meilink, 1996, p. 11). As mentioned in the previous chapter, especially in 
1993, a direct outcome included a striking rise in China's imports into Kenya, this shift to 
free markets resulted in a number of Chinese companies taking advantage of a less strict 
business environment which has provided stiff competition to local industries (Chege, 
2008, p. 22). Markedly, China has extended its reach into the Kenya natural resource 
sector. 
As illustrated in the previous Chapter, Kenya's small but significant mineral 
exports have yielded better returns due to China's demand for natural resources. Andrea 
Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud, and Helmut Reisen (2008) posited that China can be directly 
credited with the increased demand for such raw materials globally. The authors argue 
that African markets are doubly benefiting, firstly, as consumers of the cheap Chinese-
made goods and additionally as African investors benefit from lower capital costs with an 
increased access to more products. Secondly, as noted by Goldstein, Pinaud, and Reisen 
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(2008), many African countries such as Kenya can benefit in some instances because the 
commodities they are sending to China are increasing in price and the cost of the goods 
imported are reduced (pp. 34-35). However, this can be a double-edged sword because 
Kenya can also negatively affected by the increase in prices of commodities as a 
resource-poor country. This is particularly true in the case of oil, which has increased in 
price due to the emerging economies ever-increasing demand (Goldstein, Pinaud, & 
Reisen, 2008, p. 40). This has raised questions about the true beneficiary of China's 
resource thirst framing how its development aid is granted in Kenya. 
Some have pointed to China's strategy of securing natural resources through 
bilateral agreements rather than trying to acquire them through the open market, 
especially in the energy sector (Zafar, 2007, p. 120). In Kenya, the oil for aid strategy 
was most visible in a 2006 oil agreement the two countries signed. This was reinforced in 
2010, when the Kenyan president signed an agreement to transfer oil exploration rights 
for six blocks in exchange for $7.5 million in aid grants (Foreign Confidential, 2006, 
online). Even though, this agreement called for lower exploration fees than both what the 
Spanish and Swedish oil companies offered to the Kenyan government (The China 
Monitor, 2006, p. 12). At the time of the agreement, no large oil deposits had been found 
in Kenyan territory, yet China persuaded the Kenyan government to remove some oil 
exploration blocs from the open bidding process in exchange for aid. 
In Kenya, warnings have been issued with regards to China's move into the 
resource sector, within which Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, are now major 
players. Chinese firms have been rewarded with rights in coal mines, the previously 
mentioned exploration of oil, and into titanium (Onjala, 2008b, p. 20; Mullin, 2009, p. 
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53) However, Joseph Onjala (2008b) also pointed that "if the underlying goal of China's 
aid [to Kenya] is the drive to access raw materials and markets in Kenya, it will hurt 
Kenya's economy in the long run by undermining the ability of local firms to exploit the 
same market and resources" (p. 42). For this reason, many have argued that the 'Angola 
mode' of aid delivery is very much evident in Kenya, including the fact that China ties 
the aid which it gives to Kenya. To illustrate, the assistance that has been made available 
is transferred to Chinese companies to build projects. It should be noted that the Kenyan 
government denies this comparison and in fact, one government official denied the 
Angola mode applies to Kenya when directly asked in an interview with this researcher. 
Kenya's embrace of China exposed the growing tensions with its traditional 
Western donors. For example, a row which became public when German ambassador to 
Kenya Margit Hellwig-Boette and her French counterpart Etienne de Poncins voiced 
concerns that the Kenyan president was refusing to meet with Western envoys under the 
belief the Kenyan government was giving priority to the Chinese government. The 
response from the Kenyan government was the "President has been strategic and has not 
been unreachable to any nation that works for the good of the Kenyan people and 
appreciates the role played by external partners in endeavours to uplift the lives of 
Kenyans and citizens of neighbouring states" (Kibirenge, 2012, online). Consequently, 
the Kenyan government has been cautioned, by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
among others, of blindly following China's approach to the detriment of other donors, 
which could bind the country to China (Momanyi, 2010). Furthermore, in bid to match 
China's economic rise in Africa, the United States government released a new Africa 
strategy that closely resembles China's approach emphasizing trade and investment while 
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reducing the grant provisions, in addition to democratic ideals and security (The White 
House, 2012). Meanwhile, the EU has tried, with little success, to engage China directly 
by proposing the establishment of a tri-lateral method between China, EU, and Africa to 
cooperate (Lirong, 2011, p. 5). 
Accordingly, some negative intentions of China's financing of transportation 
infrastructure in Kenya are frequently raised. Many claim such projects facilitate easier 
access to these raw commodities (Alden, 2007, p. 44; de Oliveira, 2008, p. 97). China's 
focus on infrastructure has aroused suspicion that it is simply acting in its own self-
interest in order to access the resources of Kenya's neighbours who have proven caches 
of natural resources such as crude oil, cobalt, and diamonds (Nibishaka, 2011, p. 7). For 
example, Daniel Fiott (2010) asserted that the Chinese government "seized on the 
opportunity to develop major transport links to support its own economic interests" (p. 8). 
This hypothesis had already been widely circulated, as noted by a report in an American 
news service that "[c]ountries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia rely on Kenya to export their vast deposits of oil and 
minerals. Infrastructure development in Kenya is crucial to the economic prosperity of 
the entire region" (Onyiego, 2010, online). Likewise, in a prominent example, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while traveling in Tanzania and Zambia in June 2011, 
warned against what she termed 'new colonialism' in reference to China and its approach 
in Africa.41 Clinton warned against investors and countries only interested in Africa's 
natural resources and reinforcing the power of the elites (AP, 2011). This forceful 
41 Although she did not mention China by name, the Chinese government responded through a state-owned 
newspaper to this by claiming that Clinton was simply "China-bashing" again (Liang, 2011). 
117 
pushback by Western countries regarding China's involvement in Africa - and Kenya 
specifically - has exposed the inherent suspicion China's forceful role engenders. 
4.4.1: Infrastructure assistance - the core of China's approach 
In Kenya's 2011/2012 budget, China is the largest source of funds to construct roads, 
railroads, along with general infrastructure upgrades in Kenya, surpassing all DAC states 
as illustrated in Figure 3.3 in the previous Chapter. To reiterate, since 2006, China has 
provided more than $250 million to build and rehabilitate more than 900km of roads in 
Kenya (Fiott, 2010, p. 8; Kenya, 201 Id, p. xi). For this reason, both the Kenyan and 
Chinese government have stressed that these projects should be considered to be 'win-
win'. The Kenyan president, while visiting China in 2010, proclaimed that China is "a 
critical ally in Kenya's economic revival that has led to major infrastructural development 
in the country" (China Daily, 2010, online). Kenya's Prime Minister (and opposition 
leader), Raila Odinga, also reiterated this shift by stating, "Kenya and China have 
graduated into all-weather and all-time friends" (Chinese embassy in Kenya, 2012a, 
online). Undoubtedly, Kenya has been able to point to various projects that have been 
undertaken due to Chinese loans and grants, however, various questions have been raised 
about the true implications of China's aid in the infrastructure sector. 
Essentially, arguments in favour of China's role in Kenya rest on the idea that it is 
the most appropriate development partner that can assist Kenya to improve its basic 
infrastructure. In an interview with a staff member of Kenya's High Commission in 
Ottawa, they noted that China's focus on infrastructure addresses an area that is often 
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neglected by Western countries in their aid programs.42 While the interviewee added that 
this does not mean Western aid is not needed or unwelcome, nonetheless, Western aid 
focused more on the governance and the furtherance of Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) or similar policies. Thus, in Kenya, aid is not a field of competition between the 
two approaches. China's aid is geared towards the improvement of infrastructure while 
Western aid focuses more on matters of governance and social development. Indeed, 
China is implementing a strategy similar to that first propagated by development theorists 
in the 1950s, strategies that focused on letting the recipient state take the lead in 
distributing aid while also placing a heavy emphasis on capital infusion in large-scale 
projects (Brautigam, 2009). Equally important is the idea that China's delivery of aid is 
more direct and the reason why countries such as Kenya are attracted to it is due to "its 
bare-bones bureaucratic simplicity, in comparison to the donor red tape that is in part 
motivated [by] the Paris Declaration toward higher efficiency through improved 
coordination between donors. Once agreed on at the political level, China-funded projects 
are completed by Chinese contractors more quickly" (Chege, 2008, p. 29). China itself 
has promoted the idea that its development is more responsive to Kenya's immediate 
needs. The Chinese ambassador to Kenya noted that these projects "effectively improve 
the standard of living of the people of Kenya and the region"43 (Chinese Embassy in 
Kenya, 2012b, online) and this was restated in official policy documents provided by the 
Chinese embassy in Ottawa. This researcher, while in the field, encountered a recurring 
reason as to why Kenya prefers Chinese projects is attributed factors including the rapid 
42 This interview was conducted on January 3, 2012 at the Ottawa embassy. 
" ' This was translated from Mandarin using Google translator web service. 
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pace by which the projects are implemented when compared to projects funded by 
Western donors. 
Due to China's increased focus on granting infrastructure aid, the Kenyan 
government has been able to invest in its dilapidated infrastructure, which it neglected 
during the SAPs era. For example, although the country has almost 64,000km classified 
as roads, only 14% of those roads are paved (Kenya, 2009, p. 3). The Kenyan 
government noted how the poor state of its overall infrastructure was hampering its 
development vision: 
The country's infrastructure is characterized by [a] 
dilapidated road network, inadequate and inefficient 
rail network, unreliable supply and costly electricity 
and other utilities, and poor communication 
facilities. Poor infrastructure has increased the cost 
of doing business, thereby discouraging private 
sector investment. This has effectively hampered 
economic development. The challenge facing the 
country is provision of an enabling environment for 
private sector investment by ensuring adequate 
infrastructure. (Kenya, 2009, p. 14) 
Hence, Kenya turned to China for development assistance, particularly to improve its 
infrastructure because it is often perceived to have 'no strings' attached. In fact, this 
concept commonly arose across the various interviews conducted with Kenyan and 
Chinese officials. Nevertheless, contrary to the publicly stated claim that 'no-strings' are 
attached to Chinese aid, Chinese development aid is indeed tied to Chinese firms, as the 
field research confirmed. Although this criticism has been levelled at traditional donors 
too, DAC countries must clearly state 'tied-aid' and many countries now generally strive 
to identify tied-aid not as part of their official development assistance (ODA) unless 
projects "cannot attract commercial financing, although OECD members would be 
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required to report the offer and its terms so that other OECD members could compete on 
the same terms if they were so inclined" (Brautigam, 2011, p. 212). Critics have pointed 
out that the recipient country does not gain the potential multiple effects resulting from 
the loans. To illustrate, Kenya acquires a loan to build a road, if the contract is awarded to 
a local firm. Then the local firm would likely employ locals and acquire equipment and 
materials that are sourced locally, taking advantage of an economy-of-scale whereby the 
firms could then be more resilient by taking a number of the projects, all the while 
acquiring knowledge and experience that can be applied to future projects. Critics of the 
assistance granted by the Chinese government further disadvantaged local firms in 
various ways. 
One frequent criticism, that time and again arose out of the field research 
interviews, included complaints that the Chinese companies are being given preference in 
the larger contracts, especially through the secret bilateral agreements signed with the 
Chinese government. In fact, the Kenyan government has allowed China Road to bid on 
projects which are labelled 'domestic only' (Mullin, 2009, p. 50). Companies such as 
China Road also play an outsized role in determining the financing that Kenya receives 
from China. The normal application procedures that are required to gain a loan from 
China can take years to come to fruition and as such Chinese companies offer a faster 
route to gain the loans. More specifically, Chinese construction companies "use their 
networks with both the Kenyan government as well as China Exim to bypass this 
application process" (Mullin, 2009, p. 57). Consequently, the Chinese companies are 
often at the centre of debates surrounding China's role in infrastructure development. 
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Furthermore, large projects allowed Chinese firms to establish themselves in 
Kenya, detrimentally impacting local firms which could not compete against the well-
financed, cheaper bids funded by the Chinese government. Additionally, the research 
exposed a process that further eroded Kenyan firms' ability to bid on the projects by 
predicating the loans on Chinese sourced materials and equipment. Further yet, as 
interviewees pointed out, due to the use of imported Chinese labourers and managers in 
the road projects hinders some benefits that Kenya might gain from the projects. This 
brings out the criticism that the promised technology and human skills transfer are often 
not witnessed because as soon the job is completed the Chinese firms repatriate their 
workers, management and equipment. My field research confirmed that all manuals were 
in Mandarin rather than English, adding another layer of complication and making it 
likely that these projects are designed in such a manner so as to guarantee the return of 
the Chinese companies to conduct the necessary maintenance in the future. Indeed, the 
research uncovered that Chinese aid, although welcomed, does have some of their own 
'strings attached', crafted to further Chinese economic expansion. 
Further, allegations of corrupt practices have accompanied some of the Chinese 
companies, particularly the construction companies, which have firmly established 
themselves in Kenya. Overall, Chinese companies have consistently been ranked at or 
near the bottom of the indexes of bribery around the world. This was quantified in a study 
by Transparency International through its Bribery Payers Index44, which ranked China 
twenty-seventh out of twenty-eight of the largest economies in the world, just ahead of 
44 This was based on its 2011 which surveyed more than "3,000 business executives worldwide about their 
views on the extent to which companies from 28 of the world's leading economies engage in bribery when 
doing business abroad" (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011). 
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Russia (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011, p. 5). For example, the allegation of corrupt practices 
by two Chinese state-owned construction companies which have come to dominate the 
Kenyan infrastructure sector - China Road and Bridge Corporation (more commonly 
referred to as China Road) and China Wu Yi Co. Ltd. - saw them banned from all World 
Bank-financed projects for a period of five to eight years over corrupt practices in a 
World Bank-financed project in the Philippines. According to the World Bank, these two 
companies "had participated in a collusive scheme designed to establish bid prices at 
artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and 
open competition" (World Bank, 2009, online). As was noted in the third Chapter, in 
spite of these problems, the two companies maintain major on-going projects in Kenya. 
When questions were put to the Kenyan government later in August 2009 as to why it 
had awarded a contract to China Roads to build the Northern By-pass in Nairobi at a cost 
of $105 million when it was blacklisted by the World Bank for corruption, the 
government replied "one condition set out is that the company that would undertake this 
particular project would be a Chinese company. In this particular case, the Chinese 
government, in consultation with the government of Kenya arrived at the China Road and 
Construction Company" (Hansard, 2009, p. 20). This choice was thus driven by the 
bilateral agreement, stipulated by the Chinese government, as it was providing 70% of 
the financing for the project. 
In Kenya, corruption allegations have sprouted up every so often. The first 
example of corrupt practices by Chinese firms was alleged by the United States, through 
its diplomatic cables, which implicated the Chinese telecommunication giant ZTE of 
bribing Michael Gichangi, the Director General of Kenya's National Security and 
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Intelligence Service (NSIS). Gichangi's was reported to have pressured his subordinates 
to give preference to ZTE "based on kickbacks he received from the company while on a 
visit to China", while the Director of Operations Division Joseph Kamau "received 
monthly payments of over $5000 from ZTE which were used to pay medical bills" (US 
Embassy Nairobi, 2010, online). It is important to note that these allegations were never 
proven in court and, in fact, Gichangi has remained in his government position. Given 
these points, the second component of China's approach, FDI, has extenuated some of the 
criticism of the whole approach. 
4.5: Who benefits? FDI as a development approach 
An important conduit of Chinese FDI are its state owned enterprises (SOEs), these 
corporate champions have been specially selected by the Chinese government to "join the 
Fortune 500 ranks" (Alden, 2007, p. 40). Alden (2007) identified three important aspects 
of the Chinese approach) competitive political advantage 2) comparative economic 
advantage 3) diplomacy and development assistance (p. 42). When it comes to the 
attraction of FDI, China itself is considered to be a direct competitor to Kenya because 
both countries offer access to a large pool of cheap labour. Lower labour costs are often 
cited as advantageous for China as many companies have themselves set up shop in the 
country for various reasons, mainly because labour costs are much lower. In addition to 
its lower start-up costs the Chinese government provides incentives such as cheaper land 
and infrastructure costs. A crucial factor is that other companies have set up shop in 
China thus the inputs required to make the goods can be obtained quickly (Breslin, 2007, 
p. 115). Lately, in order to differentiate itself from low-cost competitors like Kenya, 
China is increasingly focused on attracting investment that helps it move up the 
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production scale. And it is encouraging Chinese companies to expand outside of China. 
This strategy would help Chinese companies in such light industries as textiles, often the 
first casualty of economic progress and development of a country, keep their competitive 
edge. One country that has attracted such Chinese investments has been Kenya. In Kenya, 
a majority of the direct investment that are backed from China have gone into the light 
manufacturing, service, and textile industries. This is in contrast to most other African 
states which have witnessed most such Chinese investments directed towards extractive 
resources. 
Over the last decade, Chinese companies have dominated large scale projects such 
as geothermal production in the country, due in part to China's active courting of Kenya. 
Kenya has quickly embraced Chinese investments as one way to try to kick start its 
lagging investment sector. The political advantage can be seen in how it lavished 
investment guarantees during the visits to China of both President Kibaki and Prime 
Minister Odinga, who sought development assistance, investments, and diplomatic 
support. As outlined in Chapter 3, Chinese FDI, standing at 7.2% of all FDI in Kenya is 
relatively small compared to that of the United States and the European Union countries 
(Onjala, 2008b, p. 12). 
Through policies designed to encourage investments into the country, the Kenyan 
government has sought to leverage its close relationship with China to bring in more 
Chinese investments. Accordingly, Chinese firms have sprouted up throughout the 
country. Traditionally, Chinese firms in Kenya were more engaged in the service industry 
with less focus on the manufacturing sector (Onjala, 2008b, p. 21). However, recently, 
Chinese companies have increasingly focused on establishing a manufacturing base in the 
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country. Initially, the Chinese firms quickly moved into Kenya's textile sector starting in 
the year 2000 taking advantage of the AGOA law, an American government initiative 
that removed tariffs on several goods for several African countries, creating many jobs in 
Kenya's EPZs (Kaplinsky, McCormick, & Morris, 2007, p. 29). Many claimed that 
AGOA helped integrate Kenya's textile industry into the global value chain - for 
example in 2004 employment in the textile industry amounted to 20 percent of all 
manufacturing employment (Kaplinsky, McCormick, & Morris, 2008, p. 7). However, in 
2005, the Multi Fibre Arrangement led to the weakening of AGOA by removing some of 
the preferences granted to African textiles. Thus, the textile industry was viewed as an 
anomaly because Chinese companies were incentivised in order to gain entry into the US 
market and not necessarily to transfer operations into Kenya. 
This bring us to the current situation, Chinese companies are announcing with 
more frequency their desire to open manufacturing outposts in Kenya as part of their 
global expansion. As previously examined, Chinese firms are moving beyond textile and 
into automobile assembly, telecommunications and service industries. A trend is starting 
to emerge of private enterprises such as Huawei investing in Kenya on the larger scale 
and tourism operators on the smaller end (Onjala, 2008b, p. 43). Chinese investments in 
the country have been wholly Chinese owned with very little participation of Kenyan 
partners or the utilization of local capital, as demonstrated in Table 3.6 in the previous 
Chapter. Chinese firms are vertically integrated, meaning that most of their materials are 
sourced from China. This deprives local producers from directly participating in Chinese 
investments. Indeed, unlike Western originated FDI, at the heart of China's increasing 
FDI figures has been the Chinese government through companies it owns which 
constricts the SOE from employing more locals (Raine, 2009, p. 105). It is important to 
note, both SOE and private Chinese companies that invest more than $30 million require 
approval from the National Development and Reform Commission, meaning that 
although companies are encouraged to 'go global', the Chinese government has effective 
say on where and which sectors to invest in (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 91). 
In Kenya the evidence suggests that the Chinese SOEs are still the largest source 
of investments. This is evidenced in ZTE, China Road, and Beiqi Foton, all SOEs. 
Moreover, this reinforces the point that these companies have been picked by the Chinese 
government to expand its global reach. China's FDI component, on its current trajectory, 
does have worrying implications for Kenya. First, the strategy is heavily skewed in 
favour of the Chinese economy. Second, the Kenyan government is becoming beholden 
to the Chinese government. Finally, the FDI segment of the approach has confirmed 
China's courtship of Kenya as the regional hub of the EAC, especially through its 
emphasis on opening Chinese branch plants in the country. Of note, prior to the recent 
discovery of oil in Kenya, Chinese aid has been directed towards it because of its 
strategic importance in the East African region, due to a lack of natural resources. Kenya 
is considered to be the regional power, it is often the home of numerous multinational 
companies through Kenya's colonial and capitalist legacies. Kenya's geographic location 
and its economic importance to the neighbouring countries has been the primary reason 
framing China's interest in the country. 
4.6: Development assistance 
Correspondingly, the main areas of focus for Chinese assistance to Kenya, in addition to 
the general infrastructure projects examined above, include the build up of human 
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capacities within the country through the construction of schools, hospitals and education 
exchange programs. There are a variety of motives as to why China offers development 
assistance, including altruism, mutual benefit, and strategic interests. Aid from China can 
be granted in either monetary or non-monetary terms, as outright grants, export credits, 
concessional loans or aid to Chinese companies to open branch plants in the target 
country (Onjala, 2008b, p. 35) 
Indeed, within discussions of China's development assistance to Kenya, a 
common theme emerged from the research conducted with Kenyan officials - that 
China's aid is very much welcome in Kenya. One senior government official at the 
Planning Ministry asserted that the Chinese government "helps Kenyans in human 
development terms and not in economic terms." This was particularly noted in the 
various scholarships to students, business professionals and government officials to study 
in China. But also the educational aid is being relocated to Kenya through Confucius 
Institutes45, the first in Africa, as well as technical experts sent to Kenya, especially in the 
agriculture sector. These commitments have increased since the 2006 FOCAC summit in 
Beijing. Even with China's increased commitment to aid Kenya, many in Kenya were 
quick to point out that the government's reliance on development assistance has 
dramatically declined over the last two decades. Specifically, Kenya's dependence on aid 
has dropped from as high as 16.8% of gross national income in the 1990s now amounting 
to only 4-5% of government expenditures, one of the lowest percentages in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Gathigah, 2012, online; World Bank, 2012c). 
45 These are institutes created by the Chinese government designed to promote Chinese culture and to 
also teach the Chinese language. 
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Interestingly, many key informants, when asked if Kenya is taking on too much 
debt from China exposing the country to potentially negative implications in its future 
ability to repay the debt, did not believe this to be factor by which to rethink the 
relationship. Many pointed out that Kenya's debt has been dropping steadily. In fact, the 
IMF and World Bank corroborated this by concluding that "All external public debt 
indictors remain below relevant country-specific debt burden thresholds" (Kenya, 2010b, 
p. 23). Another idea that kept arising in the interviews was the notion that China 
represented a new form of 'South-South' cooperation, which was geared towards the 
needs of Kenya rather than extending the entrenched global dynamic. 
Indeed, the idea of South-South cooperation has been promoted by both the 
Kenyan and Chinese governments as an integral part of the relationship. It should be 
noted that China still considers itself as both a developing country and a member of the 
Global South. These ideals, that can be traced back to the 1950s creation of the Non-
Aligned Movement, have again gained credence with China's economic and political 
rise, including resisting Western hegemony and even neo-colonialism. Recently, the 
Chinese government resuscitated the original ideals behind South-South cooperation by 
asserting in an official Foreign Aid Policy Document that its "foreign aid falls into the 
category of South-South cooperation and is mutual help between developing countries" 
going on to conclude that "China will continue to promote South-South cooperation" 
(China 2011). The Chinese ambassador added, "bilateral cooperation between China and 
Kenya has become a model for South-South cooperation" (Guangyuan, 2011). The 
Kenyan government has seconded the idea that its relationship with China is part of 
South-South cooperation. For instance, Kenya's long-term national trade policy states the 
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"policy will seek to maximize on the emerging trends such as [the] rise in south-south 
trade" (Kenya 2010, p. 11). The research presented shows that South-South cooperation 
is often cited as a way both countries should embrace each other, the implication being 
that this is one way that both countries can resist Western hegemony. 
Apart from the labels often applied to Chinese development assistance, it has been 
very hard to gauge in Kenya, trying to uncover the development assistance portion of 
China's approach is virtually impossible. Although, the precise aid figures required 
extensive research and the figures presented in this thesis all point to China being a large 
bilateral donor to Kenya figures remain opaque. It should be noted, in addition to the 
unique modalities such as FDI and trade, which are harder to quantify in developmental 
terms, China also does not publicly report using standardized methods like those 
employed by DAC countries, and finally, China closely guards the exact aid amounts 
granted. Indeed, Brautigam (2009) aptly phrased the idea of clearly quantifying China's 
aid to being like trying to uncover 'state secrets' (p. 165). This researcher's experience in 
Kenya would certainly confirm that claim; even officials within the various departments 
of government could not confirm the exact aid figures delivered. The bilateral agreements 
between the two countries are sealed and will only be made public after thirty years. 
Government officials directed me to newspaper accounts of the development aid 
delivered, but cautioned to be wary of the numbers as they are often inflated.46 One 
reason for this opacity is that China is often eager to announce aid because "China's 
diplomatic style of signing many agreements during foreign visits by its top leaders earns 
it considerable initial goodwill and positive media coverage. However, often the 
46 This is because the amount to be given can sometimes be spread over several years not a lump-sum 
payment. 
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agreements are merely letters of intent" (Kurlantzick, 2007, pp. 98-99). Moreover, how 
China classifies its aid is itself in contention. The aid granting process is also very tightly 
controlled within the Chinese government itself, leading to misrepresentation47. One 
Kenyan interviewee noted that Chinese aid is intended to fulfill China's political 
objectives. These objectives include first, gaining Kenya's crucial support in international 
forums such as the UN and second, mobilizing Kenya, as the leading economic force 
behind the EAC, to help sway the direction of the other members. 
4.7: Conclusion 
The Kenyan government has enthusiastically turned towards China to access 
development assistance. As noted earlier, the availability of Chinese development aid has 
spurred the traditional Western donors to re-examine the relationship with Kenya. This 
could, in turn, give the Kenyan government the ability to negotiate better 
'conditionalities' from both the Chinese and Western donors. The Chinese approach 
which promotes trade, encourages direct investments, along with development assistance 
to help improve Kenya's development outcomes. After analyzing the data, all indications 
point to China as being the true beneficiary of the development approach and the 
assistance that it provides to Kenya (even having acknowledged some of the benefits 
gained by Kenya). The first aspect of China's development approach is trade. However, 
Kenya has a massive and growing deficit with China. Moreover, the terms of trade have 
been skewed towards China. The second pillar of China's approach encourages direct 
investments. Indeed, Kenya has witnessed a substantial increase in the overall investment 
47 The various mistakes in reporting China's aid and their subsequent reporting in various newspapers and 
World Bank reports were listed by Brautigam (2009, pp. 162-165) 
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inflows from China in the last decade, nevertheless this too has been in sectors such as 
light manufacturing or assembly that still heavily rely on Chinese made components, 
binding Kenya's economy to China's. The final aspect of China's approach to 
development to Kenya has been in the form of assistance, which is small compared to the 
other focus areas. Moreover, China's development assistance will, in the long run, 
hamper Kenya's development path, especially when the aid granted by China is clearly 
based on an unequal trading relationship. Although, China has been promoting various 
ways that Kenya can benefit from this increased trade, in most instances Kenya seems to 
be losing based on the empirical evidence presented in this and the previous chapter. All 
in all, China has proven to be an important partner for Kenyan development, but at 
present there are still many negative factors that outweigh the benefits of the relationship. 
The next Chapter will offer some recommendations that could help ensure that Kenya 
maximizes the advantages offered by China's approach and does indeed benefit from it. 
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Chapter 5: : Conclusions and recommendations 
The three-fold objectives of this thesis were: firstly, to provide an overview of China's 
involvement in Kenya vis-a-vis bi-lateral cooperation; secondly, to critically assess bi­
lateral cooperation between these two countries; and thirdly, to critically appraise the 
substantial criticisms levelled at Chinese international cooperation in Africa, and more 
specifically, in Kenya. This study explored an area that often lacks rigorous academic 
research, relying on anecdotal evidence, and has mostly been discussed through 
generalized debates. This research focused on one African country, Kenya, rather than 
the entire African continent. By placing an intense focus on one country, this thesis offers 
a parallel condition for other African countries that are not endowed with natural 
resources. Indeed, studies on the China-Africa relationship have tended to focus on 
resource-rich African countries and the findings are then extrapolated to all other 
countries on the continent. Kenya offers many lessons that could be applied to other 
developing countries that have embraced China's approach. Interestingly, Kenya 
provides a unique vantage point because it is a country that has been friendly to the West 
along with a strong capitalist tradition since it gained independence from Great Britain in 
1963. Yet at the same time, Kenya has had a historically close relationship with China, 
which began immediately after it gained independence with the relationship remaining 
cordial even at the height of the Cold War (Copper, 1975; Snow, 1988). The Kenya-
China bilateral relationship is often a microcosm of the larger global debates, particularly 
on the role of international cooperation and development assistance, the role of trade in 
development, even the role of imperialism and neocolonialism. More recently, the 
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spotlight has been on China's growing leadership in global affairs, bringing to the fore 
many of the issues examined here, with Kenya on the frontlines of the debates taking 
place. This thesis posed the central question: what are the implications of embracing 
China's approach - comprising of trade, FDI, and aid? But a corollary question included: 
what impact will Kenya's embrace of China's approach have to its development policy? 
Kenya has strived to improve its mediocre development indictors such as the 
dismal fact that 46% of the population lives below the poverty line in 2010 (World Bank, 
2010c, p. 66). As a result, Kenya, as a developmental state, has reached out to 
development financial institutions and partners to assist it as it embarks on a path to 
become a middle-income country by the year 2030. The policy document, titled Vision 
2030, has set out benchmarks to be attained across a variety of social categories such as 
education, health, and poverty reduction. Moreover, the Vision establishes various 
economic criteria to help Kenya to provide stable employment, to create a stronger 
financial service sector, and to industrialize (Kenya, 2007). As a result, the Kenyan 
government has sought development assistance that would help it achieve those stated 
goals and priorities. One country that has responded to the Kenyan government's call for 
assistance has been China (Kenya, 2012c). Consequently, the Chinese government has 
granted billions of dollars in official development assistance (ODA) to the Kenyan 
government and more importantly the Kenyan government has welcomed China's aid 
with open arms. The Kenyan government has received billions in the form of loans from 
the Chinese state in order to construct roads, and establish the country's technology 
infrastructure. Besides the commercial-oriented assistance, the Chinese government has 
provided grants to help build schools and hospitals. By revisiting the literature 
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surrounding the overall development project, it is clear that China's aid closely resembles 
theories and policies that are strikingly similar to those of the early development era. 
These include the ideas that investing in infrastructure, along with the belief that 
furnishing recipient states with the necessary capital, leads to development. The Chinese 
government has given more prominence to trade as a development mechanism, along 
with its direct investments, meaning that it does not hide behind notions of altruism. 
Consequently, this thesis studied how all the overlapping methods were affecting Kenya, 
and this Chapter summarises the main findings of this study. 
5.1: Key finding - positive impacts 
Admittedly, these positive findings confirm that, in fact, China's approach is not a zero-
sum game. One positive finding that this study has shown is that in some in specific areas 
China does indeed respond to Kenya's development needs more quickly than the 
traditional Western donors. For instance, the Kenyan government has identified 
upgrading its infrastructure as an area that needs significant investments to improve its 
development situation and China has responded to Kenya's call for assistance directed 
towards infrastructure more than any other donor country. Kenya has lauded Chinese 
funded infrastructure projects and all evidence points to this being a tangible benefit for 
Kenyans. The Chinese funded projects have been, on average, cheaper than projects 
awarded to Kenya from other foreign donors as well as those developed by non-Chinese 
foreign contractors. The infrastructure projects, as an area of focus, were chosen by the 
Kenyan government because they had fallen into a state of disrepair. An important 
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benefit is that Chinese-funded projects are guaranteed by the Chinese government, thus 
the likelihood of a company defaulting (or not completing the project) is reduced. 
A second positive finding is the Chinese government's adamant support for the 
Kenyan government in international forums, particularly when it came to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). This support was unmatched, in fact the other 
Security Council members were opposed to granting the Kenyan government any leeway 
in its dealing with the ICC proceeding. The Chinese government even tried to bring up a 
motion that would have effectively ended the ICC engagement, and has defended the 
Kenyan government assertion that the ICC process should be stopped, and instead the 
Kenyan government should be allowed to implement its own domestic process. China's 
resolute support for Kenya when it came to the ICC process has brought the two 
countries even closer in the international cooperation arena. This has shown that China 
does indeed practice what it preaches when it comes to national sovereignty and its policy 
of non-interference. 
A third and final positive finding of the Kenya-China relationship, is China's 
increased focus in order to help Kenya improve its trade with China and lower its 
staggering trade deficit with China. China has directed aid in areas such as Kenya's 
informal sector, commonly referred to as Jua Kali, tourism, information and 
communication technology sector, and its energy sector. These are all areas that the 
Kenyan government has identified as important to improving its overall economic 
comparative advantage. These areas have seen the country gain assistance from China. 
The informal sector has witnessed increased assistance that would be given to small and 
medium Kenyan enterprises. More specifically, the Chinese government through its 
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policy banks have teamed up with a Kenyan bank to help it provide more loans to groups 
that would traditionally not have access to credit through banks. Furthermore, the tourism 
sector has seen dramatic increases since China officially granted Kenya Approved 
Destination Status as Chinese tourists have contributed to foreign exchange earnings. 
Finally, the Kenyan government has been granted funds to improve its energy sectors; the 
Chinese have provided loans and grants to build geo-thermal plants, power transmission 
lines, as well as coal-powered power plants. 
5.2: Key findings: challenges and negative impacts 
Having explored the positive effects resulting from China's approach, this thesis posits, 
however, that all things considered China's approach has a plethora of short-comings 
which outweigh the benefits for Kenya's development outcomes. What this study found 
was that China's approach is not intrinsically all that different from Western aid, despite 
all the rhetoric and sometimes vitriol surrounding it. In fact, by revisiting the literature 
surrounding the overall development project, it is clear that China's aid closely resembles 
theories and policies that are strikingly similar to those the early development era. These 
include the ideas that investing in infrastructure, along with the belief that furnishing 
recipient states with the necessary capital leads to development. This thesis has shown 
that China is generally behaving in similar ways to Western donors, in contrast to some 
of the overblown positive rhetoric that often accompanies Chinese development 
assistance. China grants more development assistance to Kenya than any other bilateral 
donor (in terms of total amounts of both grants and loans), and it is close behind in funds 
committed by the multilateral IFIs. For example, the World Bank in the 2011/2012 
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provided grants and loans that totalled $640 million and the next largest multilateral 
donor was the African Development Bank which funded $330 million in projects 
compared to $240 million from China (Kenya, 201 Id, p. xi). Indeed, direct grants not 
only consist of a small portion of the overall ODA, they are often used to support a 
portion of the loan granted. 
The Chinese direct grants in Kenya are significantly smaller even when compared 
to other donors. Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3 illustrated the top ten providers of grants to 
Kenya, showing that China's aid is still very small compared to Kenya's traditional 
donors. Moreover this research uncovered that grants from China are frequently ad hoc in 
nature. They are usually announced whenever dignitaries from China are visiting Kenya, 
and include the building of schools, the donation of computers, and upgrades to hospitals. 
This fosters the illusion that the Chinese government is a larger provider of non­
repayable grants to Kenya. However, when available figures are examined more closely, 
this type of direct grant is quite small. Besides, these types of gifts are often token gifts 
that get more media attention than would generally be given to similar forms of aid from 
other countries. More specifically, when the Chinese government announces computer 
gifts to the national assembly, the number of computers is never announced because the 
number of computers is actually embarrassing small. 
Indeed, when the Kenyan government proclaims the uniqueness of China's 
approach, this is countered by the above statistics. What the research determined was that 
Chinese aid is not the elixir that many in the Kenyan government hope it to be. For 
starters, the aid received from China is mostly through loans, which are not 'free', even 
with low interest rates. These loans must be repaid and Kenya's recent history provides a 
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lesson in the detrimental effects that can result from large debt levels. Specifically, Kenya 
needed almost two decades to achieve similar economic levels as witnessed in the 1960s 
while overcoming debts in the 1980s. The concessionary loans are by far the biggest 
component of Chinese aid to Kenya. This has brought fears that the country could fall 
into a similar debt-induced crash that occurred in the 1980s. This economic crash resulted 
in Kenya's lost two decades and it has just recently emerged out of. The loans added the 
conditionalities that bound Kenya to unpopular and unwelcome policies that, now, many 
acknowledge failed miserably in an effort to lift the country into development. The 
Chinese government repeatedly claims the loans that it provides are often forgiven when 
they come due, but in Kenya's case there is very little evidence that these loans are to be 
forgiven. In fact, due to Kenya's current prudent loan acquisition policies, it has a good 
track record of repaying the loans. This means that Kenya is often not considered to be a 
loan liability. But again, this could easily change and Kenya could find itself unable to 
repay the loans for assorted reasons, including a dramatic downturn in the global 
economy. Another weather-related agricultural crash, its heavy reliance on tourism which 
could also be affected for various reasons that are unrelated to the situation in Kenya such 
as another terrorism related incident, or the increased prevalence of piracy on its littoral. 
Another drawback with these loans is the fact that the Kenyan government is 
embracing these secretive loans without opting for ones available for public review 
offered by IFIs, and other donors. These loans could hobble future governments that will 
be locked into agreements that are secretive in nature, with unknown conditionalities. In 
contrast, a cursory search of the both the World Bank and AfDB websites shows projects 
being funded in Kenya by those two IFIs, the amount already dispersed, even the 
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government officials that signed the agreements. Bilateral Western donors also disclose 
the loans and grants that are provided through DAC. 
Another negative trend that was witnessed was that the fundamentals behind the 
relationship, mainly the unequal relationship, were never fully confronted by the Kenyan 
government. The basis of this unequal relationship has placed the Kenyan government in 
a precarious position and solutions — that might even strain the relationship - are required 
to solve it. China has taken advantage of Kenya's open market, principally through the 
cheap products that flood the local market. This is a very real threat, as the thesis showed 
examples of how cheap Chinese products such as batteries were harming local 
manufacturers. These advantages include the reduction of import tariffs which would 
provide the Kenyan government with sorely needed revenues. Moreover, Kenyan 
industries have lost the protection that import tariffs would provide, while acknowledging 
these trade barriers would increase prices that all consumers would pay for the products. 
Nonetheless, this trade deficit is leading to a huge transfer of capital to China. The 
Kenyan government must take drastic actions like it did for the battery industry in order 
to protect local manufacturers. Actions like this might hasten the often-hoped for transfer 
of Chinese industries into Kenya. Importantly, Kenya can utilize the already established 
international trade regimes such as the WTO to help it as it deals with the much larger 
China. 
The FDI aspect of the relationship is very much needed but it should not be to the 
detriment of the country's economic and development objectives. Kenya should not 
sacrifice environmental or working conditions in order to attract the Chinese companies, 
but should be instead instituted into future agreements with China. More specifically, the 
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Chinese government claims to be a world leader when it comes to the adoption of 
renewable energy technologies. Moreover, the allegations often linked to the poor track 
record of Chinese companies can be removed through stringent of rules and laws that are 
currently in place. The Kenyan government should not be providing an advantage to 
Chinese companies in order to attract FDI, rather the Chinese companies should be 
required to adapt to the Kenyan conditions. 
Indeed, what this research has confirmed is that the Chinese government has 
prioritized the commercial aspects of development assistance. For example, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) has taken centre stage in prioritizing which projects get 
funded. Once MOFCOM has decided on the project then it directs the policy banks such 
as Exim and CDB to release the funds pledged, these policies have played an outsized 
role in the delivery of aid from China. This has helped Chinese firms dominate in such 
areas as the ICT sector, Chinese companies which gained a foothold in Kenya through 
bilateral development praxis. This fits into the current capitalistic global economic order 
that both the Kenyan and Chinese governments are firmly entrenched in. 
This thesis has also reinforced the notion that the Kenyan government should not 
be too quick to jettison the 'Western option' as alluded to by President Kibaki. The 
Western option could provide leverage when it comes to negotiating with China. If it 
closes this door too quickly, then China would have the clear advantage in bilateral 
relations. Moreover, by being open to China's approach, this gives Kenya leverage with 
its Western donors and institutions. Kenya should be more strategic, it has more 
negotiating power than it believes it has over its development partners. In this case, the 
beggar can be indeed the chooser, when it comes to its development needs. This 
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recommendation includes instituting policies that guarantee minimum numbers of local 
workers on its infrastructure projects. It should insist on oversight on the projects rather 
than blindly accepting these 'turn-key' projects. 
5.3: Recommendations 
Based on these conclusions, it is clear that for Kenya to gain from China's approach and 
improve its developmental outcomes it should take a more assertive stance when it comes 
to dealing with China. This thesis utilized a framework of analysis which illustrated the 
impact that China was having on Kenya. Moreover, the framework provided areas in 
which are detrimentally affected by China. The following are a few general 
recommendations which, if instituted as policy the Kenyan government can gain further 
from its relationship with China: 
1. Protect the Kenyan manufacturing sector: 
Kenya's current free-market based system has created a situation where it is 
becoming ever more dependent on its agricultural sector. As was explored in the 
third Chapter, Kenya has faced stiff competition from Chinese imports. The 
government might want consider proactively instituting policies that help the local 
manufacturers better compete with Chinese and other low-cost importers. In the 
current global economic dynamic, especially through world bodies such as the WTO, 
the Kenyan government would face significant pressures to keep its market open; 
however, these protective measures would allow Kenyan industries and 
manufactures the space to grow and in the long run become more competitive with 
their foreign counterparts. 
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2. Ensure maximum benefits are accrued from infrastructure projects: 
The Kenyan government needs to negotiate with the Chinese government to ensure 
that Kenya can gain more from the investment in infrastructure. For example, China 
should 'untie' the development assistance that it provides to Kenya, so that more 
local firms can also bid on the projects. Chinese infrastructure aid is heavily tied to 
its own companies and the sourcing of materials from China. Indeed, other reasons 
as to why the Kenyan government does not currently insist on more local 
employment include the government's desire to complete the projects as quickly as 
possible and the fact the Chinese government guarantees the successful completion 
of projects built by Chinese firms. These policies are negatively affecting local firms 
by completely shutting them out of the bidding process and by also negatively 
affecting Kenyan suppliers by sourcing materials from China. At the same time, 
tying the infrastructure aid increases the cost of the projects which causes Kenyans to 
pay more for the project. Thus, the Kenyan government needs to insist on local 
participation in Chinese funded infrastructure projects. 
3. Kenya should utilize the East African Community 
The Kenyan government needs to work closely with the EAC in order to use EAC's 
size to pressure China to make economic concessions. The EAC, as a five-country 
common market, working towards a political federation, can play an important role 
in ensuring that China does indeed compromise on economic matters. Kenya, as the 
largest economy in the community and the main transit country for the other 
landlocked countries, has an outsized economic status over the EAC countries and 
should ensure economic agreements with China are viewed in the context of the 
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wider EAC. The EAC's growing population of 140 million makes it certain that 
China (and for that matter Western countries) does not ignore its economic potential. 
4. Protect its natural resources 
Kenya should not sign away its natural resources to China. China has actively sought 
out natural resources throughout the world, and Kenya is no different. Chinese firms 
have moved into the country's coal, oil, and titanium sectors. While in some cases 
Chinese firms have bought into existing Western-owned projects in the commodities 
sector, Chinese companies have also been granted rights to exploit certain natural 
resources in exchange for development assistance. The Kenyan government should 
learn from history (and other African countries) that by signing away rights to their 
natural resources, in the long run, does not gain the full benefits from those natural 
resources. The Kenyan government needs to put in place policies that would ensure 
that Kenya ultimately benefit from the resources. 
5. Open the bilateral agreements to public scrutiny: 
Ultimately, the Kenyan government should institute policies that ensure any 
agreement signed with the Chinese government is available to the general public. 
Currently, the agreements are secretive in nature, with the contents of the agreement 
privy only to a few senior government officials, and as such the full consequences of 
the assistance granted are not fully known, even after 30 years. In contrast, as 
mentioned above, multilateral and Western donors make available the documentation 
surrounding development assistance provided. The government should put in place 
more open procedures that would ensure that the content/stipulations of any 
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agreements with China can be publicly examined. The Kenyan public are then more 
empowered to decide if China's approach is truly beneficial to Kenya's development. 
5.4: Limitations and future research 
Due to the limited scope and time allotted to this Master's thesis, the number of research 
participants along with the inadequate access to documents acquired from the Kenyan 
government meant that some crucial information might have been missed. This thesis did 
not include interviews with elected Kenyan representatives who could have added unique 
perspectives in understanding how China reaches out to public officials. Finally, 
including some of the Chinese officials who are responsible for creating Chinese foreign 
policy would have been particularly useful to find the true motivations behind these 
policies. 
This research has laid the groundwork for future research by employing a 
framework to systematically assess the impact China's approach is having on the three 
vectors of trade, FDI, and aid in Kenya. Admittedly an adaptation from a previous 
framework, these three vectors have established a basis from which more Kenyan 
specific research could be undertaken. The thesis has also provided what could be further 
analyzed in such diverse topics as international relations, regional integration and the role 
of trade as development mechanisms. Finally, comparative studies and other frameworks 
will need to be developed to further assess China's approach not only in Africa but also 
around the world. 
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Annex 2 — The protocol: Kenya National Archives, File AE/446, Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Nairobi. 
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nillisr: in 1979; the proetsat Chinaso c.-w'.it-.-snt of 
IIC 12.5 -million is £S3?» of total ccsstss. Ir j-_.--ts easts 
ar<3 now b«iag ajtlaataS tc am.rant to K£ 20 niUian 
mainly- -iu-j tc price escalation, Ttx« Chir.«su should, 
therofaro, agrao to fin-vnea 05& oT the «iw costs 
r;->w. 
Sctcrnlnation -ai* Local and tVr;i en C:sta 
i<. Minietry of V>rks wouli work-out a proli.- iK.ary iewn 
of ljcal as*3 fsrei^n c^sts cf tho pr-jjcct b-;fcr- tho 
A:".vi:::o Party leaves for Pelting, 
5. Aivwci Party 3iioula also rjquiro of th.%; Chinas a si Ac t.? 
Jd tlis ana insist that cc-.ivint is net trvr.to." :is 
r.roi~r> costs ixccpt to tlio that JtL-ny^ or.iwjfc 
pr"vj.fio it locally. 
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Annex 4 - Interview guide 
These are a sample of the questions directed at Kenyan government officials and 
members of the civil society during the interview phase of the research. These questions 
were slightly modified to suit a specific department's mandate. 
Questions: 
1. Please tell me, what is the impact that China has been having on Kenya's 
government policies? 
a. What policies has the Kenyan government put in place to address China's 
role in the Kenya economy? 
b. How has this changed the policy making process being implemented by 
government agencies? 
c. How is China influencing Kenya's development plans, this includes the 
Vision 2030 that Kenya has set out to achieve? 
d. What role can China play to help Kenya achieve the Vision 2030? 
2. What direct impacts do you see that China is having on Kenya? 
a. What are some methods/approaches that China uses in it development 
assistance to Kenya? 
b. Is this approach tangibly different from the Western approach (i.e. United 
Kingdom, United States, and other members of the Development 
Assistance Council)? 
c. What are some of the short term positive or negative effects of China's 
increased aid, trade, and Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya? 
d. What are some of the long term positive or negative effects of China's 
increased aid, trade, and Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya? 
e. What development projects does China target with its development 
assistance? 
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3. What are some of the indirect impacts that China is having on Kenya? 
4. What risks are associated with Kenya's shift towards China? 
a. Overall, do you view China's increased role to be beneficial or detrimental 
for Kenya? 
b. What should Kenya do to minimize the detrimental effects and maximize 
the beneficial effects of China's development assistance? 
5. How is China impacting Kenya economically? 
a. In what areas have China's direct investments been directed? 
b. How is Kenya benefitting from these direct investments? 
c. What are the areas of concerns are often discussed with regards to the 
trading relationship between the two countries? 
6. Do you come in contact, either through your position or as a member of Kenyan 
society, with China's development assistance to Kenya? 
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